16. March 2010 by admin.

    By Fred Burton and Ben West   The assassination of senior Hamas militant leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh on Jan. 19 is still generating a tremendous amount of discussion and speculation some six weeks after the fact. Dubai’s police force has been steadily releasing new information almost on a daily basis, which has been driving the news cycle and keeping the story in the media spotlight. The most astounding release so far has been nearly 30 minutes of surveillance camera footage that depicts portions of a period spanning the arrival of the assassination team in Dubai, surveillance of al-Mabhouh, and the killing and the exfiltration of the team some 22 hours later.By last count, Dubai police claim to have identified some 30 people suspected of involvement in the assassination; approximately 17 have been convincingly tied to the operation through video footage either as surveillants, managers or assassins, with the rest having only tenuous connections based on information released by the Dubai police. In any case, the operation certainly was elaborate and required the resources and planning of a highly organized agency, one most likely working for a nation-state.

Pre-Operation

While the 22-hour period depicted in the video showcased the tactical capabilities of the various teams, it hardly tells the whole story. In order to pinpoint the location of al-Mabhouh on the day of his killing, the organization responsible for this operation would have had to have tracked al-Mabhouh for months, if not years. This can be done in three ways: technical surveillance, utilization of human sources and physical surveillance.Technical surveillance of al-Mabhouh would include monitoring his e-mail, telephone calls and other forms of electronic communications such as online credit-card transactions and travel reservations. This could reveal his physical location and future plans, which would allow the assassination team to anticipate his location and prepare well ahead of time. With such a large team involved in the assassination, careful coordination and planned movements would have been required to ensure that all members were in place without attracting attention.But technical surveillance has limitations. An experienced operative like al-Mabhouh (who had been the target of two previous assassination attempts in as many years) would most likely have taken precautions that would have limited his electronic visibility. The operational team likely used human sources with close ties to al-Mabhouh who could corroborate the information and possibly influence the target’s movements, putting him in place for the operation. Human sources could have included al-Mabhouh’s colleagues within Hamas or a member of a rival group such as Fatah. (Three Palestinians suspected of being members of Fatah were arrested by Dubai authorities in connection with the assassination, indicating that the group may have provided human intelligence to the organization responsible for al-Mabhouh’s assassination.) Other people could have been recruited using a number of incentives (including cash) without their knowing the consequences of their assistance. Both the technical and human intelligence operations would have been run by intelligence officers operating abroad and at locations separate from the operational team.According to Dubai police, physical surveillance was conducted by members of the operational team during al-Mabhouh’s previous trips to the United Arab Emirates. Physical surveillance is a critical part of any effective assault (whether it’s a clandestine intelligence operation or a car-jacking) because it gives the operatives an opportunity to become familiar with their surroundings and recognize their target in his or her “natural” environment.Once all this homework was done to establish al-Mabhouh’s normal routines and determine his approximate location and duration of his stay in Dubai, the intelligence-collection process moved into the deployment phase and an operational team was sent into action.

