Jay’s Blog

Why the Greeks never came back to India

By Rakesh Krishnan              

                                                            

Alexander invaded India expecting a heroic entry but in the end it turned into a humiliating retreat.

If you’ve seen the epic movie Alexander by Oliver Stone, you wouldn’t have missed the noted American director’s commentary at the end where he talks about the battle of Multan. Stone – with smugness more suited to a conqueror than a director – narrates how the Macedonian king single-handedly jumped into combat against 1000 Indian defenders, inspiring his dithering Greek soldiers and commanders to storm their fort.

To the victors go the spoils, so if the Greeks and Macedonians were really victorious, as European accounts narrate, then why did they leave India so soon? After all, over 99 per cent of the country was still unconquered. And why did the retreating army resemble a defeated brood – rather than a triumphant force – trekking across inhospitable areas, losing an estimated 60,000 men in the process?

The fact is that Alexander’s Indian campaign was a complete disaster for the Greeks. They were traumatised after the first few battles, losing most of their men in ferocious battles against Indian warriors, the likes of whom they had never encountered before.

Let’s flashback to history! In 326 BC the formidable Greek-Macedonian army entered India. It was the first time Europeans and Indians first looked into one another’s faces; the first meeting of the two halves of the Aryan people since their forefathers had parted centuries before.

In his first encounter, Alexander fought for four days against the warlike people of the city of Massaga in Swat valley. On the first day of this battle, Alexander was injured and forced to retreat. The same fate awaited him on the second and third days. When Alexander lost men and was on the verge of defeat, he called for a truce. Clearly, the Indians weren’t aware of the Trojan horse episode, for the Greeks slaughtered the unaware and unarmed citizens of Massaga as they slept in the night of the fourth day believing that the battle was over.

In the second and third battles at Bazira and Ora, Alexander faced a similar fate and again resorted to treachery to defeat those fortresses. But the fierce resistance put up by the Indian defenders had reduced the strength – and perhaps the will – of the until then all-conquering Macedonian-led army.

Greek histories record that Alexander’s hardest battle was the Battle of Hydaspes (Jhelum) in which he faced King Puru, the Yaduvanshi king of the Paurava kingdom of Punjab. Paurava was a prosperous Indian kingdom on the banks of the river Jhelum, and Puru – described in Greek accounts as Porus and standing over seven feet tall – was a generous monarch.

Perhaps, he was generous to a fault. Legend has it that ahead of Alexander’s entry into India, his Persian wife Roxana, the daughter of the defeated Persian king Darius, arrived in Paurava to meet King Puru, who was preparing for war against the foreign invader.

Roxana gained access to Puru, and through the bond of rakhi, declared herself his sister. She then begged Puru to spare her husband’s life if he encountered the Macedonian king in battle. The large-hearted Indian king agreed to this bizarre request.

In the autumn of 326BC, the Greek and Paurava armies faced each other across the banks of the river Jhelum in Punjab. By all accounts it was an awe-inspiring spectacle. The Greeks had 34,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry. This number was boosted further by their Persian allies.

Facing this tumultuous force led by the genius of Alexander was the Paurava army of 20,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry and 200 war elephants. Being a comparatively small kingdom by Indian standards, Paurava couldn’t have had such a large standing army, so it’s likely many of its defenders were hastily armed civilians.

According to Greek sources, for several days the armies eyeballed each other across the river. They write Alexander could not move his army across the river because it was swollen from the rains.

A lamer excuse is not found in history! Alexander’s army had crossed the Hellespont, a 1-8 km wide strip of sea that divides Asia and Europe, and which was well defended by the Persians. In comparison, crossing the narrower Jhelum against a much smaller adversary should have been a far easier task.

In reality, the Greek-Macedonian force, after having lost several thousand soldiers fighting much smaller Indian mountain cities, were terrified at the prospect of fighting the fierce Paurava army. They had also heard about the havoc that Indian war elephants were supposed to create among enemy ranks. The modern equivalent of battle tanks, the war elephants also scared the wits out of the horses in the Greek cavalry.

In the Battle of Hydaspes, the Indians fought with bravery and war skills that no other army had shown against the Greeks. In the first charge by the Indians, Puru’s brother Amar killed Alexander’s favourite horse Bucephalus, forcing Alexander to dismount. In battles outside India the elite Macedonian bodyguards had not allowed a single enemy soldier to deliver so much as a scratch on their king’s body, let alone slay his mount. Yet in this battle with the Paurava army, not only was Alexander injured, the Indians killed Nicaea, one of the leading Greek commanders.

According to the Roman historian Marcus Justinus, the battle was savagely fought. Puru challenged Alexander, who charged him on horseback. In the ensuing duel, Alexander fell off his horse and was at the mercy of the Indian king’s spear (and this is where legend meets history) when Puru perhaps remembered his promise to his rakhi sister (probably a Trojan horse sent in by the Greeks). He spared the Macedonian’s life, and Alexander’s bodyguards quickly carried off their king.

The Greeks may claim victory but if Alexander’s troops were so badly mauled by the petty regional fiefdoms, how could they have crushed the comparatively stronger army of Puru? An unbiased re-examination of contemporary histories suggests the Greeks probably lost the battle and Alexander sued for peace.

In his epic volume, The Life and Exploits of Alexander, a series of translations of the Ethiopic histories of Alexander, E.A.W. Budge, Egyptologist, orientalist and philologist, has given a vivid account of the Macedonian’s misadventure in India.

According to Budge, who worked for the British Museum in the early part of the 20^th century, in the Battle of Hydaspes the Indians destroyed the majority of Alexander’s cavalry? Realising that if he were to continue fighting he would be completely ruined, the Macedonian requested Puru to stop fighting. True to Indian traditions, the magnanimous Indian king spared the life of the surrendered enemy. A peace treaty was signed, and Alexander helped Puru in annexing other territories to his kingdom.

The Greek geographer Strabo complains in the Geographika that all who wrote about Alexander preferred the marvellous to the true. Certainly he alludes to Alexander’s original propaganda to glorify his struggle in the East. He created his own mystified version of the campaign, transforming it into a search for divine traces.

For instance, the ancient Greeks believed that Dionysius, one of their chief Gods, had his origins in India. They also lamented that the legendary Heracles had failed in his Indian campaigns. Alexander wanted to succeed in the Dionysius’ homeland where the great Heracles himself had failed. Also, while the ostensible purpose of Alexander’s campaign was to avenge the Persians’ destruction of Athens, the real reason was that he had many enemies among Macedonia’s elite, and a state of continuous war kept the warriors and public busy. Indeed, he simply could not afford to go back defeated. The web of lies he and his entourage spun was in keeping with that scheme.

Plutarch, the Greek historian and biographer, says of the Battle of Hydaspes: “The combat with Porus took the edge off the Macedonians’ courage, and stayed their further progress into India. For having found it hard enough to defeat an enemy who brought but 20,000 foot and 2000 horse into the field, they thought they had reason to oppose Alexander’s design of leading them on to pass the Ganges, on the further side of which was covered with multitudes of enemies.”

Indeed, on the other side of the Ganges was the mighty kingdom of Magadh, ruled by the ferocious and wily Nandas, who commanded one of the largest standing armies in the world. According to Plutarch, the courage of the Greeks evaporated when they came to know that the Nandas “were awaiting them with 200,000 infantry, 80,000 cavalry, 8000 war chariots, and 6000 fighting elephants”. Undoubtedly, the Greeks would have walked into a slaughterhouse.

Still 400 km from the Ganges, the Indian heartland, Alexander ordered a retreat to great jubilation among his soldiers. The celebrations were premature. On its way south towards the mouth of the Indus river, Alexander’s army was constantly harried by Indian soldiers. When the Greeks pillaged villages, the Indians retaliated. In some kingdoms, the Indian soldiers simply fell upon the Greeks because they wouldn’t tolerate foreigners invading their country.

In a campaign at Sangala in Punjab, the Indian attack was so ferocious that it completely destroyed the Greek cavalry, forcing Alexander the great to attack on foot. However, in the following counterattack, Alexander took the fort and sold the surviving Indians into slavery. (That’s another facet of the Macedonian that is glossed over by western historians; Alexander was far from being a noble king, and on the contrary was a vicious and cruel person.)

His battle with the Malavs of Multan – the most warlike people of Punjab – is perhaps the most recounted. In the hotly contested battle, Alexander was felled by a Malav warrior whose arrow pierced the Macedonian’s breastplate and lodged in his ribs. The Indian warrior seeing the enemy king fall, advanced to take his armour but was checked by Alexander’s bodyguards who rushed into the battle to save their king. The Macedonians later stormed the fort and in revenge killed every one of the 17,000 inhabitants of the fort, including women and children. Alexander never recovered from the wound and died in Babylon (Iraq) at the age of 33.

Western historians depict the Battle of Hydaspes as a clash of the organised West and the muddling East. That one battle is portrayed as the Greek conquest of India, while the fact is that Alexander merely probed the north-western extremity of India. Puru was by any reckoning a minor king and doesn’t even merit a mention in Indian accounts.

The Greek invasion of India was a popular subject in Greece and Rome for many centuries. The Alexander romance even entered medieval European literature and religion. Much later it became the fountainhead of inspiration for the colonisation of the East, especially India.

Yet within a few years after Alexander’s retreat, the Indians drove the Greeks out of India. Inspired by the master strategist Chanakya, Chandragupta Maurya, the founder of the Mauryan dynasty, defeated Seleucus Necator, Alexander’s satrap. This was quite unlike the rest of Alexander’s other territorial conquests. It took the Sassanians 500 years to get back Persia from the Greeks. The Parthians were able to depose the Greeks 250 years after Alexander. Egypt never recovered its lost glory.

Arrian, the Roman biographer of Alexander, says the only ‘victory’ celebration by Alexander’s troops was after the battle with Puru. Surprising – that Alexander’s troops did not celebrate any victory, till the very end of the campaign. Was it, instead, a celebration that they had escaped with their lives?

The Greek retreat from India shows clear signs of a defeated force. Indeed, if the Greek and Macedonian soldiers were really that tired of fighting, as western historians claim, then the ‘triumphant’ troops should have returned via the same route they arrived. But instead they preferred to trek south through unknown and hostile lands in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. The only explanation is that they didn’t want to face the mountain kingdoms again.

Also, it’s a myth that the Greeks and Macedonians were tired of fighting and were hankering to meet their families. Alexander’s army had a system of rotation where large batches of soldiers were released to return home (with sufficient gold, slaves and other spoils of war) after major victories. In their place, fresh troops eager to do battle (and lured by the promise of more loot) were constantly trickling in from Greece.

There is more indirect evidence of the lack of major Greek victories in India. The booty that fell into Greek hands after they defeated the Persians in the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC is estimated at 100,000 talents (more than 2,500,000 kilos) of gold. However, there is no mention of any large booty captured from India – strange because those days India was pretty much swimming in gold and other precious metals and stones. So it can be safely argued that Alexander failed to get his hands on a substantial booty because he never won any substantial victories.

