Jay’s Blog

Summary
Vladislav Surkov, head of one of Russia’s two most powerful political clans and deputy chief of staff to President Dmitri Medvedev, reportedly has plans for a major overhaul of the Russian Interior Ministry. The ministry is one of the cornerstones of power for Igor Sechin, the deputy prime minister and Surkov’s rival. Surkov’s plans for the ministry are meant to render Sechin’s allies in the ministry politically impotent — but the plans have yet to be approved by Russia’s primary decision-maker, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.   Analysis
As the Kremlin Wars — a struggle between Russia’s two powerful political clans — continue to unfold, one of the fiercest and most dangerous fights is the struggle for the control of the Interior Ministry, one of the most powerful ministries in Russia.   STRATFOR sources in the Kremlin have said that Vladislav Surkov, deputy chief of staff to President Dmitri Medvedev and leader of one of the Kremlin’s two rival clans, is planning a major reorganization of the Interior Ministry. The overhaul would see the ministry — a central bastion of power for Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, leader of the other clan made up of the siloviki (members of Russia’s various security services with positions of power in government and business) — stripped of many of its troops and much of its investigative authority. The move is part of the ongoing contest for power within the Kremlin between Sechin and Surkov. The plans are still in the early stages and have yet to be approved by Russia’s chief decision-maker, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.   Russia’s Interior Ministry, led by Rashid Nurgaliyev, is one of the most powerful ministries in Russia. In the tradition of Europe’s interior ministries — which normally are responsible for internal security — Russia’s is in charge of the police forces, paramilitary units and investigations. The ministry traditionally has also been closely associated with intelligence and security services. During the Czarist era, Russia’s Interior Ministry controlled both the gendarmes and the secret police (then called the Okhrana). In the early Soviet Union, Felix Dzerzhinsky — founder of the feared Cheka secret police, the precursor to the KGB — became the first Soviet interior minister and head of the secret police.   The ministry’s armed personnel are divided into regular local police forces, often called militsiya, federal police forces and paramilitary troops. Interior Ministry paramilitary troops — which number around 200,000 — are some of the best-trained and best-equipped armed forces in Russia and have ample combat experience, with an excellent record of service in various conflicts in the North Caucasus, most notably Chechnya.   Throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet era, the ministry has maintained its close links with the Federal Security Service (FSB) and has drawn its leadership straight from the FSB’s ranks. Nurgaliyev, for example, was in charge of internal affairs at the FSB before becoming interior minister. To this day the FSB largely considers the Interior Ministry as its own armed wing, meaning the FSB does not have to rely on the Russian military — which often has its own agenda — for military support. Thus, the ministry is a central pillar of the Sechin clan’s power — and a prime target for Surkov and his allies in the Medvedev administration.   STRATFOR has already identified the Interior Ministry as a major front in the Kremlin clan wars. As part of the first salvo against Sechin’s hold over the ministry, Medvedev signed a decree in late December 2009 calling for a 20 percent reduction in personnel within two years — a harbinger of reforms to come in 2010. The ultimate goal for Surkov is to see Nurgaliyev replaced, possibly with one of his own men — Sergei Stepashin, who heads the Audit Chamber and the Federal Antimonopoly Service and is charged with reforming the Interior Ministry.   However, Sechin has been very clear that in the coming personnel changes in the Russian government, he draws the line at the Interior Ministry, seeking to protect Nurgaliyev’s position and his FSB followers within the ministry from a massive purge. Surkov, understanding that it could be difficult to dislodge Nurgaliyev, therefore hopes to enact several reforms that will neutralize Nurgaliyev’s power from within the ministry.   STRATFOR sources say the first proposed change is to further compartmentalize the federal and militsiya police forces, with the federal forces handling serious concerns such as organized crime, corruption and terrorism, while the local militsiyas handle general law-and-order concerns. However, the key part of the plan — which should take shape in the next few months — is the possible removal of the ministry’s elite paramilitary units, its most effective tactical component, from the Interior Ministry’s control. The 200,000-strong units would be folded in with Russia’s Civil Defense Forces, which are controlled by the Ministry for Emergency Situations — which is led by Surkov ally Sergei Shoigu.   Furthermore, Surkov wants to transfer all of the ministry’s major investigative work to the Prosecutor General’s Office, creating a new investigative unit akin to the U.S. FBI. This means that the ministry would lose not only its brawn (the paramilitary units) but also its brain.   Putin will review these proposals for reforms in two weeks. At that point, there should be more clarity on the issue as news of potential changes begins trickling from Russia. It is likely that some of the reforms proposed by Surkov will be nixed or extremely diluted as Putin strives to maintain a balance between the clans.   Sechin always has the option to fight back by telling Putin that Surkov and Medvedev’s suggestions for reform have gone too far. In the interest of keeping the warring clans balanced within the Kremlin, Putin could reject the more extreme proposals.