The Operation

Prior to Mabhouh’s arrival, surveillance teams set up in the airport and at different hotels to make sure they could obtain a visual confirmation of their target. Based on their intelligence of his prior trips to Dubai, planners placed teams in two hotels to wait for al-Mabhouh approximately an hour before his arrival. They also had a surveillance team waiting for him at the airport to follow him as soon as he entered the country and report his movements to the rest of the team. While it wasn’t captured on video, we suspect that a mobile surveillance group tracked al-Mabhouh from the airport by car. To help ensure a successful outcome, the operational team used overwhelming force to prevent the target from ever seeing the same face twice. When it was established that al-Mabhouh was staying at the Al Bustan Rotana, the team responded by abandoning their other posts and directing their focus to that hotel.Once al-Mabhouh was identified, the team locked on to him at the hotel and started initiating further steps in the operation. The first surveillance team watched al-Mabhouh register at the front desk and then followed him to his room, noting the target’s specific room number. This was relayed to other members of the team, who then placed a reservation for the room across the hall from al-Mabhouh, which gave them direct access to their target. The selection of the room is very interesting for two reasons. First, it was directly across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s room, giving the team a perfect spot from which to monitor his movements. Second, the room was just behind the video camera for that floor and the camera was trained on the emergency stairwell exit, which allowed the assassination team to carry out the attack on his room without being filmed.Meanwhile, down in the hotel lobby, surveillance teams were rotating to monitor the target’s movements in and out of the hotel. At one point, a surveillant is seen following al-Mabhouh out to the street to relay by cell phone the type of vehicle he had entered. These surveillants, operating in teams of two, used disguises such as hats, sunglasses, beards and work-out gear to establish a cover for action and better conceal their identities. While many members of the operational team were identified on closed-circuit television (CCTV), hats and sunglasses helped distort their images and reduce the already low risk of being recognized by the target or any protective team during the operation.Another necessity in any operation like this is communications. Surveillance video of the team involved in this operation shows them using cell phones to send text messages and talk to other members of the team. According to reports from Dubai police, the cell phones used in the operation were dialed to an Austrian number, likely the operations and support center for the team on the ground and any others involved in the operation. This might have been an open conference line into which all members of the operational team could dial to monitor the movement of their target. It is unlikely that the center was actually in Austria; it probably used a proxy phone line to mask its true physical location.

Assassination and Exfiltration

At approximately 8:30 p.m. on Jan. 19, after al-Mabhouh returned to his hotel room from a meeting, the assassination team moved in. It was important to carry out the killing at a time and in a manner that would give the team the maximum window of opportunity. They suspected that al-Mabhouh was in for the night, which meant that nobody would miss him until early the following afternoon, giving the team ample time to flee the country. The team carried out the assassination smoothly, with video surveillance showing only two operatives casually talking outside the elevator (a cover for monitoring the hall for possible distractions) — in other words, nothing out of the ordinary. The assassination team members also exhibited no unusual behavior when they departed the scene. Demeanor is extremely important, and the ability of the team to act calmly and naturally and not catch the attention of security guards monitoring CCTV ensured that the act remained a secret until hotel cleaning staff found the body more than 17 hours after the entire team had departed Dubai.The assassination team also killed al-Mabhouh in a way that apparently confounded medical examiners trying to determine the cause of death, delaying the announcement of a criminal case for nine days. This delay gave the operational team ample time to cover its tracks, possibly by using third- and fourth-country border crossings, additional false identities and safe-houses, making it much harder for Dubai authorities to track team members to their ultimate destinations. This confusion appears to have been created by the use of a muscle relaxant called succinylcholine (also known as Suxamethonium), which, if used in large enough quantities, can cause the heart to stop, making it appear that the victim died of cardiac arrest. The drug also has a very short half-life, meaning that traces would degenerate and virtually disappear shortly after injection, making it ideal for covert operations such as this one.The team was not able to pull off the operation with complete anonymity — it is virtually impossible to operate in a modern environment without leaving some kind of electronic trace. The Dubai police were able to use video surveillance from the airport, hotels and a nearby shopping center to trace back the movements of the operatives and establish their identities according to the passports that they used. These later proved to be fraudulent passports from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany and France — but they were extremely well-made fraudulent passports that were discovered later, only after video surveillance prompted closer scrutiny; customs officials were unable to detect this when the operatives were arriving or departing. Moreover, the credit cards used by several members of the operation team were linked to a company called Payoneer. The company’s CEO is a former member of Israel Defense Forces special operations, and Payoneer has financial backing from a company based in Israel.Dubai police have announced that they retrieved DNA evidence from at least one of the members on the assassination team and fingerprints from several others, giving authorities pieces of evidence that are unalterable, unlike a passport. However, DNA evidence is only helpful when it can be compared against an exemplar. If Dubai police are unable to find a match to the DNA sample or a fingerprint, then these clues will offer little immediate help.The passports also provide little immediate help in terms of tracking down the suspects. The discovery that fraudulent British, Irish, German and French passports were used has created a diplomatic problem for Israel (Mossad is understandably at the top of the list of suspects), which raises the profile of the operation considerably. This is certainly not what a clandestine operation is supposed to do. Although the operatives will probably never be found and handed over to UAE authorities, the fact that so many details of the assassination have been made public jeopardizes the anonymity that is supposed to surround this kind of operation.

