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31. March 2010 by admin.
This is outrageous…!!! This is blatant and demeaning portrayal of Hindu Gods and Goddesses. Nina Paley has graphically projected Lord Rama kicking Sita.
What is the difference between Nina Paley and an Islamist?
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Lord Ram walking on pregnant Sita
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Lord Ram sitting on Sita’s back
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Lord Ram kicks pregnant Sita
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Lord Hanuman plays the piano for Sita
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IntroductionNina Paley an American Cartoonist is the creator of the animated film ‘Sita Sings the Blues’ which is available for free viewing on the internet. A devout person cannot begin to imagine what Nina Paley has conjured up and graphically crystallised in this film wherein Lord Ram often kicks Sita…. and walks on her pregnant stomach…. These are only two of the many painful images one must endure. The only reason for watching this absurd film is to make people aware of what a completely false representation this film is of the Ramayan and how it nosedives into taking the issue of denigration to an unbelievably low level. She states that this story is based on the Ramayan of Rushi Valmiki. But what she has done is take the ingredients of the epic story and give it a meaning which is completely opposite to the spiritual truths that the scripture conveys.Unfortunately , this film is being recommended on various parenting websites, for children to watch. Those who are unfamiliar with this Holy Scripture are going to accept this inane version as being the truth. |
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1. False representation:The commentators say that the Ramayana is not as true a story as the Bible.Spiritual fact:This seems to be an attempt to portray the Bible as being more trustworthy than the Ramayana. Yes, propaganda to prove Christianity’s superiority over Hinduism. This movie is part and parcel of the anti-Hindu movement and propagation of Christianity. This movie violates the religious feelings of Hindus. The Government must ban this film. |
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2. False representation: Ravan was a good king and the only wrong thing that he did was steal Sita. (Editors comment: Like attracts like and so quite naturally anti-Hindu Neena Paley supports Ravana.)Spiritual fact:Such remarks show Ms. Palay’s anti-Hindu mentality by demeaning the Holy Scriptures of Hindus. For this she must apologise to all Hindus. |
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3. False representation: Ravan’s sister tells Ravan about how beautiful Sita is and says that her breasts are like big round juicy lotuses. Sita is shown wearing a cholie that reveals her breasts in one outfit from above, and in another outfit from below the blouse.Spiritual fact:Such remarks shows her anti-Hindu mentality of criticizing Hindus Holy Scriptures. For this she must apologise to all Hindus. |
4. False representation: The commentator says that Ravana played the veena for Lord Shiva with his intestines and she shows Ravana’s intestines tumble out of his stomach and they play the veena. (Editors comment: Such spiritual ignorance on the part of Neena Paley makes her seem comical. This harms the religious feelings of Hindus. She should be prosecuted for this.)Spiritual fact:Actually what is mentioned in the Ramayan is that Ravana’s devotion was such that the 72 thousand nadis or energy channels in his body created a sound (Anahat nada) and this pleased Lord Shiva. |
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5. False representation: Sita sings with her love for Ram in the forest. The words of her song were… ‘He is not an ang or a Saint and I know that with all his faults, he will still get by’. Then she imagines carrying Ram piggy back. After that she stands on all her fours (like a horse or a dog) and Ram is shown sitting on her back. (Editors comment: This is outright insulting to the faith of Hindus and destroys the reverence for the Ramanyan in children’s minds.) |
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6. False representation: When Ravana speaks to Sita she speaks in an uncouth manner telling him, “Your ass is grass once Lord Ram comes here.” (Editors comment: Why has this cartoonist been allowed to spew out the filth in her mind and superimpose her nasty foul-mouthed words onto revered Divine beings ?) |
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7. False representation: Sita is shown wearing a ridiculous amount of jewellery as the commentator says she dropped her jewellery to show the way to Lanka when she was abducted by Ravana. The commentator ridicules the Ramayan by questioning how Sita had so much jewellery when she had taken up the life of a sanyasi.Spiritual fact:Sita was only in exile. She was not a sanyasi. She dropped jewellery like her ring, anklets and earrings at strategic points on the path. |
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8. False representation: One commentator viciously says that one needs to ‘give her one little tight thing’ for not returning with Lord Hanuman when he came to rescue her. Another says that Sita stayed back as she wanted Lord Ram to rescue her and defeat Ravan due to the ego of wanting ‘Her husband’ to be her rescuer and so she is called a ‘bloodthirsty’ woman and is depicted with blood coming out of her mouth and blood on her hands.Spiritual fact:Sita could not allow herself to be carried by Lord Hanuman as it is a Hindu woman’s Dharma not to be touched by any man other than her husband. |
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9. False representation: When Hanuman reports to Ram about what he saw in Lanka, Lord Ram begins to sweat and then faints in fear.