On the contrary, Alexander gave King Ambhi, the ruler of Taxila, 1000 talents (over 25,000 kilos) of gold to fight alongside him in the battle against Puru. That’s even stranger! Because Greek sources say Ambhi voluntarily came over to their side. So why a willing ally was paid such a large amount? If Alexander was really rolling through India, it’s inconceivable he would pay off a minor king to ally with him.

Almost all accounts of Alexander’s campaigns in India have been based on modern European translations of ancient texts. Unless Indian universities and think tanks look at the original Greek, Roman, Ethiopian and Egyptian manuscripts, a clear picture will not emerge. European translations are mostly slanted for obvious reasons. The Greek and Roman civilisations are the wellspring of western thought, science, culture, religion and philosophy; a defeat for Alexander ‘the Great’, would be a blow for all that he represents – especially the triumph of the West over the East.

Until Indian scholars ferret out the facts, let Plutarch have the last word. The Greek historian says that after the battle with the Pauravas, the badly bruised and rattled Greeks were frightened when they received information that further from Punjab lay places “where the inhabitants were skilled in agriculture, where there were elephants in yet greater abundance and men were superior in stature and courage”.

No wonder the Greeks never came back!

(About the author: Rakesh Krishnan is a features writer at Fairfax New Zealand. He has previously worked with Businessworld, India Today and Hindustan Times, and was news editor with the Financial Express.)

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The German bakery destroyed in a bombing in Pune, India

Summary

An improvised explosive device exploded at a German bakery in Pune, India, at about 7:30 p.m. local time Feb. 13. While no militant group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack, it bears a remarkable similarity to attacks that were commonplace throughout India before the more spectacular commando-style attack that targeted Mumbai in November 2008. Though conflicting reports have emerged on the sequence of events before the bomb detonated, the bakery, known to be frequented by foreigners, likely presented an appealing soft target for whatever individual or group wanted it hit.

Analysis

At approximately 7:30 p.m. local time on Feb. 13, an improvised explosive device detonated at a German bakery in Pune, India. Conflicting reports have emerged on the sequence of events, and while no militant group has claimed responsibility for the attack, it is similar to the type that occurred with frequency before the commando-style Mumbai attack, and the bakery may have been targeted because it was known to be frequented by foreigners.According to reports citing an employee of the bakery, a woman driving an auto-rickshaw handed the employee a backpack believed to contain the explosives responsible for the blast. However, an earlier story said that a customer placed a bag in the restaurant, and that the backpack was left unclaimed and detonated when a waiter opened it. The explosive material was reportedly RDX, a military-grade explosive, mixed with ammonium nitrate. Both materials are relatively easy to acquire and are commonly used in attacks in India. The fact that some reports indicate the device detonated as the backpack was opened suggests the bag was rigged to detonate upon being opened. However, due to conflicting information emerging about the incident, a timed device cannot be ruled out.The bakery, located just east of central Pune (approximately 100 miles southeast of Mumbai) in a neighborhood called Koregaon Park, was adjacent to Osho Ashram, a Hindu spiritual meditation center that draws in many foreign tourists. The bakery was also near many hotels that housed visitors to Osho Ashram. Other sites known to attract foreign visitors are also nearby, including a Chabad House, or Jewish cultural center, which was across the street from the bakery. (A Chabad House in Mumbai was targeted in the November 2008 militant attacks in that city.)The bakery was popular with foreign tourists, and the timing of the attack (Saturday evening) corresponded with peak business hours, when the restaurant would be bustling with people. This would make it less likely for suspicious activity to be noticed, and also provide a target-rich environment ; the restaurant was only some 344 square feet in size and was packed with nearly 70 people at the time of the blast.The latest reports indicate that nine people were killed in the incident, including the waiter who reportedly opened the bag, and as many as 60 were wounded. Contrary to earlier reports saying that most of those killed were foreigners, it appears that most of the casualties were Indians, with possibly only two foreigners (an Iranian biology student and an Italian woman) killed in the attack and 12 other foreigners injured. It is unclear how many foreigners were in the restaurant at the time, but since the restaurant was known to be a gathering place for foreigners (also as a place to buy drugs, according to one report), whoever was behind the attack could have been targeting foreigners. Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram said that David Headley, a U.S. citizen who was arrested in 2009 for his alleged links to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, had surveilled targets around the bakery during his trip prior to the 2008 attacks and during a March 2009 trip to Pune.Leading up to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, several Indian cities, including New Delhi, Bangalore and Ahmedabad, were the targets of serial bombings. The attacks involved multiple explosive devices detonating in short sequence in various locations around the cities, with crowded marketplaces and religious sites being very popular targets. These attacks occurred frequently across India, but quickly tapered off after the very different commando-style attack in Mumbai. Yesterday’s attack was the first significant bombing in India since Mumbai, but it was a fairly simple operation and involved only a single explosive device.Indigenous Islamic groups such as the Indian Mujihadeen claimed responsibility for the attacks leading up to Mumbai, for which the Pakistani-based Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba is believed to be responsible. No group has yet claimed responsible for the Pune attack, but indigenous Islamist groups certainly cannot be ruled out.Indian authorities, which have been at an elevated state of alert since the 2008 attacks, recently have issued warnings of possible attacks against religious sites around India. Chidambaram indicated that security had been stepped up at the nearby Chabad House and the Koregaon Park neighborhood of Pune in October 2009. With heightened security, it is more difficult to successfully carry out complex, multi-target attacks such as those of the recent past. However, an attack like the one against the German bakery in Pune, involving fewer people and fewer targets, would require less preparation time and communications and likely attract less attention from Indian authorities, and thus have a far higher chance of succeeding.

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Summary
India’s insurgent-ridden northeastern region has long given foreign powers a gamut of exploitable secessionist movements to use to prevent India from emerging as a major global player. Though India has grown accustomed to the ongoing volatility in its northeastern corridor, growing Islamization in the region — spurred by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency and instability in neighboring Bangladesh — will give New Delhi a good reason to pay closer attention to its porous northeastern border.

Analysis
Northeastern India is a region wracked by secessionist violence, where wide networks of drug smuggling, extortion and arms trafficking run rampant. India has traditionally dealt with the myriad secessionist movements through force, fearing that any concessions made to one group would only exacerbate the others’ secessionist tendencies and further undermine the country’s territorial integrity.

The balkanization of the region and the constant drain on Indian resources required to deal with these rebel movements was all part of the United Kingdom’s blueprint for the Indian subcontinent to prevent its former colony from developing a strong national identity and emerging as a major Asiatic power. Up until the partition in 1947, the British played a major role in encouraging tribal, ethnic, religious and linguistic identities, and in isolating various tribal groups from the mainland and the plains areas in Assam for the British East India Co. to secure its commercial enterprise.
Pakistan did not hesitate to jump in where the British left off in the post-partition period, and has since used its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to fund, train and arm these rebel groups in order to keep India’s hands tied. The largest and most powerful of the northeast secessionist movements is the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). Once a student movement with populist aims to redistribute the state’s oil wealth, ULFA has gradually changed into what appears to be a moneymaking machine with a strong willingness to do the ISI’s bidding. ULFA runs an impressive extortion racket in the northeast, where Assam’s tea plantation owners and corporate leaders are regularly targeted.

The group maintains that its armed campaign will not let up until the Indian government engages it in unconditional peace talks. Yet, when New Delhi makes such an offer, ULFA usually responds with a bombing, as was the case in the April 9 bomb attack near Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s motorcade in the Assamese capital of Guwahati. ULFA’s leadership understands that New Delhi is not about to reward the armed movement with political concessions, and does not wish to disturb the financial networks it has running throughout the region. Moreover, to preserve their militant proxy, the group’s handlers in both Pakistan’s and Bangladesh’s intelligence services have told ULFA not to hold peace talks with the Indian government.

Pakistan’s ISI, in cooperation with Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), appears to be investing a considerable amount of resources in solidifying India’s militant corridor. There are growing indications that these two agencies are working clandestinely in Bangladesh to bring all the northeast-based insurgent outfits and jihadist elements under one umbrella. The ISI has facilitated cooperation between ULFA and other northeastern militant outfits with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, Islamist militant groups in Kashmir, Islamist groups in Bangladesh and a growing number of al Qaeda-linked jihadist groups operating in the region.

Religion, ethnicity and ideology lose relevance within this militant network, as each group has a common interest in furthering their militant and financial capabilities by working together. For example, Tigers cadres organize training camps in the northeast and use their maritime contacts to assist ULFA in transporting arms and narcotics up to Cambodia in ULFA-owned shrimp trawlers that operate out of Bangladesh’s Chittagong port. The Tigers have also been known to train Maoist rebels in Nepal and India at camps in the jungles of India’s eastern state of Bihar.

ULFA’s growing links with Bangladeshi Islamists and jihadist elements in the area are increasingly coming to light. The April 9 attack timed with Singh’s visit to Assam marked the group’s, a tactic that was pioneered by the Tigers (a non-Islamist, majority Hindu group) and has been frequently employed by Islamist militants. Prior to the attack, ULFA chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa warned that New Delhi’s offer for unconditional peace talks was not acceptable, and that that ULFA cadres “have reached such a stage they would strap bombs on their chest and attack.” ULFA’s adoption of suicide bombing looks to be the result of the group’s increased Islamization caused by collusion with Islamist outfits in the region. The bomber in the April 9 suicide attack was Ainul Ali, a Muslim. Indian security sources revealed that ULFA did not have many Muslim cadres in its fold in the past, but the increasing flow of Bangladeshi refugees across the border has given the group more — and more capable — members willing to sacrifice their lives for the group’s cause with nudging from the ISI.

Collaboration between ULFA and the Islamist militants will expand further, as political conditions in Bangladesh appear to be indirectly contributing to the empowerment of Islamists there. Using the Pakistani military regime as an example, Bangladeshi army chief Lt. Gen. Moeen U. Ahmed is reasserting the army in Bangladeshi politics — which have long suffered from a bitter political feud between the family dynasties represented by the Awami League, led by Sheikh Hasina, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, led by Begum Khaleda Zia. With both party leaders driven into exile, a political vacuum has started to take root in the country, and Bangladesh’s Islamist parties are anxiously waiting to fill it.

India will be taking note of these political developments in Dhaka, though there is not much New Delhi can or wants to do to intervene. As a result, New Delhi is facing a bleak situation in which the ISI’s maneuvers and Bangladesh’s political troubles are sure to further constrain India’s ability to dig itself out of the militant trap Pakistan has set.

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Who are the Naxalites ?

The Naxalites, also sometimes called the Naxals, is a loose term used to define groups waging a violent struggle on behalf of landless labourers and tribal people against landlords and others. The Naxalites say they are fighting oppression and exploitation to create a classless society. Their opponents say the Naxalites are terrorists oppressing people in the name of a class war.

How many Naxalite groups are there?