Potential Consequences

Al-Mabhouh was hardly a likable character. As a senior Hamas military commander, arms smuggler and liaison to Iran, he was already on the terrorist watch lists in the countries that have complained about the use of fraudulent passports. Public indignation is a necessary and expected reaction from these countries to save diplomatic face, but when it comes down to it, there would be few incentives to seriously punish Israel, if it indeed sponsored the hit. The police of Dubai and the United Arab Emirates, rightfully frustrated that they are tasked with solving an unsolvable case, will still probably not miss al-Mabhouh. Their efforts to stir up outrage over the assassination are likely fueled by their desire to save face in the Arab world, where the Palestinian cause is of high rhetorical importance but little strategic importance.The fact is that the high level of complexity involved in this assassination, along with the smoothness with which it was carried out, is evidence that the operation was undertaken by an elite covert force, the likes of which could only be sponsored by a nation-state. The ability to conduct preliminary intelligence collection, to muster a large and coordinated team of skilled operatives, to fabricate passports to an exacting degree, to successfully exfiltrate all members of the team — all of this requires a significant and well-funded effort that, we believe, exceeds the current capabilities of any non-state terrorist group. It is worth noting here that the most impressive aspect of the operation was the team’s tradecraft and demeanor. All the members of this team were professionals.Indeed, with so much time having already elapsed, and if the operation was sponsored by a nation-state, it is highly improbable that any of the operatives involved will ever be caught. However, countries around the world are offering their assistance in the case, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia. Few officials from these countries actually believe any of the operatives will be apprehended, but that is not the real reason to participate in the investigation. What officials are really looking for are the granular details of how this group of assassins and surveillants operated. These details are extremely valuable in ongoing counterintelligence efforts by countries to thwart foreign intelligence agencies operating on their home turf. The information can provide clues to past and future cases, and it can be used to build databases on covert operatives, so that if any of these people show up unexpectedly at an airport, hotel or embassy in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia or elsewhere, the alarms can be sounded more quickly.

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12. March 2010 by admin.

Last week a small crisis with potentially serious implications blew up between Israel and Turkey. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon summoned Turkish Ambassador to Israel Ahmet Oguz Celikkol to a meeting Jan. 11 to protest a Turkish soap opera that depicted Israeli agents kidnapping Palestinian children. When the ambassador arrived, he received a lower seat than Ayalon — and was photographed in that position, making it appear that Ayalon was speaking to an inferior. Ayalon wouldn’t shake hands with him during the televised parts of the meeting, and had an Israeli flag visible on the table. Topping it all off, Ayalon told an Israeli cameraman in Hebrew that the important thing was that people see Celikkol sitting down low “while we’re up high.”Turks saw the images as a deliberate Israeli insult, though Ayalon argued that the episode was not meant as an insult but as a reminder that Israel does not take criticism lightly. While it is difficult to see the relative height of seats as an international incident, Ayalon clearly intended to send a significant statement to Turkey. The Turks took that statement to heart, so symbolism clearly matters. Israel’s intent is not so clear, however.

Turkey and Israeli National Security

Over the past year, Turkey has become increasingly critical of Israel’s relations with the Arab world. Turkey has tried to mediate, for example, between Syria and Israel. Now, Turkey has made it known that it holds Israel responsible for these failures. Even so, Turkey remains Israel’s major ally, albeit informally, in the Muslim world. Turkey is also a growing power. Uniquely in the region, it provides Israel with a dynamic economy to collaborate with. Turkey also has the most substantial and capable military force in the region. Should Turkey shift its stance to a pro-Arab, anti-Israel position, the consequences for Israel’s long-term national security would not be trivial.

Also last week, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman introduced a new concept to Israeli diplomacy, and Israel’s treatment of the Turkish ambassador must be understood in this light. According to Lieberman, Israel will expel ambassadors from countries that it feels have criticized Israel unfairly. The presence of ambassadors does not mean as much today as it did in the 18th century, but the image of Israel responding to criticism — which, fair or not, is widespread — by reducing relations seems self-defeating. For many governments, having Israel reduce diplomatic status causes no harm, and might even be a political plus domestically. Obviously, Lieberman’s statement was meant to generate support among the Israeli public, and it well might. But consider the strategic consequences to Israel.