Spiritual fact:Lord Ram’s arrow never missed its target no matter where the target was. How could such a Divine warrior who was an incarnation on earth be afraid of a mere demon ?. |
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10. False representation: When Lord Ram comes to rescue Sita, he says that she is impure and unfit to be his wife and that he had terrible suspicions about her character and conduct to the extent that the sight of her was painful to him. He dismisses her ends with the crushing statement, ‘I have no more use for you.’Spiritual fact:Lord Ram says the opposite in the Ramayan. In addition, the Ramayan states that Lord Ram surrendered to Agni devata and she sent an illusionary form of Sita to Lanka so that the real Sita was kept safe and after the ‘Test by Fire’ that Sita underwent successfully, Agni devta returned the real form of Sita to Lord Ram. |
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11. False representation:Sita sings a song saying ‘Ram is mean to me’ and Lord Ram is depicted kicking Sita into the fire at the time of her agnipariksha (Test by fire) and He kicks her at the time of banishing her from the kingdom. Lord Ram nonchalantly also walks over Sita’s pregnant stomach (Editors comment: The way to extinguish a religion is to first create utter disrespect for it in the minds of people about their faith. Then ridicule the followers so that they are downright ashamed of being Hindu. Then the lost directionless Hindu populace will be soft targets to defeat on any front.) |
Are you going to blindly allow this unrighteous strategy to work ? Or are you willing to stand up for Dharma and realise that in this increasingly unrighteous world, ‘Only Dharma protects the Dharmic’. Ultimately Dharma will be established in the world and evildoers will be destroyed. But each Hindu is now being called upon to play his/her part and do something to stop this outright denigration.
Become a ‘vanar’ of Lord Hanumans army ! Make your small offering towards Dharma by lodging your protest with the US Embasy.
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31. March 2010 by admin.
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, March 24-30, 2010
Sights on Kandahar
Indications emerged March 29 that the long-anticipated U.S./NATO offensive in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar would begin in June and last at least two months. While the action will not commence until more surge troops arrive in the country, preparations are already under way, including securing key routes, moving foreign and Afghan security forces into the area and talking with local elders. Kandahar has had a constant foreign military presence since the 2001 invasion, but it also has a population of nearly half a million people and sits at the ideological heartland of the Taliban, which have maintained their own presence, especially in areas surrounding the city.
The offensive to establish firm control over Kandahar will be different than the recent offensive in the farming community of Marjah. Kandahar is a bigger, denser city, and the operation there will be less of an intense urban assault and more of a slow and gradual expansion of security throughout the city, with Afghan forces taking more of a leading role. But the Kandahar operation is being telegraphed every bit as publicly as the February assault in neighboring Helmand province. The value of this is that it allows time to consult with local leaders and get their buy-in. The theory is that this will involve them in the process early on and strengthen subsequent efforts to force out Taliban shadow governments and establish civil authority, all while reducing civilian casualties.
This effort is still a work in progress in Marjah, where last week the Taliban were continuing to emplace improvised explosive devices and employ intimidation and subversion tactics. Locals have complained that during the day, U.S. and Afghan forces are the reality, while at night the reality is the Taliban. Residents say they feel trapped between the two forces, unable to side with either for fear of provoking the other’s wrath. There are certainly reports that the seizure of Marjah has indeed put a squeeze on local Taliban commanders in terms of resources and manpower, but the speed and extent to which a more fundamental shift in local politics and perception will occur — which is central to the U.S. strategy — remains to be seen. How long this transition will take in Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city and one the Soviets never fully controlled, is anybody’s guess.
At the same time, the United States is attempting to force the Taliban to the negotiating table, but this will take time. On March 24, in testimony before a U.S. House of Representatives committee, Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted it was too soon for talks with the Taliban. A central part of U.S. strategy is to win the hearts and minds of the people, deprive the Taliban of popular support and thereby bring them to the negotiating table. The first step in that process is communicating with the people, hence telegraphing the assault on Marjah and the forthcoming offensive in Kandahar. Presumably, this tactic will be employed in subsequent operations in the main area of U.S. focus, the 80 key districts along the Ring Road
that represent about a third of the country and two-thirds of its population.
With its population-centric approach, the United States obviously wants to avoid destructive urban battles like the twin 2004 battles of Fallujah in Iraq. But by announcing its planned Afghan offensives, the United States sacrifices the ability to trap key Taliban leaders and hard-line fighters. Some do stay and fight, but tipping the Taliban off gives them a great deal of freedom of action in terms of choosing how, when and where they will continue the battle. And the Taliban continue to demonstrate their skill in classic guerilla warfare, resisting and wearing down their opponent without allowing themselves to be engaged decisively — and while waiting out the inevitable withdrawal.
More details have emerged about the seizure of the Shah Karez area outside the district capital of Musa Qala. Taliban fighters wearing the uniforms of foreign and Afghan national security forces overran a police checkpoint and beheaded five policemen. But it remains unclear whether this act of intimidation itself prompted the withdrawal of Afghan police from the town (which reportedly lies outside the security bubble provided by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the district capital). It is also unclear whether the police offered stiffer resistance before falling back (reports of Taliban casualties vary, from the Taliban’s claim to have lost only two fighters to government reports of more than 40 Taliban casualties).
It is clear that the ISAF cannot move forces to counter every flare-up without engaging in a futile game of “whack-a-mole,” which would disperse its limited forces too widely and undermine attempts to mass forces and provide sustained security in key areas such as Marjah and Kandahar. More Taliban attacks on peripheral areas such as Shah Karez will likely occur, and how the ISAF manages this Taliban tactic will be of central importance to its wider efforts in Afghanistan.
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30. March 2010 by admin.
March 29 2010
A helicopter lands outside the Lubyanka station after the bombing of two Moscow metro stations on March 29
Twoexplosions in Moscow’s metro network on March 29 killed approximately 35 people (reports of the number of dead vary) and injured more than 100 others. While nobody has yet claimed responsibility for the attack, tactical details emerging from the investigation indicate that militants from the northern Caucasus were responsible.