Many groups operate under different names.  The Communist Party of India  (Marxist-Leninist) is the political outfit that propagates the Naxalite ideology. There are front organisations and special outfits for specific groups such as the Indian People’s Front.

The two main groups involved in violent activities, besides many factions and smaller outfits, are the People’s War, the group many believe is responsible for the attempt on Naidu, and the Maoist Communist Centre.

Where do they operate?

The most prominent area of operation is a broad swathe across the very heartland of India, often considered the least developed area of this country. The Naxalites operate mostly in the rural and Adivasi areas, often out of the continuous jungles in these regions. Their operations are most prominent in (from North to South) Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, eastern Maharashtra, the Telengana (northwestern) region of Andhra Pradesh, and western Orissa. It will be seen that these areas are all inland, from the coastline.

The People’s War is active mainly in Andhra Pradesh, western Orissa and eastern Maharashtra while the Maoist Communist Centre is active in Bihar, Jharkhand and northern Chhattisgarh.

Who do they represent?

The Naxalites claim to represent the most oppressed people in India, those who are often left untouched by India’s development and bypassed by the electoral process.  Invariably, they are the Adivasis, Dalits, and the poorest of the poor, who work as landless labourers for a pittance, often below India’s mandated minimum wages.

The criticism against the Naxalites is that despite their ideology, they have over the years become just another terrorist outfit, extorting money from middle-level landowners (since rich landowners invariably buy protection), and worse, even extorting and dominating the lives of the Adivasis and villagers who they claim to represent in the name of providing justice.

Who do the Naxalites target?

Ideologically, the Naxalites claim they are against India as she exists currently. They believe that Indians are still to acquire freedom from hunger and deprivation and that the rich classes – landlords, industrialists, traders, etc – control the means of production. Their final aim is the overthrow of the present system, hence the targeting of politicians, police officers and men, forest contractors, etc.

At a more local level, the Naxalites have invariably targeted landlords in the villages, often claiming protection money from them. Naxalites have also been known to claim ‘tax’ from the Adivasis and landless farmers in areas where their writ runs more than that of the government.

When did this movement start? How did it get its name?

The earliest manifestation of the movement was the Telengana Struggle in July 1948 (100 years after the Paris Communes were first set up, coining the word Communist). This struggle was based on the ideology of China’s Mao Zedong, with the aim of creating an Indian revolution. Not surprisingly, the ideology remains strong in this region of Andhra Pradesh.

But the Naxalite movement took shape after some members of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) split to form the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), after the former agreed to participate in elections and form a coalition government in West Bengal. Charu Mazumdar led the split.

On May 25, 1967, in Naxalbari village in Darjeeling district, northern West Bengal, local goons attacked a tribal who had been given land by the courts under the tenancy laws. In retaliation, the tribals attacked landlords and claimed the land. From this ‘Naxalbari Uprising’ came the word Naxalite.

Was it ever popular?

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Naxalite movement was popular. There were reports of brilliant students, including from the famed IITs, dropping out of college to join the struggle for the rights of the tribals and landless labourers. But as has been the case with many movements set up with high principles, over the years the Naxalite movement is seen as having lost its vision and having compromised its principles. Nevertheless, the fact that it has an endless supply of men and women joining its ranks shows that many still believe in its cause.

Do the Naxalites face much opposition?

Yes they do, almost from the entire Indian political spectrum. Noticeably, when the Naxalite movement first started in the late sixties in West Bengal, it was the CPI-M that cracked down hardest on the Maoist rebels, with ample support from the Congress at the Centre. At village levels, the Naxalites’ terror tactics have spawned local armies to provide protection to the landlords and others. The most infamous of these is the Ranvir Sena in Bihar and Jharkhand, formed by Bhumihar caste landlords, which kill tribals, Dalits and landless labourers either in retaliation or to enforce their domination.

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The geopolitics of India must be considered in the geographical context of the Indian subcontinent — a self-contained region that includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and, depending how one defines it, Nepal and Bhutan.   We call the subcontinent “self-contained” because it is a region that is isolated on all sides by difficult terrain or by ocean. In geopolitical terms it is, in effect, an island.

  This “island” is surrounded on the southeast, south and southwest by the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. To the west, it is isolated by mountains that rise from the Arabian Sea and run through Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, stretching northward and rising higher and higher to the northwestern corner of Pakistan. There, at the Hindu Kush, the mountain chain swings east, connecting with the Pamir and Karakoram ranges. These finally become the Himalayas, which sweep southeast some 2,000 miles to the border of Myanmar, where the Rakhine Mountains emerge, and from there south to India’s border with Bangladesh and to the Bay of Bengal. The Rakhine are difficult terrain not because they are high but because, particularly in the south, they are covered with dense jungle.

The Geography of the Subcontinent

The subcontinent physically divides into four parts:

• the mountainous frame that stretches in an arc from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal;
• the North Indian Plain, stretching from Delhi southeast through the Ganges River delta to the Myanmar border, and from the Himalayas in the north to the southern hills;
• the Indian Peninsula, which juts southward into the Indian Ocean, consisting of a variety of terrain but primarily hilly;
• the deserts in the west between the North Indian Plain and Pakistan’s Indus River Valley.

Pakistan occupies the western region of the subcontinent and is based around the Indus Valley. It is separated from India proper by fairly impassable desert and by swamps in the south, leaving only Punjab, in the central part of the country, as a point of contact. Pakistan is the major modern-day remnant of Muslim rule over medieval India, and the country’s southwest is the region first occupied by Arab Muslims invading from what is today southwestern Iran and southern Afghanistan.

The third major state in the subcontinent is the Muslim-majority Ganges delta state of Bangladesh, which occupies the area southeast of Nepal. Situated mainly at sea level, Bangladesh is constantly vulnerable to inundations from the Bay of Bengal. The kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan rest on the heights of the Himalayas themselves, and therefore on the edge of the subcontinent. There is also a small east-west corridor between Nepal and Bangladesh connecting the bulk of India to its restive northeastern states and its eastern border with Myanmar. In this region is India’s easternmost state, Arunachal Pradesh, whose territory is also claimed by China.

  The bulk of India’s population lives on the northern plain. This area of highest population density is the Indian heartland. It runs through the area around Lahore, spreading northwest into Pakistan and intermittently to Kabul in Afghanistan, and also stretching east into Bangladesh and to the Myanmar border. It is not, however, the only population center. Peninsular India also has an irregular pattern of intense population, with lightly settled areas intermingling with heavily settled areas. This pattern primarily has to do with the availability of water and the quality of soil. Wherever both are available in sufficient quantity, India’s population accumulates and grows.

  India is frequently compared geographically to non-Russian Europe because both are peninsulas jutting out of the Eurasian land mass. They have had radically different patterns of development, however.   The Europeans developed long-standing and highly differentiated populations and cultures, which evolved into separate nation-states such as Spain, France, Germany and Poland. Their precise frontiers and even independence have varied over time, but the distinctions have been present for centuries — in many cases predating the Roman Empire. The Indian subcontinent, on the other hand, historically has been highly fragmented but also fluid (except when conquered from the outside). Over fairly short periods of time, the internal political boundaries have been known to shift dramatically.
The reason for the difference is fairly simple. Europe is filled with internal geographic barriers: The Alps and Pyrenees and Carpathians present natural boundaries and defensive lines, and numerous rivers and forests supplement these. These give Europe a number of permanent, built-in divisions, with defined political entities and clear areas of conflict. India lacks such definitive features. There are no internal fortresses in the Indian subcontinent, except perhaps for the Thar Desert.   Instead, India’s internal divisions are defined by its river systems: the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the Narmada and so on. All of India’s major cities are centered around one of these river systems, a fact that has been instrumental in the rise of so many distinct cultures in India — Punjabis, Gujaratis, Marathis, Tamils and others — which have manifested in modern times as states within India. That said, Indian nationalism is very strong and counters the separatist tendencies. There is a balance between a strong central governance and substantial regional autonomy.   What is permanent in the subcontinent is the frame, the mountains, and beyond these the wastelands. We can see this most clearly when looking at the population distribution of the surrounding regions. The subcontinent is isolated as a population center, surrounded by comparatively empty regions. It is not only a question of the mountains around it, although those are substantial barriers; the terrain beyond the mountains in every direction is sparsely populated, and in many ways its resources are insufficient to support a sizable, sedentary civilization. As a result, India has rarely demonstrated an appetite for adventurism beyond the subcontinent. If India can find a way to manage Pakistan and Bangladesh, there is little pressure to do anything more.

India’s Geopolitical Imperatives

The geography of the subcontinent constrains the behavior of governments that arise there. If there is to be an independent India, and if it is to be a stable and secure nation-state, it must do the following things:

• Achieve suzerainty in the Ganges River basin. The broad, braided plains of the Ganges basin are among the most fertile in the world and guarantee a massive population. India must become the premier power in this heartland. This does not mean that such power must be wielded by a unified, centralized authority. A coalition of powers can be functional, and even somewhat hostile powers such as Bangladesh can be tolerated so long as they do not challenge India’s authority or security.
• Expand throughout the core of the subcontinent until it reaches all natural barriers. Forests, hills and rivers aside, there is little else in the confines of the subcontinent that limits India’s writ. “Control” of the additional territories can be a somewhat informal and loose affair. The sheer population of the Ganges basin really requires only that no foreign entity be allowed to amass a force capable of overwhelming the Ganges region.
• Advance past the patch of land separating the Ganges basin from the Indus River basin and dominate the Indus region (meaning Pakistan). The Indus Valley is the only other significant real estate within reach of India, and the corridor that accesses it is the only viable land invasion route into India proper. (Modern India has not achieved this objective, with implications that will be discussed below.)
• With the entire subcontinent under the control (or at least the influence) of a centralized power, begin building a navy. Given the isolation of the subcontinent, any further Indian expansion is limited to the naval sphere. A robust navy also acts as a restraint upon any outside power that might attempt to penetrate the subcontinent from the sea.

These imperatives shape the behavior of every indigenous Indian government, regardless of its ideology or its politics. They are the fundamental drivers that define India as a country, shaped by its unique geography. An Indian government that ignores these imperatives does so at the risk of being replaced by another entity — whether indigenous or foreign — that understands them better.

A History of External Domination

India’s geopolitical reality — relative isolation from the outside world, a lack of imposed boundaries, the immense population and the dynamic of a central government facing a vast region — has created localized systems that shift constantly, resist central authority, and ultimately cannot be organized into a coherent whole, either by foreign occupiers or by a native government. It is a landscape of shifting political entities, constantly struggling against each other or allying with each other, amid an endless kaleidoscope of political entities and coalitions. This divided landscape historically has created opportunities for foreign powers to divide India and conquer it — and indeed, the subcontinent was under foreign domination from the 11th century until 1947.