Turkey has been shifting its position on its role in the Islamic world in recent years under the Islamist-rooted government of President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While increasingly critical of Israel, the Turkish government also has tried to bridge the gap between the Arabs and Israelis, albeit to promote Turkey’s position in the Muslim world. Thus, Turkey is far from being confrontational with Israel. Moreover, tensions in Turkey between secularists in the military and the civilian Islamist-rooted government are substantial. Turkish internal politics are complicated, and therefore politics between Turkey and Israel are complicated.

Israeli Strategy

Ever since its peace treaty with Egypt, Israel’s grand strategy has been to divide Muslim nations in the region, finding common interests with some to make certain no common front against Israel arises. To this end, Israel has formal treaties with Jordan and Egypt both based on common enemies. The Jordanian government — Hashemites ruling a country with a substantial Palestinian population — fears the Palestinians at least as much as Israel. Egypt, which suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s, opposes Hamas, which is an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel accordingly uses mutual hostility toward the Palestinians to create a balance of power on its border.

Still, both Egypt and Jordan have said — and will continue to say — many critical things about Israel. They need to speak to their respective domestic audiences, and Israel understands that what is said to satisfy that audience is not necessarily connected to their foreign and security policies. Some Israelis condemn both Egypt and Jordan for such criticisms. But from a larger perspective, if Egypt were to repudiate its peace treaty with Israel and begin refurbishing its military, and Jordan were to shift to an anti-Israeli policy and allow third parties to use its territory and the long and difficult-to-defend Jordan River as a base of operations, Israel would face a fundamental strategic threat.

So Israel has adopted a very simple policy: Egypt and Jordan may say what they want so long as Egypt does not abandon its neutrality and beef up its military and Jordan does not let a foreign force into the Jordan Valley. And given that the Israelis want to ensure that the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes survive, the Israelis tolerate periodic outbursts against Israel. Rhetoric is rhetoric and geopolitics is geopolitics, and the Israelis understand the distinction.

That they understand this difference makes Ayalon’s behavior, let alone Lieberman’s as-yet-unimplemented policy, difficult to follow. It is difficult to know whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sanctioned Ayalon’s move. As has been the case in Israel for years, Netanyahu’s coalition is weak and fragmented, enabling smaller parties to pursue their own policies. There is no question that embarrassing the Turkish ambassador pleased many Israelis, particularly those who already belong to Netanyahu’s coalition. If the event was staged with an Israeli audience in mind, the episode might have made sense. But Ayalon also spoke to the Turkish public, and at the moment, the Turkish voters may well be more important to Israel than Israeli voters. Turkey is just too powerful a country for Israel to have as an enemy.

On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak made an official visit to Turkey, and both sides went out of their way to put the Ayalon incident behind them. Clearly, there are members of the Turkish and Israeli cabinets who do not want a crisis between the two countries. And they probably will be able to contain the current situation.

Either way, Israel certainly knew how the seating episode would play in Turkey. Perhaps the Israelis felt that by showcasing their displeasure they might incite Turkish secularists against the Islamists. If so, this is a dangerous game, as insulting Turkey is apt to mobilize the secularists against Israel as much as the Islamists, leading to a Turkish consensus on the Israeli issue not in Israel’s best interests.

The Turkish Re-Emergence

When we step back and look at the broader strategic picture, we see a Turkey slowly but systematically re-emerging as a regional power prepared to use its influence. Washington has observed this, too, and so regards Turkey as a key part of its strategy to draw down the U.S. presence in Iraq. Turkey does not want to see massive instability in Iraq any more than the Americans do. Similarly, in any confrontation with Iran, Turkey is both a communications channel and a potential ally. Further afield, Turkey is contributing to the Western war effort in Afghanistan, and has substantial influence in the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia. The United States has no desire to move into confrontation with Turkey. Indeed, it sees Turkey not so much as a U.S. surrogate, which Turkey is not, but as the most significant regional power with interests aligned with the United States.