Posted via email from Jay’s Blogs

KREMLIN WARS: PART 1

Searching for the Minister of Organized Crime

Summary

STRATFOR sources have indicated that there is a concerted effort under way to oust longtime Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. The Kremlin’s two powerful political clans — currently at war with each other — are scrambling to fill the vacancy with one of their own. While the mayoralty of Moscow is an important position, part of its prestige comes from Luzhkov’s alleged ties to the Moscow Mob, Russia’s largest organized crime group. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin reportedly wants to make oversight of the Moscow Mob part of the duties of the mayor of Moscow, making that position even more powerful and adding to the potential for another frenzied battle between the Kremlin’s clans.

Analysis

The Kremlin Wars — a power struggle between Russia’s two main political clans, led by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov — have spread to new battlefronts. The newest is the Moscow mayoralty, a position that could be left vacant within the year by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s forced retirement. More important, Luzhkov’s alleged “shadow portfolio” of running the Moscow Mob, the powerful Russian organized crime (OC) syndicate, will also be up for grabs when he steps down.

  Luzhkov himself is an institution in Moscow. He has served as mayor since 1992. He and his wife Elena Baturina — who runs Russia’s largest construction group and is the country’s only notable female oligarch — are politically and economically one of the most powerful couples in Russia. Now in his fifth term in office, the 73-year-old Luzhkov thus far has been seen as indispensable to the Kremlin because of his alleged ability to oversee the political aspects of the Moscow Mob’s operations. At the same time, Luzhkov has been difficult to deal with politically because of the independence he has as mayor of Moscow, and has therefore often run afoul of Russia’s chief decision-maker, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.   Putin is expected to make sure that whoever replaces Luzhkov as Moscow’s mayor also receives the alleged OC “portfolio,” in order to maintain government oversight on the most powerful OC group in Russia (and arguably one of the most powerful in the world). This will immediately make Luzhkov’s replacement a powerful figure — and the opposing Kremlin clans will fight wildly to get one of their own into that position.   Russian OC is an integral lever of state power in Russia. Russia’s size traditionally has made government control over the entire territory tenuous during periods when the state’s authority is weak. During those periods, OC has provided employment opportunities and power for Russia’s entrepreneurial minds. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, for instance, many members of Russia’s intelligence services easily integrated themselves into the OC groups that emerged from the shadows in the early 1990s to replace the crumbling state in the economic, political and even judicial spheres.  

When the state is strong — as it has been with Putin as president and then prime minister — it can either expend extraordinary energy on countering OC or include it under the umbrella of the state, essentially regulating it. The latter is almost always the preferred option, since so many connections between former and current intelligence operatives and OC already exist. Currently, the Russian state is looking to increase its influence over domestic OC groups for three main reasons:

• Money: The Russian shadow economy — essentially the production of banned products and services, tax evasion and criminal activity (especially racketeering) — is a significant part of the overall economy. According to data from Russia’s statistical service released in January, the shadow economy is equal to approximately 20 percent of gross domestic product and is set to expand as the labor market deteriorates due to the economic crisis. OC controls this economy and its manifestations outside the country, through trafficking weapons, drugs and people. The government essentially taxes this economy by having political oversight on — or direct kickbacks from — OC activities at various regional levels. This means that regional political bosses are crucial to controlling the flow of money from the shadow economy to government coffers.
• Influence abroad and at home: Russian OC, through its own networks and those of former and current Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) personnel in its midst, has a large overseas presence. Main hubs for OC operations are London, Tokyo, Dubai, Istanbul, Paris, Rome, Amsterdam, Prague, New York and Miami. Thus the Russian government can use OC elements for intelligence, sabotage and even diplomatic service abroad. This also gives the Kremlin plausible deniability, since OC’s actions are always extrajudicial and are assumed, but rarely proven, to be directly linked to the state. Central Europe, where Russian OC often “negotiates” deals with local politicians on Moscow’s behalf, is full of examples of this. Russian OC’s influence also extends domestically by allowing the Kremlin to use OC to pressure regional politicians, businessmen or journalists without using government organs.
• Control of criminal activity: Ultimately, the Kremlin wants Russia to run with minimal internal discord, which means making sure that OC activities are contained. OC gives the government a way to evict businesses not approved by the state while maintaining a veneer of impartiality. Conversely, foreign investors in Russia understand that racketeers will impose a political/security protection fee — called a krysha — on their profits, but the government can use its control of OC to make sure the fee is predictable and not exorbitant, and that OC acts in a way that allows government-approved businesses to operate in Russia.