Two blasts in Moscow’s metro network on March 29 killed approximately 35 people (reports vary; the number of dead could be as high as 46) and injured more than 100 others. The explosions, reportedly carried out by two female suicide bombers, were timed to hit the heart of the city’s public transportation network at its peak morning rush hour.
The first explosion occurred at 7:56 a.m. at Lubyanka station as the train pulled up to the platform and passengers entered and exited the train. The blast, which originated from the second car, killed approximately 23 people in the car and on the platform. Forty-three minutes later at Park Kultury, a second, very similar attack occurred. As the train pulled up to the platform and opened its doors, an explosion occurred on a rear train car, killing approximately 12 people. Both train stations are near prominent Moscow landmarks, such as the Federal Security Services offices, the Kremlin and Gorky Park.
No one has claimed responsibility for the attacks yet, but the tactical details emerging point to the involvement of militants from the northern Caucasus.
First, Russian investigators have said evidence from the scene suggests the two suicide bombers were female (authorities claim to have discovered their heads). The use of female suicide operatives is significant, as Chechen militants commonly use women — who generally attract less suspicion than men — as suicide bombers. Female Chechen suicide bombers referred to as “black widows” were used in many plots against civilian targets in Russia, including subways and rock concerts, and in attacks on board two crashed airliners in 2004. Female suicide bombers’ involvement in the March 29 explosions supports the idea that militants from the northern Caucasus carried out the attacks.
Furthermore, Russian media have reported that the devices contained nuts and bolts, which acted as deadly projectiles in the blasts. Packing shrapnel around explosives to maximize the casualty count in a bombing is a tactic used by many militants around the world, including Chechen operatives. Also, authorities have confirmed that the explosive material used in the attacks was TNT, which is frequently used by a number of militant groups, including those from the northern Caucasus. Suspected militants from the northern Caucasus have used TNT in several high-profile attacks, most recently in the November 2009 Nevsky express train bombing (involving a device containing approximately 30 pounds of TNT but using very different tactics) that killed 39 people and the attempted assassination of Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov in June 2009 that involved an improvised explosive device containing 130 pounds of TNT. Although use of shrapnel and TNT is hardly unique to militants from the northern Caucasus, the devices used in the March 29 attacks had the same components used in devices in previous attacks carried out by northern Caucasus militant groups.
Reports on the sizes of the devices vary; the device used in the Lubyanka station attack is said to have been between 3 and 8 pounds, and the device in the Park Kultury attack is said to have been between 1 and 4 pounds. Both operatives reportedly wore explosive belts that would be easily concealed by winter coats. Although larger devices can be engineered, it would make sense for these operatives to use smaller devices to reduce the risk of detection. The reported sizes of the explosive devices match up with the reports of the number of deaths in both attacks. In a very similar attack in February 2004 against a train on the metro’s green line, a single suicide bomber killed 41 people by detonating a device that reportedly contained 8 pounds of TNT. That attack was later claimed by a Chechen militant group.
Russian security officials reviewing surveillance footage of the attackers said the operatives boarded their respective trains at the Yugo-Zapadnaya station (the last stop on the red line in southwestern Moscow; security is more lax in the suburbs than in central Moscow). They appeared to be accompanied by two other women and a man; however, it is unclear how these individuals might have been connected with the bombers. They could have been handlers ensuring that the operatives got to their destinations securely, or they could have been uninvolved individuals who simply boarded the trains at the same time. Details about these possible accomplices should be watched to determine the nature of their involvement.
In addition to all of these tactical details, the timing of the attack also matches with past attacks carried out by northern Caucasus militant groups, who take advantage of the spring thaw to increase attacks against Russian targets. Most of these attacks take place in the northern Caucasus regions of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, but as demonstrated in attacks over the past decade militants from these regions are capable of reaching Moscow and other regions in the Russian core. For this reason, security in Moscow (especially within the metro system, which is an established target) is usually stringent. However,
public transportation systems around the world — not just Moscow’s — are notoriously difficult to secure, meaning that no matter how tight security is, successful attacks are inevitable.
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29. March 2010 by admin.
Catholicism in Peril
Courtsey: www.theatlanticwire.com
As Germany–the pope’s own homeland–continues to be rocked by allegations of priestly abuse, many are wondering how high the scandal will go–after all, Pope Benedict XVI himself, as archbishop of Munich, approved an abuser’s therapy treatment without reporting it to authorities, though he claims not to have known about the abuse. Meanwhile, the pope’s attempt to put out a similar fire in Ireland with a letter this past weekend is stirring mixed reactions.
All this has convinced some commentators that this controversy is different from the American abuse scandal. In fact, some have begun to ask whether the Vatican–and even Catholicism itself–will pass through unscathed. If so, will it still resemble the Catholic Church of old?
Please: raping children is not a hard call for a Christian. Today or at any time in history. Covering it up is evil. If defending the perpetrators, rather than saving the victims, is not immoral, what is?So when will this Pope resign? And what happens to the church hierarchy’s moral authority if he doesn’t?
if other cases of abusers who were reassigned emerge, even fair-minded people with no axe to grind may be tempted to ask: Can Benedict XVI credibly ride herd on bishops for failing to manage the crisis, if his own record as a diocesan leader isn’t any better?Much about the church’s capacity to craft an “exit strategy” from the crisis–and, perhaps, much about Benedict’s own legacy–may hinge on his ability to offer a convincing answer.