  Externally, the threats to India historically have come from the passes along the Afghan-Pakistani border and from the sea. India’s solution to both threats has been to accommodate them rather than resist directly, while using the complexity of Indian society to maintain a distance from the conqueror and preserve the cultural integrity of India. (In a sense, Mahatma Gandhi’s strategy of nonviolent resistance represents the foundation of India’s historical strategy, although the historical basis for Indian nonviolent resistance has been more commercial than ethical.) But essentially, India’s isolation, coupled with its great population, allows it to maintain a more or less independent foreign policy and balance itself between great powers.

  Between the 11th and 18th centuries, India was ruled by Muslims. The first invasion occupied the area of what is today Pakistan. Over the centuries — under various rulers and dynasties, particularly the Mughals — Muslims expanded their power until they dominated much of India. But that domination was peculiar, because the Muslims did not conquer the Hindus outright. Except in the area west of the Thar Desert and the Ganges delta, they did not convert masses of Indians to their religion. What they did was take advantage of the underlying disunity of India to create coalitions of native powers prepared to cooperate with the invaders. The urge to convert Hindus to Islam was secondary to the urge to exploit India’s wealth. Political and military power was a means toward this end, rather than toward conversion, and because of this, the Hindus were prepared to collaborate. In the end, the Indians’ internal tensions were greater than their resentment of outsiders.   European powers followed the Muslims into India en masse. Unlike the Muslims, they arrived from the sea, but like the Muslims, their primary motive was economic, and they sought political power as a means toward economic ends. The British, the most permanent European presence in the subcontinent, used India’s internal tensions to solidify their own position. They did not conquer India so much as they managed the internal conflicts to their advantage.   What was left behind when the British departed was the same sea of complex and shifting divisions that had defined India before they came. Most of the regions that were Muslim-majority areas became Islamic entities, eventually dividing into Pakistan and Bangladesh. The rest of India was united under a single government, but in a sense, that government ruled in the same way the British had.

The Geopolitics of Modern India

Modern India has its origins in the collapse of the British Empire. Indeed, it was the loss of India that ultimately doomed the British Empire. The entire focus of imperial Britain, from the Suez Canal to Gibraltar and Singapore, was to maintain the lines of supply to India. Many of the colonies and protectorates around the world secured by Britain in the 19th century were designed to provide coaling stations to and from India. In short, the architecture of the British Empire was built around India, and once India was lost, the purpose of that architecture dissolved as well. The historical importance of India could not be overestimated. Lenin once referred to it as the supply depot of humanity — which overstated the case perhaps, but did not overstate India’s importance to Britain.

  The British gave up India for several reasons, the most important of which was commercial: The cost of controlling India had outstripped the value derived. This happened in two ways. The first was that the cost of maintaining control of the sea-lanes became prohibitive. After World War II, the Royal Navy was far from a global navy. That role had been taken over by the United States, which did not have an interest in supporting British control of India. As was seen in the Suez crisis of 1956, when the British and French tried to block Egyptian nationalization of the canal, the United States was unprepared to support or underwrite British access to its colonies (and the United States had made this clear during World War II as well). Second, the cost of controlling India had soared. Indigenous political movements had increased friction in India, and that friction had increased the cost of exploiting India’s resources. As the economics shifted, the geopolitical reality did as well.   The independence of India resulted in the unification of the country under an authentically Indian government. It also led to the political subdivision of the subcontinent. The Muslim-majority areas — the Indus Valley region west and northwest of the Thar Desert, and the Ganges River basin — both seceded from India, forming a separate country that itself later split into modern-day Pakistan and Bangladesh. It was this separatism that came to frame Indian geopolitics.   India and Pakistan, for the bulk of their mutual existence, have had an adversarial relationship. For a long time, the Indian sentiment was that Pakistan’s separation from India could have been avoided. This attitude, coupled with Pakistan’s own geographic, demographic and economic inferiority, has forced Islamabad to craft its entire foreign policy around the threat from India. As a result, the two sides have fought four wars, mostly over Kashmir, along with one that resulted in the hiving off of Bangladesh.   As noted earlier, the Indian heartland is the northern plain of the Ganges River basin. This plain is separated from Pakistan’s heartland, the Indus Valley, only by a small saddle of easily traversed land; fewer than 200 miles separate the two rivers. If India is to have any ambition in terms of expansion on land, the Indus is the only option available — all other routes end either in barriers or in near-wasteland. Meanwhile, the closeness — and sheer overwhelming size — of India is central to Pakistan’s mind-set. The two are locked into rivalry.

China and the Himalayan Wall

Apart from this enmity, however, modern India has faced little in the way of existential threats. On its side of the mountain wall, there are two states, Nepal and Bhutan, which pose no threat to it. On the other side lies China.

  China has been seen as a threat to India, and simplistic models show them to be potential rivals. In fact, however, China and India might as well be on different planets. Their entire frontier runs through the highest elevations of the Himalayas. It would be impossible for a substantial army to fight its way through the few passes that exist, and it would be utterly impossible for either country to sustain an army there in the long term. The two countries are irrevocably walled off from each other. The only major direct clash between Indian and Chinese forces, which occurred in 1962, was an inconclusive battle over border territories high in the mountains — both in the northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Kashmiri border region of Aksai Chin — that could lead nowhere.   A potential geopolitical shift would come if the status of Tibet changed, however. China’s main population centers are surrounded by buffer states — Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. So long as all are in Chinese hands, the core of China is invulnerable to land attack. If, however, Tibet were to become independent, and if it allied with India, and if it permitted India to base substantial forces in its territory and to build major supply infrastructure there, then — and only then — India could be a threat to China. This is why the Indians for a long time championed the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence movements, and why the Chinese until fairly recently regarded this as a major threat. Had a pro-Indian, independent government been installed in Tibet, the threat to China would be significant. Because New Delhi held open the option of supporting Tibetan independence, Beijing saw the Indians as engaged in developing a threat to China.   The Chinese tried to develop equivalent threats in India, particularly in the form of Maoist communist insurgencies. Indian Maoists (Naxalites) and Nepalese Maoists have been supported by Beijing, though that support is no longer what it used to be. The Chinese have lost interest in aggressive Maoism, but they do have an interest in maintaining influence in Nepal, where the Maoists recently increased their power through electoral gains. This is China’s counter to India’s Tibet policy.
But for both, this is merely fencing. Neither would be in a position militarily to exploit an opening. Stationing sufficient force in Tibet to challenge the Chinese People’s Liberation Army would outstrip India’s resources, and for little purpose. Using Nepal as a base from which to invade India would be similarly difficult and pointless for Beijing. At the moment, therefore, there is no Indo-Chinese geopolitical hostility. However, these would be points of friction if such hostility were to occur in the distant future.

Russia, the United States and Pakistan

In the absence of direct external threats, modern India’s strategic outlook has been shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War and its aftermath. The most important strategic relationship that India had after gaining independence from Britain in 1947 was with the Soviet Union. There was some limited ideological affinity between them. India’s fundamental national interest was not in Marxism, however, but in creating a state that was secure against a new round of imperialism. The Soviets and Americans were engaged in a massive global competition, and India was inevitably a prize. It was a prize that the Soviets could not easily take: The Soviets had neither an overland route to India nor a navy that could reach it.

  The United States, however, did have a navy. The Indians believed (with good reason) that the United States might well want to replace Britain as a global maritime power, a development that might put India squarely in Washington’s sights. The Indians saw in the United States all the same characteristics that had drawn Britain to India. Elsewhere, India saw the United States acting both to hurry the disintegration of the European empires and to fill the ensuing vacuum. India did not want to replace the British with the Americans — its fundamental interest was to retain its internal cohesion and independence. Regardless of American intent — which the Indians saw as ambiguous — American capability was very real, and from the beginning the Indians sought to block it.   For the Indians, the solution was a relationship, if not quite an alliance, with the Soviet Union. The Soviets could provide economic aid and military hardware, as well as a potential nuclear umbrella (or at least nuclear technical assistance). The relationship with the Soviet Union was perfect for the Indians, since they did not see the Soviets as able to impose satellite status on India. From the American point of view, however, there was serious danger in the Indo-Soviet relationship. The United States saw it as potentially threatening U.S. access to the Indian Ocean and lines of supply to the Persian Gulf. If the Soviets were given naval bases in India, or if India were able to construct a navy significant enough to threaten American interests and were willing to act in concert with the Soviets, it would represent a serious strategic challenge to the United States.   In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States was facing a series of challenges. The British were going to leave Singapore, and the Indonesian independence movement was heavily influenced by the Soviets. The Egyptians, and therefore the Suez Canal, also were moving into the Soviet camp. If India became a pro-Soviet maritime power, it would simply be one more element along Asia’s southern rim threatening U.S. interests. The Americans had to act throughout the region, but they needed to deal with India fast.   The U.S. solution was an alliance with Pakistan. This served two purposes. First, it provided another Muslim counterweight to Nasserite Egypt and left-leaning Arab nationalism. Second, it posed a potential threat to India on land. This would force India to divert resources from naval construction and focus on building ground and air forces to deal with the Pakistanis. For Pakistan, geographically isolated and facing both India and a not-very-distant Russia, the relationship with the United States was a godsend.   It also created a very complex geographical situation.
The Soviet Union did not directly abut Pakistan — the two were separated by a narrow strip of territory in the northeasternmost confines of Afghanistan known as the Wakhan Corridor. The Soviets could not seriously threaten Pakistan from that direction, but the U.S. relationship with Pakistan made Afghanistan a permanent Soviet interest (with full encouragement of the Indians, who wanted Pakistan bracketed on both sides). The Soviets did not make a direct move into Afghanistan until late 1979, but well before then they tried to influence the direction of the Afghans — and after moving, they posed a direct threat to Pakistan.   China, on the other hand, did border on Pakistan and developed an interest there. The aforementioned Himalayan clash in 1962 did not involve only India and China. It also involved the Soviets. India and China were both putatively allied with the Soviet Union. What was not well known at the time was that Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated. The Chinese were very suspicious of Soviet intentions and saw Moscow’s relationship with New Delhi as potentially an alliance against China. Like the Americans, the Chinese were uneasy about the Indo-Soviet relationship. Therefore, China also moved to aid Pakistan. It was a situation as tangled as the geography, with Maoist China and the United States backing the military dictatorship of Pakistan and the Soviets backing democratic India.
From the Indian point of view, the borderland between Pakistan and China — that is, Kashmir — then became a strategically critical matter of fundamental national interest. The more of Kashmir that India held, the less viable was the Sino-Pakistani relationship. Whatever emotional attachment India might have had to Kashmir, Indian control of at least part of the region gave it control over the axis of a possible Pakistani threat and placed limits on Chinese assistance. Thus, Kashmir became an ideological and strategic issue for the Indians.