The crime syndicates’ day-to-day operations are managed by the bosses of the various mobs. For the Kremlin to synchronize those activities with the interests of the state, political oversight is needed. Luzhkov allegedly provided exactly that sort of political oversight during his time as mayor. His purported ability to control Russia’s largest OC syndicate, the Moscow Mob, has been uncanny and is in large part why he is one of the few Yeltsin-era politicians still very much active in Russia’s political scene. This is not to say Luzhkov is directly involved with the operations of the Moscow Mob himself; rather, he is widely perceived to be the group’s political handler — a very powerful position.
However, STRATFOR sources in the Kremlin say Putin feels the Russian state has grown significantly stronger since the 1990s and that the time is ripe to institutionalize political oversight of the Moscow Mob as part of the Moscow mayoralty, thus separating it from Luzhkov as an individual. Putin is expected to add Luzhkov’s alleged role in the Moscow Mob to the next mayor’s portfolio, making it a tool of the state.

  However, this presents three immediate problems. First, Luzhkov must agree to (or be persuaded to accept) the arrangement. While he might accept being forced to resign as Moscow’s mayor, it is unclear that he would agree with Putin in terms of his alleged OC portfolio. Second, the Moscow Mob will have to find Luzhkov’s replacement acceptable. This immediately leads to the third problem: the obvious question of who will be able to replace Luzhkov. His replacement will need to have sufficient clout with both Russia’s security services — the FSB in particular — and the Moscow Mob, but be “clean” enough to be the face of Moscow to the rest of the world in dealing with matters like investment, Russia’s bid for the World Cup in 2018, a potential 2020 Olympic bid and other such events.   The uncertainty over Luzhkov’s replacement leaves room for competition between the two Kremlin clans. Sechin’s clan, made up of the siloviki (members of the Russian intelligence community with positions of power in government and, in some cases, OC), would seem to have the upper hand. The FSB is the backbone of Sechin’s clan, and because that organization has so many links to Russian OC, it would only make sense for the Moscow mayoralty to fall within the Sechin clan’s purview.  

But Surkov, who heads the other powerful political clan, has other ideas. He sees the upcoming vacancy in Moscow as a way to counteract the FSB’s oversight of Russian OC and therefore outmaneuver his nemesis, Sechin.

  The battle for the control of crime syndicates would be highly explosive in any circumstance or in any country. But when it is combined with the ongoing Kremlin Wars — and when it involves OC organizations with reach, clout and capacity as great as Russian OC’s — the conflict will be exponentially greater.   http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100129_kremlin_wars_special_coverage_searching_minister_organized_crime

Posted via email from Jay’s Blogs

RUSSIA’S ISLAMIC THREAT, Gordon M. Hahn, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, 368 pages, $35.00.

Russia’s Islamic Threat provides meticulously detailed research and analysis about Islamic separatism in Russia, focusing on two particular areas–the Sufi Islamic North Caucasus (with a special emphasis on Chechnya) and Tatarstan/Bashkortostan, where a jihad movement holds sway.

Hahn sees two types of Islamic separatism in the Russian Federation violent, radical rebellion, supported by a small percentage of the population in the North Caucasus, and a potentially broader-based and more moderate political movement for self-determination in the Tatar/Bashkortostan region. At the heart of both Islamic separatist movements lie strong nationalist sentiment, distrust of the Russian Government, and a poor (or worsening) economic outlook.

Hahn asserts that the policies of President Vladimir Putin’s regime have fueled Islamic separatism, whether in the radical hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism in the North Caucasus, or in more Russified, secular, and moderate Muslim Tatarstan. Another significant cause of discontent is Putin’s anti-federalist policies, which have given much more power to the Russian federal government at the expense of individual Russian states/regions.

The net effect is that Putin is dismantling the “asymmetrical fiscal federalism” established by President Boris Yeltsin that made some concessions to state/regional sovereignty and reduced inter-ethnic competition for resources in potentially unstable regions. According to Hahn, asymmetrical federalism was a key factor in limiting nationalist aspirations and radicalism.

Hahn is probably overly pessimistic about Russia’s future. Judgments such as “‘Russia remains a weak state,” “is becoming a failing state,” and “‘risks becoming a failed one” seem extreme, considering Russia’s economy is booming, its international influence is on the rise, and the North Caucasus has been relatively quiet in the last year.

Russia’s Islamic Threat is a must-read for any student of radical Islam in Russia/Central Asia. In addition to its main arguments, the work provides extensive lists of resources, notes, and events concerning Islamic separatism in the region. Hahn’s book will be of great interest to anyone studying Putin’s impact on the development of democracy in Russia. Many journalists and scholars have written about declining civil liberties in the Russian Federation, but Hahn looks at a lesser known facet of this policy–the destruction of Russian “asymmetrical federalism” and its repercussions.

Posted via web from Jay’s Blogs