The historical argument with Catholicism, an argument that has been going on for so many centuries, which the wily Church has defeated or circumvented or stonewalled or built mighty barricades against, is back on the table again.This time, the Church could very well lose it.
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29. March 2010 by admin.
Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and Finance Minister
Naoto Kan speak during a March 4 budget session
The Japanese legislature on March 24 approved a record 92.3 trillion yen ($1 trillion) budget for fiscal year 2010. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government hope that the budget will not only stimulate Japan’s notoriously stagnant economy but also boost the DPJ’s popularity ahead of Upper House elections in July.Japan’s parliament on March 24 approved a record 92.3 trillion yen ($1 trillion) for the 2010 fiscal year, which begins April 1. The budget is 4.2 percent larger than the budget for fiscal year 2009. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government, led by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, hopes the budget will stimulate Japan’s long-stagnated economy and show the DPJ’s ability to restore economic performance — particularly amid the global economic turmoil that began in 2008 — in hopes of bolstering its popularity ahead of Upper House elections slated for July. Among expenditures in the budget, the substantial increases came from social security and local allocation tax grants, which grew by 9.8 percent and 5.5 percent, respectively, from 2009. Of these expenses, a considerable portion is to cover Hatoyama’s ambitious agenda, outlined during his election campaign, to solve the longstanding deflationary problem of the world’s second-largest economy. Two newly enacted policies — one that gives allowances to households raising children and another that provides free tuition for public high school students — will cost 233.7 billion yen and 393.3 billion yen, respectively (0.7 percent of the total budget). Meanwhile, spending on public works projects will drop 18.3 percent to 5.8 trillion yen, the lowest level in 32 years. However, there is a sharp shortfall in tax revenue. Taxes only amount to 37.4 trillion yen — an 8.7 trillion yen, or 18.9 percent, decrease from fiscal year 2009. This decrease is primarily due to a lack of taxes from enterprises that have been losing profits and individuals experiencing lower income due to salary cuts. Because of this drop, the government has to issue a record 44.3 trillion yen in bonds (an 11 trillion yen increase from fiscal year 2009) to help finance the budget. This is the first Japanese budget in which bond issuance is greater than tax revenue. This, in turn, creates greater concerns about Japan’s fiscal health; Japan’s government debt reached 189 percent of its gross domestic product in 2009, the highest among industrialized countries.
In fact, this partially reflects a structural deficiency that would make it difficult for any policy effort to restore Japan’s economy. Since late 2009, Japan’s economy has been in a “mild deflationary phase” — something seen in the late 1990s and early 2000s when a fall in the general level of prices severely impeded the economy. The expectation of decreasing general prices discourages consumers from spending and defers business purchases. This in turn limits demand across the country, affecting the overall economic growth dynamics. The problem is particularly severe during economic recessions, when the government’s attempts to introduce stimulus packages could hardly revive consumption levels and boost prices. Japan is the only advanced economy suffering from entrenched deflation.The country’s population is aging and therefore less able to spend, and big lending by large enterprises due to the bubble collapse of the mid-1990s has reduced companies’ capabilities. Combined, these two factors make for a lack of spending incentives for Japan. Moreover, the Japanese government has relied heavily on public savings to make up for its increased expenditure, and more than 90 percent of government debt is financed domestically, making it even more difficult to manage public expectations. Add to this the fact that the government cannot spur spending by reducing interest rates, which have been at near zero for more than a decade, and deflation is expected to be a structural and endemic problem with no immediate resolution. Though the country’s export sector has rebounded since mid-2009 — which could help increase employment and fight deflation in the short run — the growth is primarily generated from stimulus spending in the outside world (such as the United States as well as China and other Asian countries) and most of these countries have gradually moved away from stimulus measures. Until the export sector becomes more stable, fighting deflation will not be easy. Given these circumstances, despite the increase of direct aid to households and the freeing of more household income, the new budget is not likely to achieve the expected goal of increasing domestic spending and reducing deflation. Moreover, the shift of expenditures from public infrastructure projects into aid might reduce investment — another important component of maintaining a country’s economic growth. Japan’s severe fiscal condition can be traced back to Tokyo’s fiscal policies and financial rescues during the “lost decade.” Massive stimulus spending and financial bailout programs resulted in huge budget deficits, and translated to surging government debt since the mid 1990s — the public debt was 189 percent of GDP in 2009 and is expected to reach 200 percent in 2010. Despite the DPJ-led government’s pledges to rein in government spending since it came to power in September 2009, the ongoing global financial turmoil has exacerbated the problem. The government responded by launching a 7.2 million yen stimulus package to help weather the financial crisis. This, in turn, further exposed the country to an extraordinary burden of budget deficits and public debts. In January, the ratings agency Standard & Poor’s (S&P) threatened to downgrade the country’s sovereign credit ratings if the government failed to curb the ever-growing public debts and budget deficits, which would make the debt more expensive and significantly reduce Tokyo’s ability to pay the debt. This would particularly affect the Japanese people, who have shouldered most of the government debt.