Shifting Alliances and Enduring Interests

In 1992, India’s strategic environment shifted: The Soviet Union collapsed, and India lost its counterweight to the United States. Uncomfortable in a world that had no balancing power to the United States, but lacking options of its own, India became inward and cautious. It observed uneasily the rise of the pro-Pakistani Taliban government in Afghanistan — replacing the Indian-allied Soviets — but it lacked the power to do anything significant. The indifference of the United States and its continued relationship with Pakistan were particularly troubling to India.
Then, 2001 was a clarifying year in which the balance shifted again. The attack on the United States by al Qaeda threw the United States into conflict with the Taliban. More important, it strained the American relationship with Pakistan almost to the breaking point. The threat posed to India by Kashmiri groups paralleled the threat to the United States by al Qaeda. American and Indian interests suddenly were aligned. Both wanted Pakistan to be more aggressive against radical Islamist groups. Neither wanted further development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Both were happy to be confronting the Pakistanis with more and more aggressive demands.

  The realignment of Indian relations with the United States did not represent a fundamental shift in Indian geopolitics, however. India continues to be an island contained by a ring of mountains. Its primary interest remains its own unity, something that is always at risk due to the internal geography of the subcontinent. It has one enemy on the island with it, but not one that poses a significant threat — there is no danger of a new generation of Muslim princes entering from Pakistan to occupy the Indian plain. Ideally, New Delhi wants to see a Pakistan that is fragmented, or at least able to be controlled. Toward this end, it will work with any power that has a common interest and has no interest in invading India. For the moment, that is the United States, but the alliance is one of convenience.   India will go with the flow, but given its mountainous enclosure it will feel little of the flow. Outside its region, India has no major strategic interests — though it would be happy to see a devolution of Tibet from China if that carried no risk to India, and it is always interested in the possibility of increasing its own naval power (but never at the cost of seriously reshaping its economy). India’s fundamental interest will always come from within — from its endless, shifting array of regional interests, ethnic groups and powers. The modern Indian republic governs India. And that is more important than any other fact in India.

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Dawood Ibrahim, one of Asia’s most notorious mafia dons and India’s version of Osama bin Laden, is emerging as a key suspect in the funding and logistical support for the November 26 terrorist strike on Mumbai.
 
Ibrahim, who tops the Mumbai police list of its 44 most wanted criminals, is among 20 fugitives India has asked Pakistan to extradite following the multiple attacks in Mumbai that killed nearly 200.

  Pakistan, as it did with a similar list received after terrorists assaulted India’s parliament in 2001, has refused to deport the fugitives, or even acknowledge their presence in the country.   The “most wanted” list reflects a deadly South Asian stew of terrorist organization chieftains, crime gang bosses, murderers, hijackers and violent leaders of separatist groups.   If Pakistan extradited Ibrahim, an Interpol-listed criminal, it may ease tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. If not to India, Pakistan could hand him over to Interpol, or the US, where enforcement authorities want him as one of the world’s most dangerous drug lords. Such a move would mollify India’s public anger against Pakistan’s inactivity.
The catch is that India’s most infamous mafia boss has stories that powerbrokers on both sides of the border might not want the world to hear. Therein lies a reason why Ibrahim apparently continues to live lavishly – alternating between Karachi and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, according to various reports including from the Pakistan media.   Even as Pakistani authorities claim ignorance of Ibrahim’s whereabouts, his family is well settled in Pakistan society. Dawood’s eldest daughter Mahrukh married Junaid Miandad, eldest son of well-known former Pakistan cricket captain Javed Miandad in July 2005. Javed Miandad is now the newly appointed director-general of the Pakistan Cricket Board.
The boss of “D” Company, as India calls Dawood Ibrahim’s global criminal organization, is the main suspect in the 1993 serial bomb blasts in Mumbai that killed over 300. He has been accused of executing the attack in collusion with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).   Ibrahim is also suspected of orchestrating the November 26 terrorist strikes in Mumbai through a businessman in Saudi Arabia said to be his frontman.
The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists set sail from Karachi to Mumbai in the ship MV Alpha, allegedly an Ibrahim-owned vessel. After being warned of Indian navy patrols along the Indian coast, the LET terrorists hijacked an Indian fishing trawler, Kuber, and murdered its crew except for the navigator, Amarsinh Solanki.   The terrorists slit Solanki’s throat five nautical miles off the Indian coast – the Indian Navy found his body aboard the abandoned trawler with his hands tied behind his back. Later, they linked up with an Ibrahim gang member in Mumbai who provided them motorized inflatable rubber dinghies in which they landed ashore after 9pm on November 26. Within 30 minutes, they struck pre-determined targets in South Mumbai starting with the Leopold Cafe in Colaba.   The Mumbai police’s Crime Branch has yet to make any official statement on “D” Company’s alleged involvement in the terrorist attacks. Still, there is unofficial tacit admission from present and retired police officials that the attacks could not have been carried out without Ibrahim’s involvement.   “The Dawood Ibrahim involvement comes under criminal intelligence and none speaks whoever has it,” Kiran Bedi, a former inspector General of Police and special commissioner of Police Intelligence, told Asia Times Online. Bedi, one of Asia’s most distinguished female police officers and 1994 Magsaysay Award winner, was a prominent voice within the Indian police until she retired in 2007. “The only other option is the media’s investigators who may have covered him in the past and are still on the person concerned,” she said.
Some senior Indian Coast Guard officials have privately admitted to Mumbai journalists of Ibrahim’s hand in the terrorist attacks, saying nobody knows the sea around Mumbai better than the man who controls smuggling off Mumbai’s coast. The LET terrorists used resources provided by one of Ibrahim’s pointmen in Mumbai, who is said to be a major smuggler of diesel, drugs and petroleum products along India’s western coast.   Ibrahim’s involvement featured in a media briefing at the White House on December 1, even as US President George W Bush was in the Situations Room receiving an update on the Mumbai attacks. Press Secretary Dana Perino neither denied nor confirmed Ibrahim’s role in the attacks, though she pointedly picked at the reference to him in a long-winded question from one of the reporters present.   Fifty-two-year old Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar has 26 aliases – from Abdhul Hamid Aziz to Sheik Ibrahim – and is known to have used at least 11 passports. He started as small-time smuggler of gold and silver nearly 30 years ago in Mumbai. Standing 5-feet, 4-inches, the diminutive son of a police constable gradually built a worldwide criminal network said to number around 1,500. His path to power has been littered with accusations of extortion, murder contracts, counterfeit currency printing, smuggling, gambling, narcotics and international cricket match-fixing.   Mumbai police officials in the Crime Branch have long been aware of Ibrahim’s heavy investment in real estate and the production of Bollywood movies. Police said “D” Company men in Mumbai recently sent Ibrahim US$24 million from real estate transactions.
The US government set its sights on Ibrahim on October 16, 2003, with the US Treasury Department marking him as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist”. “For the Ibrahim syndicate, the business of terrorism forms part of their larger criminal enterprise, which must be dismantled,” said Juan Zarate, the US deputy assistant secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, while releasing Executive Order 13224.   On June 1, 2006, the US Statement on “Presidential Designation of Foreign Narcotics Kingpins”, named Ibrahim among “significant foreign narcotics traffickers, their organizations and operatives worldwide” who were to be “denied access to the US financial system and all trade and transactions involving US companies and individuals”.
Ibrahim’s involvement in the Mumbai terrorist attacks may have already been known to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as early as September. According to information now circulating among the global intelligence community, US signals intelligence (SIGINT) spotted a sharp increase in “chatter” from Pakistan that indicated an operation was cooking. Field agents confirmed suspicions.   In mid-September, the CIA station chief in New Delhi met his Indian counterpart of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s overseas spy agency. The CIA station chief is said to have specifically revealed that the Lashkar-e-Taiba was planning a major attack that would come from the sea.   As late as November 18, RAW intercepted a satellite phone call made to a number in Lahore, Pakistan, often used by Yusuf Muzammil, the military commander of LET. The caller informed his Pakistan-based handlers that he was heading for Mumbai with unspecified “cargo”, in the ship belonging to Ibrahim.   When Interpol on July 21, 2006, arrested a leading Lashkar-e-Taiba operative, Syed Abdul Karim, in Mombassa, on the East African coast, Indian and US intelligence agents pointed to Ibrahim’s growing connections with Pakistan-based terror groups such as the LET and Harkat ul-Jihad Islami, as well as al-Qaeda. Ibrahim is suspected of renting out his vast smuggling network, and resources such as ships, material and corrupt officials, to terrorist groups worldwide.   Following his trail, Mumbai police on December 2 interrogated “D” Company gangsters in Arthur Road Jail. Those questioned included Ibrahim henchman Abu Salem, Mustafa Dossa and Salim Fruit. The outcome of the interrogations is not yet publicly known, but one account claims that incarcerated “D” Company gangsters are now “terrified”.
Where is Dawood Ibrahim? According to Mumbai police, his last known city address is “33/36, Pakmodiya street, Haji Ismail, Musafirkhana, Dongri, Mumbai”.   An Interpol-United Nations Security Council Special Notice QI K 135 03, maintained by the UN Security Council al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee (1267 Committee), gives Dawood Ibrahim’s address as “White House, near Saudi Mosque, Clifton, Karachi.”
Karachi-based newspaper Newsline reported in a September 2001 cover story titled “Karachi’s Gang Wars” that two rival underworld gangs in the city were both working for Ibrahim.   “After the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts, Dawood Ibrahim and his team have made Karachi their new home and base of operations,” the Karachi Newsline report said. “Living under fake names and IDs, and provided protection by government agencies, they have built up their underworld empire in Karachi employing local talent like Shoaib and Bholoo.”
But Pakistan leaders, including current President Asif Zardari, have for years dismissed Ibrahim’s presence in Pakistan. Zardari even termed Dawood “a phantom created by India”.
Even so, a US Office of Foreign Assets Control statement from June 1, 2006 listed at least four addresses for Dawood Ibrahim in Karachi, Pakistan:
- 617 CP Berar Society, Block 7-8, Karachi
- House No. 37, Street 30, Phase V, Defense Housing Authority, Karachi
- House No. 10, Hill Top Arcade, Defense Housing Authority, Karachi
- Moin Palace, 2nd Floor, Opp Abdullah Shah Gazi Dargah, Clifton, Karachi   The Foreign Assets Control list also included Ibrahim’s Dubai address: White House, Al-Wassal Road, Jumeira, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.   “Dawood’s underworld connects and business ventures are extensive,” according to Lahore-based Pakistan journalist Amir Mir. “And he sublets his name in Pakistan, Thailand, South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates, among other countries, to franchises in the fields of drug trafficking and gambling dens.”   Another Pakistan journalist Ghulam Hasnain described Ibrahim’s life as a “king” in Karachi: “His home is a palatial house spread over 6,000 square yards, boasting a pool, tennis courts, snooker room and a private, hi-tech gym. He wears designer clothes, drives top-of-the-line Mercedes and luxurious four-wheel drives, sports a half-a-million rupee Patek Phillipe wristwatch, and showers money on starlets and prostitutes.”   The Karachi-based Hasnain explains why Ibrahim is valuable to the ISI and the army: “Dawood is Pakistan’s number one espionage operative. His men in Mumbai help him get whatever information he needs for Pakistan. Rumor has it that sometimes his men in Karachi accompany Pakistani intelligence agents to the airports to scan arriving passengers and identify RAW agents.”   Hasnain even claims Dawood once rescued Pakistan’s Central Bank during a crisis by providing a huge loan. For now, as international patience wears thin, Pakistan could rescue itself from a worsening crisis by handing over Dawood Ibrahim to Interpol or US law enforcement agencies, if not directly to India.