Israel is also an ally of the United States, but it cannot achieve the things Turkey might in Syria, Iraq and the rest of the region. The U.S. interest at present lies in stabilizing these countries and moving them away from Iran. The Turks could help this process. The Israelis can’t. That means that in any breakdown of relations between Turkey and Israel, the United States will be hard-pressed to side with Israel. The United States shares fundamental interests with Turkey, so in breaking with Turkey, the Israelis are risking a breach with the United States.

U.S. relations aside, Israel needs its relationship with Turkey as well. The region as a whole has two major powers and one potential power. Turkey and Israel are the major powers, Egypt is the potential one. The ongoing Turkish economic surge of the past few years will generate economic activity throughout the region, particularly in Egypt, where wages are low and where the (albeit small) middle class can buy Turkish products. A Turkish-Egyptian economic relationship follows from the Turkish surge. Maintaining Egyptian neutrality is a foundation of Israeli national security, but souring Israeli-Turkish relations during a Turkish-sponsored economic revival in Egypt could threaten this. And Israel does not want to be caught between a hostile Egypt and Turkey.

Elsewhere in the region, Turkey is increasing its influence in Syria. It currently shares Israel’s interests in curbing Hezbollah in Lebanon and redirecting Syrian relations away from Iran toward Turkey. Obviously, Israel wants to see this process continue, but Turkey could expand its influence in Syria without dealing with Hezbollah.

Israeli Limitations

Turkey is a developing power with options, while Israel is a power that has developed to its limits. The Turkish re-emergence could well transform the region, and Turkey has a number of ways it could play this. By contrast, geopolitically and economically, Israel is committed in a certain direction. This is a moment during which Turkey has options, and more options than Israel.

Israel has relatively few tools available to shape Turkey’s choices, though it does have several ways to close off some Turkish choices. One of Turkey’s choices is to maintain its relationship with Israel. If the Turks choose not to maintain this relationship, Israel’s strategic position will suffer a severe blow. Logic would therefore have it that Israel would try to avoid sparking a political process in Turkey that makes breaking with Israel the easier choice.

By deliberately embarrassing the Turks, Lieberman and Ayalon are unlikely to make the Turks want to improve their relationship with Israel. And Lieberman and Ayalon seem to underestimate the degree to which Israel needs this relationship. Turkey can afford to criticize Israel because an Israeli rupture with Turkey actually solves diplomatic problems for Turkey without harming the Turkish strategic position. If Turkey breaks with Israel, Israel now has a very powerful regional adversary quite capable of arming regional Arab powers. It is also a country able to challenge the primacy of the Israeli relationship in American regional thinking. We therefore see avoiding a crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations as mattering more to Israel in the long run than to Turkey.

“This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR“

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12. March 2010 by admin.

The Lebanese army command believes major military operations in the forthcoming war between Israel and Hezbollah will begin in the western Bekaa Valley. The army command believes the Israelis will pursue Hezbollah as far as Hirmil at the northern end of the valley. The Lebanese army also reportedly is aware that Iranian missiles continue to reach Hezbollah from Syria. Iranian planes unload missiles at the airport in Aleppo, Syria, after which they are shipped to the Bekaa.

A team of missile experts from Iran’s elite military unit, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, led by an Iranian colonel reportedly arrived in Lebanon about three weeks ago. The team examined Hezbollah missile sites in the western Bekaa Valley and supervised the installation of additional missile silos and concrete bunkers. Iran also reportedly will begin a new cycle of guerrilla warfare training in al-Shara near the Lebanese-Syrian border.

Meanwhile, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), a pro-Syrian left-wing faction opposed to the mainstream ruling Palestinian Fatah movement, is said to have mobilized 4,000 highly trained fighters outside the large PFLP-GC military base in Qusaya, Lebanon. At present, the troops at are stationed on the Syrian side of the border, but they could enter Qusaya’s perimeter in a matter of minutes. The Lebanese army reportedly is aware of the arrival of eight additional tanks to Qusaya.