In fact, the coalition government has seen intense debate over whether the administration will introduce another stimulus package, with Banking Minister Shizuka Kamei — also the head of The People’s New Party (PNP) coalition — calling for 11 trillion yen in fresh stimulus spending. Though the DPJ quickly responded by denying the proposal, such policy debates appear to be one of the main issues as Upper House elections approach and the DPJ wants to be seen as effective in spurring the economy. In addition, the DPJ government is also pressuring Japan’s central bank, the Bank of Japan, to take additional measures to ease monetary policy (particularly to expand its emergency lending program and to buy more assets from troubled companies) to combat deflation and bolster its slumped support, while the Bank of Japan is worried about the ongoing debt problem that threatens the nation in the long run. Japan is in a trap; stimulus spending and monetary loosening have been used so frequently for so long that they do not help to solve the structural deflationary problem, but exacerbate the country’s extraordinary government debt. This, in turn, shapes domestic policy debates and puts the government under further political and financial pressure.
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29. March 2010 by admin.
The cause of the sinking of the South Korean Navy corvette Chon An (771) remains unclear. What has been confirmed thus far is that there was an explosion near the stern of the ship, and that some time either before or shortly after the explosion, a sister ship fired on an unidentified vessel heading north from the area. South Korean officials have not confirmed the cause of the explosion, but South Korean media are reporting several conflicting theories:
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28. March 2010 by admin.
Germany: Looking for Bismarck
NEWS FROM BRUSSELS ON THURSDAY brought dire tidings to an already embattled Athens. A Franco-German negotiated deal — apparently agreed upon by the rest of the European Union — on a financial aid package to be offered to Greece has more characteristics of a loan shark proposal than of a “bailout.” According to the draft circulated on Thursday at the two-day EU heads of government summit, Greece would indeed be offered a financial aid package of around 22 billion euro, but only after Athens was no longer able to raise funds by selling its bonds in the international markets, and even then at above-market rates, entirely obviating the point of the bailout. That is akin to offering a homeowner, who is about to default on a mortgage, a refinancing offer that equals or increases his mortgage rates above the rate he already cannot pay.
According to DPA, the German press agency, the Franco-German proposal explained that “…the objective of this mechanism will not be to provide financing at average euro area interest rates…” — which is how Greece and its fellow “Club Med States” got into the problem in the first place — “…but to set incentives to return to market financing as soon as possible by risk-adequate pricing.” In other words, Germany is telling the entire Club Med — Greece, Italy and Spain — that the days of riding the German interest rates into an orgy of profligate spending are over. The problem is that Greece would not be asking for a bailout if market rates were not already too high.
The likelihood that Greece would go along with the proposal — despite initially positive comments from Athens — at the moment of an eventual default is highly unlikely. The proposal may very well push Athens to pursue an International Monetary Fund package independent of the eurozone, which could be the intention of Berlin perhaps looking to wash its hands of the entire problem.
The current crisis is providing Germany with one of the best opportunities to make its control over the eurozone explicit, before its own demographic problems catch up with it. Germany essentially has a limited window of opportunity in the next 10 years to make or break its leadership of the European Union and therefore its claim to global relevancy. Germany’s birth rate is lower than all of the major European powers that surround it (France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden), while its population is significantly older than that of Poland. Having a low birth rate means that fewer young people will enter the labor force and provide tax revenue. High life expectancy means more old people will burden the economy through social welfare and health care costs. Considering German resistance to allowing immigration to make up the difference, it is unclear how Germany will pull itself out of the rising social welfare and health care costs that will bury Europe’s economies to a varying degree in the foreseeable future. This is not to say that controlling Europe will help Berlin solve its or the continent’s demographic problems, just that if Berlin is ever going to take command of Europe, the time is now. If Germany ever had room for maneuver — room to bulldoze through domestic dissent over, say, bailing out Greece — then it needs to act before economic and social problems overtake its — and Europe’s — agenda.
The crisis with Greece has offered Berlin the chance to use any potential financial aid package as a carrot with which to motivate the rest of the EU to accept strict rules and mechanisms by which the EU can enforce the rules of the European Monetary Union in the future. But Thursday’s agreement only calls for a meeting at the end of 2010, at which point some proposals on new enforcement and punishment mechanisms, that include turning EU summits into “the economic government of the EU,” would be discussed. The problem for Germany is that there is very little chance that the Club Med countries will agree at the end of 2010 to give up sovereignty over their fiscal policy when they have seen how Germany has handled the Greek call for aid, especially considering the harsh terms of the proposed “financial aid.”
The ultimate problem for Germany is that the moment the rest of Europe perceives that Berlin is looking out solely for its own national interests — such as when it refuses to put up money to save a eurozone member state — it ceases to be a viable European leader. This is due to deeply entrenched fears — not unfounded considering Germany’s power and history — that Germany would completely dominate the continent. Berlin therefore needs a careful balance of sticks and carrots with which to cajole and entreat countries to follow its lead, the kind of balance that was the norm during the leadership of Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck in the late 19th century. This balance often means paying a high cost on the political or monetary front to get the rest of Europe to do what it wants on the geopolitical front.
Germany is of course just coming out of 60 years where domestic politics ruled supreme and foreign policy was outsourced to the United States through NATO, and to Paris through the EU. During those 60 years, Germany did pay for all sorts of European political adventures — starting with the EU project itself. It is therefore unsurprising that Germany today is uncomfortable with the concept of paying for yet another eurozone bailout. But this is only because Germany has yet to remember fully how to be… well, German.