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Creationism vs Evolution has always been a topic of hot debate between Christian/Jewism/Islamic scholars and modern scientists. Why? Because science claims that human beings evolved from monkeys but these religions preach that God “created” humans and sent them to the earth. Hinduism is the ONLY religion that actually combines scientific theory with religious mythology! It might come as a surprise to many people, but Hinduism actually explained Darwin’s theory of Evolution much before Darwin! This is in accordance with many other scientific discoveries/inventions that Hindus made thousands of years before modern scientists.

So how does Hinduism explain Darwin’s theory of evolution? Let me backtrack a little, for the readers who are not familiar with mythology - God Vishnu (one of the trinity in Hinduism) is said to incarnate on Earth periodically and in various “forms”. The “forms” might be some animal form or human or humanoid forms. Now, many Christian/Islamic scholars scoff at the whole “God incarnating as a fish” concept but they don’t realize that Hindus have discovered and documented the biological theory of evolution and these stories are just a form of easy documentation. Ok, enough digressing, let’s get into the specifics of how early Hindus documented the theory of evolution via the mythology of incarnations/avatars (avtars) of Vishnu. According the the modern theory of evolution, Homo Sapiens started out as Fish in the water and went through many different stages before finally evolving into Homo Sapiens. Now let’s get to the actual details. I’ll explain each stage of the evolution first as described by modern science and then as described by Hindu texts - Stage 1 - Chordates (Fish) vs MatsyaModern Science:
Proto-Amphibians that primarily lived in the water, this can be seen as the first stage of life. Examples are prehistoric fishes.

Hinduism:
The very first incarnation of Vishnu was Matsya avatar and Matsya literally means Fish. It clearly parallels with the scientific view. Stage 2 - Tetrapodes (Reptiles with legs) vs Kurma (tortoise) Modern Science:
Fish finally evolved out of water became Reptiles (with legs to be accurate). The examples are tortoise, lizards etc.Hinduism:
Second avatar of Vishnu is Kurma. Kurma means Tortoise which is a reptile that walks on four legs. Again it’s a direct parallel with the scientific view. Stage 3 - Mammals vs Varaha (Boar)

Modern Science:
Reptiles evolved into Mammals that could bear children and lived only on the land.Hinduism:
Varaha (Boar) avatar represents land dwelling Mammals. You may ask - why Boar? Why not a deer or monkey or some other mammal? The reason is that Boar belongs the the “Suina” family whose maxillary or teeth are in front and therefore they do not have to swallow and regurgitate their food just like us humans! It’s extremely enlightening to note that Hinduism had such a very insightful knowhow thousands of years ago! Stage 4 - Primates (to Hominidae) vs Narasimha Modern Science:
Finally primates were evolving into Hominidae forms that looked more like humans, were partially bipedalled (walk on legs) but their brains were still not quite developed. They can be figuratively seen as having partly human lower body and animal like upper body. Hinduism:
Narasimha avatar is a more abstract representation of a Hominidae that is half human and half animal. The interesting thing to note here is that Narasimha has the upper body of a lion but lower body of a man. This is important because this directly relates to the idea of a pre-human without a well developed brain but with the partial ability to become bipedal (walk on legs). Also, Lion was used because it’s primarily a carnivore just like the early Hominidae. Another interesting observation is that the Narasimha avatar is characterized by being in the “middle” of two things (being neither and midway) and that directly correlates to Hominidae that is about halfway though to being human! So, Narasimha is a perfect way to explain the pre-Homo Erectus form. Stage 5 - Hominidae before Homo Erectus (more like humans but much shorter) vs Vamana Modern Science:
Finally Hominidae got closer to Homo Erectus was evolved. He was bipedal (walk on legs) more human looking but very short. Hinduism:
Vamana avatar represents a being that is very close to humans but is extremely short. I guess, the parallel is obvious! Stage 6 - Homo Erectus (to Homo Sapiens) vs Parashurama Modern Science: Homo Erectus and then Homo Sapien was evolved that was about as tall as present day humans and could use tools. Homo Sapien is the present day human and biological evolution ends here. Hinduism: Parashurama avatar represents a man with an Axe. As you notice, unlike earlier Avatars, this is the first avatar of Vishnu that has no animal characteristics and wields an Axe. So basically, Parashuaram is what the current day human would be who could also use tools, in other words Homo Sapien. Again, the Avatar as described by Hinduism matches perfectly with the description of Homo Sapien! Stage 7 - Homo Sapiens exterminate Homo Neanderthalensis vs Rama kills demons Modern Science:
There were other “types” of humans evolving in parallel to Homo Sapiens, they are called Homo Neanderthalensis. So, another step in biosocial evolution is the extinction of Homo Neanderthalensis so that only Homo Sapiens (us) remained. These “other humans” had distinctly different bone structures and body types and it’s not a far stretch of imagination to realize that these “other humans” can very well be the “demons” (asuras) mentioned in Hinduism. Hinduism:
According to mythology, suras (gods) and asuras (demons) had been warring since the start of time and it’s the Lord Rama (7th avatar of Vishnu) that finally killed all the asuras so that human beings can live in peace. Again a direct parallel. Stage 8 - Advanced in civilizations and culture and to todays world vs Tretayuga Modern Science: Mankind never stopped since they learned to use tools and all the

Neanderthalensis were eliminated. Civilizations were formed, wars were fought, kingdoms were born and finally the world is as we see it today. The chief characteristic here is the increasing complexity of life and society. Hinduism: Krishna’s incarnation represents the stage where the world was in Treta Yuga and therefore far more complex than the Satya Yuga. I think a proper explanation with comparison of economy, business, society, language and other factors will require a separate post. Conclusion: The 8 avatars of Vishnu are strikingly similar to different stages of human evolution and details like using Boar (an animal from Suina family) and extermination of Neanderthalensis etc leave no doubt that the avatars of Vishnu really describe evolution of human beings so it’s clear that Hindus had figured the evolution/origin of species (and perhaps natural selection) thousands of years before Darwin.It’s unbelievably that Hindus correctly theorized evolution thousands of years before western scientists did. This is another gem from long forgotten ancient Hindu scientific discoveries/inventions! Or is it another example of when western scientists stole Hindu scientific discoveries/inventions?

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One thousand years of slavery. Millennia of defeat and domination caused by a dogmatic adherence to the doctrine of ahimsa, preventing an effective resistance to foreign domination. This is what most Hindus are brought up to believe about their history.