  It has been reported that Hezbollah and the PFLP-GC are coordinating their military plans. Moreover, at Damascus’ insistence, the Iranians allegedly have instructed Hezbollah to treat the PFLP-GC as its equal.

 The Syrians hope the PFLP-GC will be able to prevent the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from reaching the Beirut-Damascus highway. An IDF advance into the Bekaa would put Damascus within just a few hours of Israeli forces. As the Syrians do not want to become embroiled in Israel’s next war with Hezbollah, they are therefore preparing the PFLP-GC to fight a proxy war on Syria’s behalf.

  Courtsey:http://www.stratfor.com/node/156688/analysis/20100311_lebanon_syria_preparations_future_conflict_israel

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11. February 2010 by admin.

By George Friedman
 
Last weekend’s newspapers were filled with stories about how the United States is providing ballistic missile defense (BMD) to four countries on the Arabian Peninsula. The New York Times carried a front-page story on the United States providing anti-missile defenses to Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, as well as stationing BMD-capable, Aegis-equipped warships in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, the front page of The Washington Post carried a story saying that “the Obama administration is quietly working with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf allies to speed up arms sales and rapidly upgrade defenses for oil terminals and other key infrastructure in a bid to thwart future attacks by Iran, according to former and current U.S. and Middle Eastern government officials.”
 
Obviously, the work is no longer “quiet.” In fact, Washington has been publicly engaged in upgrading defensive systems in the area for some time. Central Command head Gen. David Petraeus recently said the four countries named by the Times were receiving BMD-capable Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) batteries, and at the end of October the United States carried out its largest-ever military exercises with Israel, known as Juniper Cobra. More interesting than the stories themselves was the Obama administration’s decision to launch a major public relations campaign this weekend regarding these moves. And the most intriguing question out of all this is why the administration decided to call everyone’s attention to these defensive measures while not mentioning any offensive options.
 
The Iranian Nuclear Question
U.S. President Barack Obama spent little time on foreign policy in his Jan. 27 State of the Union message, though he did make a short, sharp reference to Iran. He promised a strong response to Tehran if it continued its present course; though this could have been pro forma, it seemed quite pointed. Early in his administration, Obama had said he would give the Iranians until the end of 2009 to change their policy on nuclear weapons development. But the end of 2009 came, and the Iranians continued their policy. All along, Obama has focused on diplomacy on the Iran question. To be more precise, he has focused on bringing together a coalition prepared to impose “crippling sanctions” on the Iranians. The most crippling sanction would be stopping Iran’s gasoline imports, as Tehran imports about 35 percent of its gasoline. Such sanctions are now unlikely, as China has made clear that it is not prepared to participate — and that was before the most recent round of U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan.
 
Similarly, while the Russians have indicated that their participation in sanctions is not completely out of the question, they also have made clear that time for sanctions is not near. We suspect that the Russian time frame for sanctions will keep getting pushed back. Therefore, the diplomatic option appears to have dissolved. The Israelis have said they regard February as the decisive month for sanctions, which they have indicated is based on an agreement with the United States. While previous deadlines of various sorts regarding Iran have come and gone, there is really no room after February. If no progress is made on sanctions and no action follows, then the decision has been made by default that a nuclear-armed Iran is acceptable. The Americans and the Israelis have somewhat different views of this based on different geopolitical realities. The Americans have seen a number of apparently extreme and dangerous countries develop nuclear weapons.
 
The most important example was Maoist China. Mao Zedong had argued that a nuclear war was not particularly dangerous to China, as it could lose several hundred million people and still win the war. But once China developed nuclear weapons, the wild talk subsided and China behaved quite cautiously.
 
From this experience, the United States developed a two-stage strategy. First, the United States believed that while the spread of nuclear weapons is a danger, countries tend to be circumspect after acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, overreaction by United States to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other countries is unnecessary and unwise. Second, since the United States is a big country with widely dispersed population and a massive nuclear arsenal, a reckless country that launched some weapons at the United States would do minimal harm to the United States while the other country would face annihilation. And the United States has emphasized BMD to further mitigate — if not eliminate — the threat of such a limited strike to the United States. Israel’s geography forces it to see things differently. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said Israel should be wiped off the face of the Earth while simultaneously working to attain nuclear weapons. While the Americans take comfort in the view that the acquisition of nuclear weapons has a sobering effect on a new nuclear power, the Israelis don’t think the Chinese case necessarily can be generalized.
 