This is not to say that when Greece’s current crisis is over, that Germany will not be able to get what it wants on enforcement mechanisms via other means, or that Germany will not have more opportunities in the future to become the EU’s undisputed leader. But the clock is ticking, and Europe’s demographic challenges are right around the corner. At that point, all of Europe will be so embroiled in domestic political, economic and social concerns that settling issues of leadership and power will be impossible, and that is if the EU even survives the coming crisis.
When the time comes, Europe will need Germany to be Bismarck and Germany will need Europe to want a Caesar. If they fail to accommodate each other before the crisis hits, all may very well slip into global irrelevancy.
Wonder if Japan is ever going to show its true colors again as well… or has it been pacified to the point of no return?
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27. March 2010 by admin.
The South Korean corvette Chon An, which sank off the coast of Baekryeongdo Island in the Yellow Sea March 26, may have been hit and penetrated by some kind of explosive device below the water line. This suggests a naval mine or torpedo rather an anti-ship missile, coastal artillery or friendly fire. It also could have been a catastrophic internal mishap. In any case, South Korea has yet to point any fingers.
Though details — especially the sequence of events — remain unclear, multiple reports citing officials have suggested that the South Korean corvette Chon An (772), which sank off the coast of Baekryeongdo island in the Yellow Sea late on March 26, was holed below the waterline before sinking. If this ultimately proves to be the case, it is an important clue to the cause of the Chon An’s demise. In any event, based on the speed with which the ship appears to have sunk, the damage to the stern was likely severe and catastrophic.
North Korea has no shortage of options for striking South Korean naval vessels along the northern limit line. The north has long been prepared to repel any sort of amphibious landing and has focused much of its attention on these hotly contested waters (with major incidents in 1999, 2002 and 2009). Pyongyang has surveillance radars deployed along its coast that are linked with coastal defense artillery and anti-ship missile batteries. Though the exact location of the incident off the coast of Baekryeongdo Island remains unclear, the Chon An appears to have been within range of at least some of these systems. In addition, there have been reports of North Korean engineers attempting to modify the indigenously built KN-01 anti-ship missile to be air-launched (probably from the Chinese-built H-5 bomber).
But anti-ship missiles and coastal artillery rounds would be unlikely to penetrate a ship below the waterline. And suggestions that the Chon An may have been hit by friendly fire would probably not fit the scenario, either, since the Sok Cho (which was accompanying the Chon An) is fitted with 76mm naval guns that would have had to have ignited a fuel bunker or magazine to create a major hole below the surface.
With the exception of a catastrophic internal mishap — unnamed South Korean officials have suggested explosives may have gone off on board — this leaves a torpedo or a naval mine as the most likely cause of the damage. The torpedo has been the most widely discussed in media reports, although initial coverage of breaking events such as Chon An sinking are often flawed or erroneous. Nevertheless, North Korea has nearly 200 torpedo boats and numerous small submarines that could have taken advantage of the cluttered littoral environment to approach and fire upon the Chon An (whether it would have been done at the direction of Pyongyang or by a rogue naval commander is another question entirely). Though many of North Korea’s torpedoes are World War II vintage, it has acquired some more modern models and is known to manufacture its own. If a torpedo boat — or especially a submarine — surprised the Chon An, technological sophistication would not have been required.
But the North Korean navy also places considerable emphasis on mine warfare. Some reports have placed an unknown object in the water near the Chon An before the explosion, though a floating mine would hole her at, not below, the waterline. Nevertheless, though the bulk of the North Korea’s mine arsenal is fairly archaic, like its torpedo arsenal, it also has more advanced mines and is known to manufacture modified Soviet designs domestically. Though a free-floating mine released long ago could conceivably strike a South Korean naval vessel, a catastrophic hole at the stern beneath the water line could indicate a more modern and sophisticated mine that would have been emplaced and activated more recently, possibly by a submarine.
At this point in the drama, despite frantic emergency Cabinet meetings, even the South Korean government has yet to definitively point a finger at the north. “For now,” said President Lee Myung-bak’s spokeswoman, “it is not certain whether North Korea is related.” Local media have also been quoting unnamed “senior” government officials claiming that the sinking does not appear to be due to hostile action from the north. Meanwhile, rescue efforts — including some eight naval and coast guard vessels supported by helicopters — have so far rescued 58 of the ship’s complement of 104.
Ultimately, the cause of the Chon An’s sinking may never be known. These incidents do happen from time to time, and vitriolic rhetoric — and ambiguity — usually follows.
Courtsey: stratfor.com
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26. March 2010 by admin.
The modern iteration of the jihadist phenomenon that resulted in the formation of al Qaeda was spawned in the rugged mountainous area along the Afghan-Pakistani border. This was a remote region not only filled with refugees — and militants from all over the globe — but also awash in weapons, spies, fundamentalist Islamism and intrigue. The area proved ideal for the formation of modern jihadism following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, but it was soon plunged into Muslim-on-Muslim violence. After the fall of the communist regime in Kabul in 1992, Afghanistan was wracked by near-constant civil war between competing Muslim warlords until the Taliban seized power in 1996. Even then, the Taliban-led government remained at war with the Northern Alliance. In 1992, in the midst of this chaos, al Qaeda began to move many of its people to Sudan, which had taken a heavy Islamist bent following a 1989 coup led by Gen. Omar al-Bashir and heavily influenced by Hasan al-Turabi and his National Islamic Front party. Even during this time, al Qaeda continued operating established training camps in Afghanistan like Khaldan, al Farook and Darunta. The group also maintained its network of Pakistani safe-houses in places like Karachi and Peshawar that it used to direct prospective jihadists from overseas to its training camps in Afghanistan.
In many ways, Sudan was a better place for al Qaeda to operate from, since it offered far more access to the outside world than the remote camps in Afghanistan. But the access worked both ways, and the group received far more scrutiny during its time in Sudan than it had during its stay in Afghanistan. In fact, it was during the Sudan years (1992-1996) when many in the counterterrorism world first became conscious of the existence of al Qaeda. Most people outside of the counterterrorism community were not familiar with the group until after the August 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, and it was not really until 9/11 that al Qaeda became a household name. But this notoriety came with a price. Following the June 1995 attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (an attack linked to Egyptian militants and al Qaeda), the international community — including Egypt and the United States — began to place heavy pressure on the government of Sudan to either control Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda or eject them from the country.When one looks for prime jihadist real estate, one of the first important factors (as in any real estate transaction) is location. Unlike most home buyers, though, jihadists don’t want a home near the metro stop or important commuter arteries. Instead, they want a place that is isolated and relatively free of government authority. That is why Afghanistan, the Pakistani border region, the Sulu Archipelago, the African Sahel and Somalia have all proved to be popular jihadist haunts.
A second important factor is human terrain. Like any militant or insurgent group, the jihadists need a local population that is sympathetic to them if they are to operate in numbers larger than small cells. This is especially true if they hope to run operations such as training camps that are hard to conceal. Without local support they would run the risk of being turned in to the authorities or sold out to countries like the United States that may have put large bounties on the heads of key leaders. A conservative Muslim population with a warrior tradition is also a plus, as seen in Pakistan and Yemen. Indeed, Abu Musab al-Suri, a well-known jihadist strategist and so-called “architect of global jihad,” even tried (unsuccessfully) to convince bin Laden in 1989 to relocate to Yemen precisely because of the favorable human terrain there. The importance of human terrain is very evident in the Iraq example described above, in which a change in attitude by the tribal sheikhs rapidly made once welcoming areas into hostile and dangerous places for the foreign jihadists. Iraqi jihadists, who were able to fit in better with the local population, were able to persist in this hostile environment longer than their foreign counterparts. This concept of local support is one of the factors that will limit the ability of Arab jihadists to operate in remote and chaotic places like sub-Saharan Africa or even the rainforests of South America. They are not indigenous like members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or Sendero Luminoso, and differences in religion and culture will impede their efforts to intermarry into powerful tribes as they have done in Pakistan and Yemen. Geography and human terrain are helpful factors, but they are not the exclusive determinants. You can just as easily train militants in an open field as in a dense jungle, so long as you are unmolested by an outside force, and that is why government is so important to place. A weak government that has a lack of political and physical control over an area or a local regime that is either cooperative or at least non-interfering is also important. When we consider government, we need to focus on the ability and will of the government at the local level to fight an influx of jihadism. In several countries, jihadism was allowed to exist and was not countered by the government as long as the jihadists focused their efforts elsewhere. However, the wisdom of pursuing such an approach came into question in the period following 9/11, when jihadist groups in a number of places began conducting active operations in their countries of residence. This occurred in places like Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and even Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, where jihadist groups joined al Qaeda’s call for a global jihad. And this response proved to be very costly for these groups. The attacks they conducted, combined with heavy political pressure from the United States, forced some governments to change the way they viewed the groups and resulted in some governments focusing the full weight of their power to destroy them. This resulted in a dynamic where a group briefly appears, makes a splash with some spectacular attacks, then is dismantled by the local government, often with foreign assistance (from countries like the United States). In some countries, the governments lacked the necessary intelligence-gathering and tactical capabilities, and it has taken a lot of time and effort to build up those capabilities for the counterterrorism struggle. In other places, like Somalia, there has been very little government to build on. Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government has paid a lot of attention to “draining the swamps” where these groups seek refuge and train new recruits. This effort has spanned the globe, from the southern Philippines to Central Asia and from Bangladesh to Mali and Mauritania. And it is paying off in places like Yemen, where some of the special counterterrorism forces are starting to exhibit some self-sufficiency and have begun to make headway against AQAP. If Yemen continues to exhibit the will to go after AQAP, and if the international community continues to enable them to do so, it will be able to follow the examples of Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, countries where the jihadist problem has not been totally eradicated but where the groups are hunted and their tactical capabilities are greatly diminished. This will mean that Yemen will no longer be seen as a jihadist haven and training base. The swamp there will have been mostly drained. Another significant part of this effort will be to reshape the human terrain through ideological measures. These include discrediting jihadism as an ideology, changing the curriculum at madrassas and re-educating militants. With swamps such as Yemen and Pakistan slowly being drained, the obvious question is: Where will the jihadists go next? What will become the next focal point on the physical battlefield? One obvious location is Somalia, but while the government there is a basket case and controls little more than a few neighborhoods in Mogadishu, the environment is not very conducive for Somalia to become the next Pakistan or Yemen. While the human terrain in Somalia is largely made up of conservative Muslims, the tribal divisions and fractured nature of Somali society — the same things that keep the government from being able to develop any sort of cohesion — will also work against al-Shabaab and its jihadist kin. Many of the various tribal chieftains and territorial warlords see the jihadists as a threat to their power and will therefore fight them — or leak intelligence to the United States, enabling it to target jihadists it views as a threat. Arabs and South Asians also tend to stick out in Somalia, which is a predominately black country. Moreover, Somalia, like Yemen, has broad exposure to the sea, allowing the United States more or less direct access. Having long shorelines along the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, it is comparatively easy to slip aircraft and even special operations teams into and out of Somalia. With a U.S. base in Djibouti, orbits of unmanned aerial vehicles are also easy to sustain in Somali airspace. The winnowing down of places for jihadists to gather and train in large numbers continues the long process we have been following for many years now. This is the transition of the jihadist threat from one based on al Qaeda the group, or even on its regional franchise groups, to one based more on a wider movement composed of smaller grassroots cells and lone-wolf operatives. Going forward, the fight against jihadism will also have to adapt, because the changes in the threat will force a shift in focus from merely trying to drain the big swamps to mopping up the little pools of jihadists in places like London, Brooklyn, Karachi and even cyberspace. As discussed last week, this fight will present its own set of challenges.Posted in Uncategorized | Print | No Comments »