Moreover, the United States is outside the range of the Iranians’ current ballistic missile arsenal while Israel is not. And a nuclear strike would have a particularly devastating effect on Israel. Unlike the United States, Israel is small country with a highly concentrated population. A strike with just one or two weapons could destroy Israel. Therefore, Israel has a very different threshold for risk as far as Iran is concerned. For Israel, a nuclear strike from Iran is improbable, but would be catastrophic if it happened.
 
For the United States, the risk of an Iranian strike is far more remote, and would be painful but not catastrophic if it happened. The two countries thus approach the situation very differently. How close the Iranians are to having a deliverable nuclear weapon is, of course, a significant consideration in all this. Iran has not yet achieved a testable nuclear device. Logic tells us they are quite far from a deliverable nuclear weapon. But the ability to trust logic varies as the risk grows. The United States (and this is true for both the Bush and Obama administrations) has been much more willing to play for time than Israel can afford to be. For Israel, all intelligence must be read in the context of worst-case scenarios.
 
Diverging Interests and Grand Strategy
It is also important to remember that Israel is much less dependent on the United States than it was in 1973. Though U.S. aid to Israel continues, it is now a much smaller percentage of Israeli gross domestic product. Moreover, the threat of sudden conventional attack by Israel’s immediate neighbors has disappeared. Egypt is at peace with Israel, and in any case, its military is too weak to mount an attack. Jordan is effectively an Israeli ally. Only Syria is hostile, but it presents no conventional military threat.
 
Israel previously has relied on guarantees that the United States would rush aid to Israel in the event of war. But it has been a generation since this has been a major consideration for Israel. In the minds of many, the Israeli-U.S. relationship is stuck in the past. Israel is not critical to American interests the way it was during the Cold War. And Israel does not need the United States the way it did during the Cold War. While there is intelligence cooperation in the struggle against jihadists, even here American and Israeli interests diverge. And this means that the United States no longer has Israeli national security as an overriding consideration — and that the United States cannot compel Israel to pursue policies Israel regards as dangerous. Given all of this, the Obama administration’s decision to launch a public relations campaign on defensive measures just before February makes perfect sense.
 
If Iran develops a nuclear capability, a defensive capability might shift Iran’s calculus of the risks and rewards of the military option. Assume, for example, that the Iranians decided to launch a nuclear missile at Israel or Iran’s Arab neighbors with which its relations are not the best. Iran would have only a handful of missiles, and perhaps just one. Launching that one missile only to have it shot down would represent the worst-case scenario for Iran. Tehran would have lost a valuable military asset, it would not have achieved its goal and it would have invited a devastating counterstrike. Anything the United States can do to increase the likelihood of an Iranian failure therefore decreases the likelihood that Iran would strike until they have more delivery systems and more fissile material for manufacturing more weapons.
 
The U.S. announcement of the defensive measures therefore has three audiences: Iran, Israel and the American public. Israel and Iran obviously know all about American efforts, meaning the key audience is the American public. The administration is trying to deflect American concerns about Iran generated both by reality and Israel by showing that effective steps are being taken. There are two key weapon systems being deployed, the PAC-3 and the Aegis/Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). The original Patriot, primarily an anti-aircraft system, had a poor record — especially as a BMD system — during the first Gulf War. But that was almost 20 years ago. The new system is regarded as much more effective as a terminal-phase BMD system, such as the medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) developed by Iran, and performed much more impressively in this role during the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. In addition, Juniper Cobra served to further integrate a series of American and Israeli BMD interceptors and sensors, building a more redundant and layered system. This operation also included the SM-3, which is deployed aboard specially modified Aegis-equipped guided missile cruisers and destroyers. The SM-3 is one of the most successful BMD technologies currently in the field and successfully brought down a wayward U.S. spy satellite in 2008. Nevertheless, a series of Iranian Shahab-3s is a different threat than a few Iraqi Scuds, and the PAC-3 and SM-3 have yet to be proven in combat against such MRBMs — something the Israelis are no doubt aware of. War planners must calculate the incalculable; that is what makes good generals pessimists.
 