25. March 2010 by admin.
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Afghan President Hamid Karzai
at a welcoming ceremony in Beijing, China, on March 24
Afghan President Hamid Karzai is on a three-day trip to China, during which he has met with Chinese President Hu Jintao and is scheduled to meet with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. He is expected to seek financial aid and economic deals along with support for his plans to establish a stable government in Kabul after U.S. forces leave. China, meanwhile, has reasons of its own to forge closer ties with Afghanistan.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai met with Chinese President Hu Jintao on March 24 on the second day of a three-day trip to China. Karzai, who is accompanied by a delegation of Afghan businessmen, also is scheduled to meet with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. The trip comes at a critical time for Afghanistan as it tries to stabilize its government amid insurgency and make plans for the period after international forces withdraw. China, meanwhile, has both short- and long-term security and economic interests in Afghanistan, and is an ally of Pakistan, the most influential player in Afghanistan’s future.
Karzai is in Beijing primarily to see if he can secure more financial aid and economic deals to bolster his government. He is in an extremely fragile situation, struggling to bring some semblance of stability to the country’s economy to reduce the Taliban’s support and solidify his authority, all in the context of heightening conflict between the Taliban insurgency and U.S.-led international troops that are increasing their counter-insurgency efforts. Karzai also will seek Chinese support for his plans for establishing a stable government after the withdrawal of U.S. troops, a subject of intense interest among a number of international players.
The Chinese, for their part, have shown a willingness to help with reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. This is not meant as support for U.S. efforts. Strategically, China is happy to have the United States bogged down in Afghanistan and elsewhere, because as long as Washington is focused there, its ability to push its interests elsewhere — especially in ways that could pressure China — is limited. Rather, China presents its assistance as a commitment to regional stability and international efforts at resolving the conflict while pursuing its interests in the country.
Most importantly, Beijing fears the lawlessness that allows militancy to thrive in Afghanistan is also nurturing financing, training and ideological support for militants or would-be militants in China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang. Though the border between China and Afghanistan is only about 62 miles of extremely rugged mountains, there are various channels through which China suspects militant connections can be formed between Central Asia and Xinjiang. Beijing also sees an opportunity in developing its interests in Afghanistan’s natural resources — especially mining, as with China Metallurgical Group’s $3 billion investment in the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan — and markets, through its Central Asian trade routes.
So far Karzai’s trip does not appear to have been wildly successful in getting Afghanistan enhanced financial support. The two sides are said to have signed three agreements on March 24, with only the vaguest details released about the nature of the cooperation other than to expand technical training, economic cooperation and China’s no-tariff policies toward some Afghan exports. The Chinese are also expected to commit $23 million in aid — a token sum but in proportion with previous aid commitments of $130 million since 2002 and a promised $75 million in the next five years. Moreover, the Chinese have also shown themselves willing to send developers into Afghanistan to continue building infrastructure.
However, the biggest indicator of success for Karzai’s trip will be whether he can persuade the Chinese to play some role in mediating between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan is caught in the middle of increasing competition between foreign powers — not only the United States but also Pakistan and India, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey — over what kind of power arrangement will exist in Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal. Pakistan is positioned to wield extensive influence in Afghanistan in terms of fighting the irreconcilable parts of the Taliban, negotiating with the reconcilable parts and establishing political relations to buttress the Afghan government in the future. But Afghanistan is also working with India, Pakistan’s chief rival, to limit Pakistan’s control. This raises the question of China’s role.
China does not want to be excluded from the international negotiations, especially given its security concerns in the region and alliance with Pakistan. Before Sept. 11, 2001, Beijing maintained relations with the Taliban, and it could reactivate those ties to assist with the reconciliation efforts and to gain more support for the Afghan government. Moreover, Karzai will seek Chinese assistance in restraining Pakistan from pressing its interests too aggressively. But China will be unlikely to give much on Pakistan, since doing so would give India room to maneuver.
China’s role in Afghanistan extends beyond its economic and security interests in reconstruction to the question of how it will navigate the ongoing international negotiations toward a political settlement. While China is unlikely to take bold actions in Afghanistan, it will seek to secure its long-term interests in the country as the new dynamic takes shape, and that is one reason to pay attention to the outcome of Karzai’s visit.
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