The Obama administration does not want to mount an offensive action against Iran. Such an operation would not be a single strike like the 1981 Osirak attack in Iraq. Iran has multiple nuclear sites buried deep and surrounded by air defenses. And assessing the effectiveness of airstrikes would be a nightmare. Many days of combat at a minimum probably would be required, and like the effectiveness of defensive weapons systems, the quality of intelligence about which locations to hit cannot be known until after the battle. A defensive posture therefore makes perfect sense for the United States. Washington can simply defend its allies, letting them absorb the risk and then the first strike before the United States counterstrikes rather than rely on its intelligence and offensive forces in a pre-emptive strike. This defensive posture on Iran fits American grand strategy, which is always to shift such risk to partners in exchange for technology and long-term guarantees. The Arabian states can live with this, albeit nervously, since they are not the likely targets. But Israel finds its assigned role in U.S. grand strategy far more difficult to stomach. In the unlikely event that Iran actually does develop a weapon and does strike, Israel is the likely target. If the defensive measures do not convince Iran to abandon its program and if the Patriots allow a missile to leak through, Israel has a national catastrophe. It faces an unlikely event with unacceptable consequences.
 
Israel’s Options
It has options, although a long-range conventional airstrike against Iran is really not one of them. Carrying out a multiday or even multiweek air campaign with Israel’s available force is too likely to be insufficient and too likely to fail. Israel’s most effective option for taking out Iran’s nuclear activities is itself nuclear. Israel could strike Iran from submarines if it genuinely intended to stop Iran’s program. The problem with this is that much of the Iranian nuclear program is sited near large cities, including Tehran. Depending on the nuclear weapons used and their precision, any Israeli strikes could thus turn into city-killers. Israel is not able to live in a region where nuclear weapons are used in counterpopulation strikes (regardless of the actual intent behind launching).
 
Mounting such a strike could unravel the careful balance of power Israel has created and threaten relationships it needs. And while Israel may not be as dependent on the United States as it once was, it does not want the United States completely distancing itself from Israel, as Washington doubtless would after an Israeli nuclear strike. The Israelis want Iran’s nuclear program destroyed, but they do not want to be the ones to try to do it. Only the United States has the force needed to carry out the strike conventionally. But like the Bush administration, the Obama administration is not confident in its ability to remove the Iranian program surgically. Washington is concerned that any air campaign would have an indeterminate outcome and would require extremely difficult ground operations to determine the strikes’ success or failure. Perhaps even more complicated is the U.S. ability to manage the consequences, such as a potential attempt by Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian meddling in already extremely delicate situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Iran does not threaten the United States, the United States therefore is in no hurry to initiate combat. And so the United States has launched a public relations campaign about defensive measures, hoping to affect Iranian calculations while remaining content to let the game play itself out. Israel’s option is to respond to the United States with its intent to go nuclear, something Washington does not want in a region where U.S. troops are fighting in countries on either side of Iran. Israel might calculate that its announcement would force the United States to pre-empt an Israeli nuclear strike with conventional strikes. But the American response to Israel cannot be predicted. It is therefore dangerous for a small regional power to try to corner a global power. With the adoption of a defensive posture, we have now seen the U.S. response to the February deadline. This response closes off no U.S. options (the United States can always shift its strategy when intelligence indicates), it increases the Arabian Peninsula’s dependence on the United States, and it possibly causes Iran to recalculate its position. Israel, meanwhile, finds itself in a box, because the United States calculates that Israel will not chance a conventional strike and fears a nuclear strike on Iran as much as the United States does.
 
In the end, Obama has followed the Bush strategy on Iran — make vague threats, try to build a coalition, hold Israel off with vague promises, protect the Arabian Peninsula, and wait — to the letter. But along with this announcement, we would expect to begin to see a series of articles on the offensive deployment of U.S. forces, as good defensive posture requires a strong offensive option.

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