These and other such theories are happily put forward as history of Hindus for the past 14 centuries and postulated by self proclaimed scholars from both within and without the Hindu fold. It was something I have heard from my youth and accepted without question. However some thoughts rankled in my mind. If the Hindus were truly slaves for a thousand years plus, then how have we survived to this day with dignity and honour and with a spiritual tradition stretching back to the mists of time and beyond? Many other cultures, civilisations and spiritual traditions have been reduced to museum pieces, but the words of the Holy Vedas are recited in an identical fashion today as they were thousands of years ago when first revealed to the Rishis. This is no mean achievement. How did Hindus survive and manage to maintain a civilisational identity stretching into the dawn of human history? How was Sanatana Dharma kept alive as a living presence in the world, and indeed regenerated over time if the Hindus were slaves for so long? This impelled me to look for the truth myself, and undertake a study of the history of the Hindu people. The beginning of Hindus’ “thousand years of slavery” is supposed to have begun with the overrunning of India by Muslims of Arab and Turkish origin. It is popularly believed that Hindus put up a feeble defence and that the Islamic armies had a cake walk through India. If we examine at what actually happened, however, we see that Hindus put up a huge struggle, which was eventually victorious. Following the death of their founder, Muhammad we see the Arab Khilafat expand swiftly over the Middle and Near East, pouring over the deserts of North Africa and crossing the waters to begin a six century occupation of Spain and beyond. The combined might of Christian Europe struggled again and again to reclaim the ‘holy lands’ to end in bitter failure with the rise of the Ottoman Empire, who ruled over a large part of Eastern Europe for centuries. On the other side, the lands of Iran, home of the ancient and historical Persian civilisation fell to the yet undefeated Arab warriors and within a short period the indigenous culture becoming extinct or expelled, today being largely the confine of museums and relics. The Arab hordes then pushed into the Indian Subcontinent, land of the Hindus, overwhelming the small desert region of Sindh and then attempted to push and conquer the existing Hindu kingdoms. Here however their advance was stopped. With the inspiration of Sant Gorakhnath the warrior clans of the Rajputs united under their legendary king Bappa Rawal and in a series of Battles known collectively as the Battle of Rajashtan inflicted a heavy defeat on the Arab invaders in 738 CE. Any further advances by the Arabs were repelled, impelling the formation of large organised Hindu states in the centre and west of India. Frustrated by their failures in India the Arabs turned northwards shortly after defeating the Chinese Empire in the Battle of Talas in 751 CE opening the gate for the Islamisation of Central Asia. India remained unaffected for another three hundred years. (the “thousand years of slavery theory” was beginning to shake) The Islamisation of Central Asia began to grow apace and one by one the ancient Buddhist kingdoms began to totter and fall as tribe after tribe joined the ranks of the growing Muslim religion. The destruction of Buddhism and its centers in the region prompted an exodus towards India, and the conversion of the remaining clans to Islam. The Muslim armies were expanded, filled with the zeal and energy of new converts, who were sent spiraling towards the Middle East to fight the advancing Crusaders under the leadership of Saladin. Another wave of attacks poured towards India resulting in large scale damage and loot from the subcontinent under the leadership of Mahmud of Ghazni around 1000 CE. Two further centuries passed as further advances were resisted until a breakthrough around 1200 CE allowed the invaders access to the North Indian plains. The remaining Buddhists were slaughtered or converted in an unprecedented orgy of violence and horror. The majority Buddhist regions of Afghanistan, Kashmir and West Punjab joined the crescent banner of Islam. However the conversion of Hindus was slower and the resistance was more fierce. Hindu warrior clans kept up a relentless resistance fighting from the deserts, the mountains and the forests. The heavy cavalry of the Muslim Turks which had proved fatal to the Crusaders of Western Europe were victorious on the plains of North India but this did not prevent an endless cycle of attack and counter attack by the Hindus. It took nearly another hundred years under the leadership of the infamous Aladdin Khilji for the Muslims Empire firmly established itself in India. This mantle was inherited by the Tughlaqs only to lead to a revival from the Hindu population. The religious traditions of India had been severely mauled by the endless bloodletting over the past two centuries. Many important institutions and temples were destroyed. Prosperity suffered, as it tends to in times of continuous war. This created a certain weakening of Hindu society. Religion became preserved in rituals which were les and les understood. Sanskrit learning was on the decline. Caste became more rigid. However, a religious renewal took place in the form of the “Bhakti movement”. A simplified form of Hinduism particularly suitable to the times emerged. A new wave of spiritual teachers preaching that simple devotion and love of God and love of all people and creatures is the simplest root to salvation. A message of defiance and brotherhood from saints and rishis from all corners of India emerged. From Tukram and Namdev from the west of India, from Nanak in Punjab, from Chaitanya in the east and Kabir in the north plus many others, the message of dharma revived itself in the teeth of an implacable enemy. The fearless postulating of the brotherhood of all mankind defied the savagery raging around them as the Turks endeavoured to convert the entire subcontinent to Islam and the Hindus fighting tooth and nail to resist. The Muslim empire seemed to rest on specified military encampments and cities surrounded by a sea of hostile Hindus usually left to their own devices. Hundred of Rajahs and Maharajahs dotted the nation living in virtual independence from the central authorities in which traditions of culture and religion were maintained unchanged through the centuries. Other larger organised resistance emerged in the Vijaynagara Empire of South India around 1336 CE which consolidated Hindu resistance for over two centuries. In the north the revival of the Rajput kingdoms and the defiance of kings like those of Orissa under the Gajapati Kings, the hills of Punjab under Jasrath Khokhar and the rise of neo Hindu kingdoms in the north east of India along with the entire hill region signaled the revival of Hindu rule over vast tracts of India. A steady period of Hindu growth then ensued until by the dawn of the 1500’s the southern region of India was dominated by the mighty king of the Vijaynagara Empire, Krishnadevarya and the north by the revival of the valiant Rajputs under the charismatic leadership of Rana Sanga (grandfather of the equally illustrious Rana Pratap). The tides of history however turned again – with the influx of cannons and other artillery utilised by Babur the Mughal entered into the Indian subcontinent against which the wild charges of the Rajputs and Pathans had no answer. The reckless disregard of their own lives in the defence of dharma saw a series of battles in which the Hindu forces fought quite literally to the last man woman and child, most famously the siege of Chhitor in 1567. The utter refusal of the Hindus to surrender in the century old tussle with Islam for political control over the subcontinent was a lesson not lost by the new Emperor Akbar. He instead moved away from the tenets of Islam to a new faith of the Din i Ilahi. By following the age old traditions of religious toleration in India he endeared himself to the majority population and through a period of compromise and alliance brought a brief period of peace to the troubled land. This tenuous alliance was shattered by his descendant Aurangzeb who in his zeal for the establishment of an Islamic state caused an upheaval which left the Mughal Empire fall beyond all hope of repair. The renewal of the civilisational Hindu-Islam conflict saw the rise of a generation of Sants and holy men inspiring the people for the defence of dharma which saw the might of the Mughals humbled by Rajputs, Marathas, Jats, Satnamis, Ahoms, Sikhs, Bundelas and others. In a cataclysmic wave of defiance the Mughal Empire lay broken and on its ruins rose a number of Hindu states competing for space in the subcontinent. The inspirational rise of the Maratha king Shivaji and his bold defiance of the Mughal empire in the noontide of its realm is an apt example. Who did the British wrest control of India from? When the British came on the Indian scene, it if thought or assumed by many people that he British took control of India from the Mughals. This is not true. In fact, by the time that the British emerged as a major force in India, the Muslim political power in the subcontinent had been virtually cast down. The situation is best defined by a British author, H.G.Keene The idea, however, that the British have wrested the Empire from the Mohamadans is a mistake. The Mohamadans were beaten down — almost everywhere except in Bengal — before the British appeared upon the scene; Bengal they would not have been able to hold, and the name of the “Mahratta Ditch” of Calcutta shows how near even the British there were to extirpation by India’s new masters. Had the British not won the battles of Plassey and Buxar, the whole Empire would ere now have become the fighting ground of Sikhs, Rajputs, and Mahrattas and others. Except the Nizam of the Deccan there was not a vigorous Musalman ruler in India after the firman of Farokhsiar in 1716; the Nizam owed his power to the British after the battle of Kurdla in 1795), and it was chiefly British support that maintained the feeble shadow of the Moghul Empire, from the death of Alamgir II. to the retirement of Mr. Hastings. Not only Haidarabad but all the other existing Musalman principalities of modern India owe their existence, directly, or indirectly, to the British intervention.
The march of western civilisation ended the Hindu revival at a time when Hindus exercised control over almost the entire subcontinent. But it took Three wars with the Marathas, Two wars with the Sikhs, two wars with the Gurkhas, war with the Jaats, also smaller ranging wars with the Santhals, Sanyasis and many others – all Hindu rebellions. Hindus unwillingness to surrender culminated in the huge uprising from the predominantly Hindu sepoys in 1857 which almost brought the British Indian Empire to a swift conclusion being the largest anti colonial uprising in history. The end result was 90 years of imperialist rule. This was matched by a concerted disarming of the population by the British rulers, leaving only select regions free from the disarming which were perceived as loyal to the British under the flawed marital race theory. This theory propagated by the forerunners of the concepts of eugenics and Nazism believed the Indian races could not match the British combination of physical and mental facilities. Thus a large percentage of Hindu population, despite holding sway of almost all of the Indian subcontinent were delegated into the non martial section by the British. Other sections believed to be of sufficient physical abilities (but not mental development) were delegated by the Imperialists as ‘martial races’ This flawed theory was propagated as an absolute truth (still followed by some) and together with the disarming of the population led to the diminishing of the martial spirit amongst Hindus. However the theories propagated by the British found challengers from the Hindus. Spurred by a revaluation of their history and the knowledge of western theories a new revival began to take fruit. From the universal preaching of Swami Vivekananda to the guns of the Anushilan Samiti the Hindus were at the forefront of a growing anti colonial challenge to the most powerful empire in the world. Finally finding control of the subcontinent untenable in the teeth of endless opposition the British Indian Empire collapsed in a wave of unprecedented bloodshed which has seen a slow and steady spread and reach of the Hindu world. So again, I was stumped by this ‘thousand years of slavery’ theory. I was even more surprised to find this postulated by otherwise very earnest Hindus in the mistaken belief of their own history. When examining our history I saw a spirit of defiance stretching over a thousand years in the face of implacable and merciless enemies, who put an end to many other cultures and civilisations. The same forces which had overcome virtually every indigenous civilisation in the world had thrown their entire might against India – and failed. Attack after attack was defeated. Horrific massacres did not force the people to abandon their religion and identity. The destruction of holy places did not see dharma die but rise again and overcome their opponents with the power of truth. The banner of freedom was raised generation after generation despite the best attempts of some vested parties to blur the truths and sacrifices made again and again. So 150 of effective rule by the Muhamadans and 90 of British rule was suddenly expanded into ‘one thousand years of slavery’ an utterly absurd contention is being bandied about like an absolute truth but has failed to hide the facts that remain unaltered in history. Ancient faiths like Buddhism and Zorasterism were almost obliterated from the Middle East, Central Asia and India but the Hindus rose in defiance to emerge even stronger at the end of the blood soaked millennia. Even well wishers of Hindus, lost in their Victorian outlook on India have propagated the same absurdities in total insult of the enduring Hindu spirit. The spirit is best exemplified by the renowned historian Sir Jadunath Sarkar when talking of the legendary Maratha king Shivaji: He [Shivaji] has proved that the Hindus can still produce not only clerks and soldiers but rulers of men. (…) Shivaji proved that the tree of Hinduism is not really dead – that it rose from the seemingly crushing load of centuries of attack and put forth new leaves and lift its head to the skies.     Courtsey: M. R. Vaghela
Hindu Voice UK, 26 September 2009
k/issues/30/history.htm

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Two of the most influential people in history, Constantine and Ashoka, are also the center of constant debate. Historians have to discern who they were, what they did, and what they truly believed.

  While Constantine did not create Christianity, he certainly brought it to a place of prominence in the Roman Empire when he converted to it. And he increased its prestige when he gave bishops a level of authority which surprises many people to this day.[1] But he did much more. Perhaps the four things which he did that had the greatest impact on history are the proclamation of the Edit of Milan in 313, the calling of the Council of Nicea in 325, the creation of the Holy Sepulchre (a project begun around the time of Nicea), and the consecration of Constantinople in 330.   Ashoka, like Constantine, was a convert to a new faith, Buddhism. By his royal patronage, he gave it the kind of respect and resources it needed in order to become a major, world-spanning religion. Like Constantine, it appears Ashoka wanted the adherents of his new faith to come together and work out what it was they believed, and he did this by calling a Buddhist council. If any of the traditions associated with it has any validity (which is likely), this council was to impact the future shape of Buddhism in the way Nicea helped shape Christian history.[2] And like Constantine, Ashoka had a major impact on the land in which he lived: not only was he to have established one of the greatest kingdoms in India through his conquests (before his full conversion to Buddhism), once he became a Buddhist, the number, extent, and quality of the projects he created for the improvement of the lives of those within his kingdom was to become second to none in the ancient world. He became one of history’s greatest humanitarians.   While the legends associated with Constantine and Ashoka developed along similar lines, this could only have happened if there were similarities in their actual histories. Legends come out of real events and develop them, creating fanciful interpretations of what happened. They have to have been based upon something which really happened, for without those events, nothing would have been said. Thus, for both of them we find:

• Even before they were converted, it appears both were actively seeking religious insight for their lives, helping to explain why they would latch on to a new faith once they believed it helped answer questions which had long confused them. They were both, in their own way, prepared for their conversion. Constantine was already monotheistic; he was trying to understand who the one Great Divinity actually was. Even his vision of the cross seems to have been initially misunderstood, and treated as if revealed to him by Apollo.[3] Ashoka, before his becoming Buddhist, was already in dialogue with Buddhist monks and was learning from them; and since Buddhism at this time was closer to Hinduism and was able to adapt Hindu cosmology for its new teaching, this made the transfer from one to the other much easier.[4]
• Both of them had two stages of conversion. For Constantine, his acceptance of the Christian faith did not lead him to baptism until the end of his life; he was clearly interested in integrating his pre-Christian monotheistic faith with his Christianity, although the reason seems to have been for the sake of unity in the empire. Constantine wanted to use the concord between faiths, wherever it could be found, to keep the peace. Ashoka on the other hand had come to accept the tenets of Buddhism while he was actively involved in his conquest of India; it was only after experiencing the aftermath of a very bloody battle did he find the need to give himself entirely to the teachings of the Buddha and grieve over the slaughter he had caused. [5]
• Both seem to have been influenced, in part, by the work of the women in their lives: Constantine’s mother, Helen, helped shape his pious activity. For Ashoka, history suggests that it was one of his queens, one who was from Vidisa and the mother of Mahinda and Sanghamitta, who lead him to Buddhism.[6]
• For both, it was during war, and through the execution of that war, that they would slowly find themselves drawn into their new faith. For Constantine, the power and authority of the Christian God in the time of war affirmed his conversion. For Ashoka, it was the tragedy of war, and the suffering which came from its wake, that transformed him into a man of peace.[7]
• Both had a sense of great guilt associated with them. Constantine certainly had some blame in the death and execution of his wife and son Fausta and Crispus;[8] for Ashoka, the tyranny it took to become emperor was place a lot of blood on his hands (including many in his own family).[9] Both seemed to satisfy that guilt in part through the creation and visitation of holy sites: Constantine with the Holy Sepulchre, Ashoka with various monuments concerning the life and relics of the Buddha (indeed, extending the relics far and wide so that many would have access to them).
• Both saw their empires flourish during their reign. Constantine re-established a unity in Rome which had been lost the previous century. Ashoka created a great empire, bringing the greater part of India together for the first time in the process. But both of their successes was limited to the time of their life; as soon as they died, both empires would quickly be lost – Rome becoming divided, India being conquered.
• Both had to find a way to balance their new faith with the administration of their kingdoms. Both wanted to establish peace in their lands, and this included the promotion of people in their administration without any necessary religious requirement.
• Extremely important to both was how they should deal with schismatics in their new faith, since they did not want to use their patronage to help promote division, and yet they also saw any action on their part would be the cause of some sort of reaction. Constantine had a greater difficulty with this than Ashoka, though Ashoka is known to make examples of those who divided the Buddhist Sangha.[10]

The last two of these likely played a significant role in their respective administrations. Constantine had to deal with conflicts within the Church while trying to appease the non-Christian majority of Rome. The pagan majority would not follow Constantine if he did not provide a place for them. He tried to build a better Rome, and much of what he tried to do remains with us to this day. However, we must always realize he was not successful, and a major reason for this was the lack of unity among the Christians of his day.

  Their squabbling caused him no end of heartache. He wasn’t prepared for it, and thought they would just work together despite differences in belief. How was he to bring peace to Rome if the Christians, whom he backed, were the ones causing the greatest disturbances throughout the empire? His solution was pragmatic; he would take sides in disputes according to how well he thought a given side would work for peace; for those who were the cause of division and were unwilling to work with him for peace, he sent into exile (he would not send those disputants who, despite their schism with the majority of the Christians, were harmless and causing no problems to his administration of Rome).   This can easily explain his seemingly contradictory actions, where he would one day support one group of Christians, the next, another group, sending and bringing back from exile the same people over and over again (like St. Athanasius). His treatment of non-Christians, for the most part (there were a few exceptions) was of toleration, and this is because they did not have the same kind of rivalries and divisions harming his rule as the Christians; indeed, they were still more in tune with the empire and wanted to work with him to preserve the integrity of the empire (and hoped he would reconvert back to the ancient pagan traditions).Ashoka, it seems, also had to deal with conflicts within Buddhism, and from the little evidence we have, he was just as displeased with it as Constantine was with Christian strife.   The solution to both was to encourage as much inclusion in their empire as possible; they really wanted the members of their new faith to feel the need to follow them with the creation of new political alliances, the kind which was inclusive in content. Their decrees demonstrate this: they were written in such a way as to be able to be read and accepted by as many people as was possible, using what was in common agreement to promote both political and religious harmony. Certainly, they both knew their position in power was both political and religious, and if they did not want to disenfranchise their empires, they had to do this. Historians, sometimes missing out on what it was they were doing, have used this sometimes to question their respective adherences. For some, Constantine was a manipulative politician who just saw the future in Christianity, but he did not hold any real Christian faith. For others, Ashoka never converted, he remained a Hindu all his life, and his conversion to Buddhism is a myth. But anyone who looks at the evidence offered sees that these historians only show a small selection of the possible texts – the most vague – and ignore the ones which were made for more particular use, the kind which show their true devotion. Both give ample evidence of their conversion, both in word and in deed, though both also knew it meant the governing of their empire required prudence and the ability to interact with and promote those aspects of their old faiths which best connected with their new one, such as the idea of the logos in ancient Rome, and the idea of dharma in ancient India.[11]   The paths Constantine and Ashoka took in their lives were rather unusual for their day. It was not that common for rulers to convert from one faith to another; when it happened, it was generally expected that their subjects would their lead and convert with them. One can see the kind of conflicts this brought in the ancient world when one looks at the history of Egypt. Constantine and Ashoka tried to get around that conflict. They made mistakes. What they did was not entirely perfect. And it seems it was too early for the fruit of their labor to be established. The Roman Empire after the death of Constantine would become a hotbed of religious conflict. Even St Vladimir of Rus, who wanted himself to be seen in the light of Constantine, did not follow through with Constantine’s example here: he made it quite clear that he wanted his people to be baptized like he had been, and he made sure this would happen through the use of his armed forces (he sent his soldiers out far and wide with priests to help administer the baptism, and to give out crosses those who had been baptized as a sign of their conversion). India would be conquered from one group after another, each sponsoring one religious tradition or another; when Islam took control of the continent, Buddhism and Hinduism was in conflict with one another, and Muslims took the side of Hinduism (for many political reasons), leading to the end of mainstream Indian Buddhism. But the example of Ashoka, which had once been lost, would be brought back into the forefront  in modern times, and Ashoka was to become praised as one of the great heroes of Indian history, and his example promoted in modern day India.   The modern separation of religion from the affairs of state was something which was to develop much later in history than the times of Constantine and Ashoka, through many trials and tribulations; but we must not forget what Constantine and Ashoka did to help make this possible. They were exemplars of toleration in the ancient world. Perhaps if we understood them better, and what they actually accomplished, we could find a better way to deal with the religious pluralism of today (for then we could understand their mistakes and avoid them). Indeed, they should be the shining stars of religious liberty. They both show us that toleration does not have to mean relativism, nor does the holding to one religious faith mean one has to totally denigrate and reject the good found in other traditions. They also show us that this idea has ancient religious foundations, and one does not have to fear it as if it comes from secular humanism trying to push aside the role of religion in the contemporary world.    
Footnotes
[1] For example, the so-called Sirmondian Constitution gave bishops the authority to act as a court of appeals in secular courts. For an analysis of why this was done, and how long it lasted, see H.A. Drake, Constantine and the Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 325 – 336.
[2] While there is some debate as to the historicity of the council, it is more likely than not that something happened, and that the council was convened in part to elaborate on what could and could not be viewed as authentic Buddhist practice and teaching.  See Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Volume II: Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.. Ed. Karl H. Potter (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1998), 29-30.
[3] A panegyric given to Constantine before his conversion to Christianity places his victory with a vision given to him by Apollo:

“For you did I believe, Constantine, see your patron Apollo, and Victory accompanying him, offering you crowns of laurel, each of which represents a foretelling of thirty years. That is of course the length of human generations, which are certainly due to take you beyond the old age of Nestor. And yet why do I say ‘I believe’? You did see him, and you recognized yourself in the image of the one to whom the sacred poems of bards prophesied that the kingdoms of the whole world were due by right. That has now I think at last come to pass, seeing that you are, Emperor, like him, young blessed, our saviour and a most handsome one!”

– “The anonymous panegyric on Constantine (310), Pan. Lat. VII (6)” in From Constantine to Julian: Pagan and Byzantine Views. Ed. Samuel N. C. Lieu and Dominic Montserrat (London: Routledge, 1996),90.
[4] See D.C. Ahir, Asoka the Great (Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1995), 24.
[5] Thus, in Rock Edict 13, we read:

Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, conquered the Kalingas eight years after his coronation. One hundred and fifty thousand were deported, one hundred thousand were killed and many more died (from other causes). After the Kalingas had been conquered, Beloved-of-the-Gods came to feel a strong inclination towards the Dhamma, a love for the Dhamma and for instruction in Dhamma. Now Beloved-of-the-Gods feels deep remorse for having conquered the Kalingas.
Indeed, Beloved-of-the-Gods is deeply pained by the killing, dying and deportation that take place when an unconquered country is conquered. But Beloved-of-the-Gods is pained even more by this — that Brahmans, ascetics, and householders of different religions who live in those countries, and who are respectful to superiors, to mother and father, to elders, and who behave properly and have strong loyalty towards friends, acquaintances, companions, relatives, servants and employees — that they are injured, killed or separated from their loved ones. Even those who are not affected (by all this) suffer when they see friends, acquaintances, companions and relatives affected. These misfortunes befall all (as a result of war), and this pains Beloved-of-the-Gods.
There is no country, except among the Greeks, where these two groups, Brahmans and ascetics, are not found, and there is no country where people are not devoted to one or another religion. Therefore the killing, death or deportation of a hundredth, or even a thousandth part of those who died during the conquest of Kalinga now pains Beloved-of-the-Gods. Now Beloved-of-the-Gods thinks that even those who do wrong should be forgiven where forgiveness is possible.
Even the forest people, who live in Beloved-of-the-Gods’ domain, are entreated and reasoned with to act properly. They are told that despite his remorse Beloved-of-the-Gods has the power to punish them if necessary, so that they should be ashamed of their wrong and not be killed. Truly, Beloved-of-the-Gods desires non-injury, restraint and impartiality to all beings, even where wrong has been done.
Now it is conquest by Dhamma that Beloved-of-the-Gods considers to be the best conquest. And it (conquest by Dhamma) has been won here, on the borders, even six hundred yojanas away, where the Greek king Antiochos rules, beyond there where the four kings named Ptolemy, Antigonos, Magas and Alexander rule, likewise in the south among the Cholas, the Pandyas, and as far as Tamraparni. Here in the king’s domain among the Greeks, the Kambojas, the Nabhakas, the Nabhapamkits, the Bhojas, the Pitinikas, the Andhras and the Palidas, everywhere people are following Beloved-of-the-Gods’ instructions in Dhamma. Even where Beloved-of-the-Gods’ envoys have not been, these people too, having heard of the practice of Dhamma and the ordinances and instructions in Dhamma given by Beloved-of-the-Gods, are following it and will continue to do so. This conquest has been won everywhere, and it gives great joy — the joy which only conquest by Dhamma can give. But even this joy is of little consequence. Beloved-of-the-Gods considers the great fruit to be experienced in the next world to be more important.
I have had this Dhamma edict written so that my sons and great-grandsons may not consider making new conquests, or that if military conquests are made, that they be done with forbearance and light punishment, or better still, that they consider making conquest by Dhamma only, for that bears fruit in this world and the next. May all their intense devotion be given to this which has a result in this world and the next.  

This and all subsequent translations from his edicts and pillars come from the translation by Ven. S. Dhammika (http://www.cs.colostate.edu/~malaiya/ashoka.html). I have used this translation because it is offered for free distribution via DharmaNet by arrangement with the publisher. DharmaNet International P.O. Box 4951, Berkeley CA 94704-4951.
[6] See D.C. Ahir, Asoka the Great, 23.
[7] This is not to say he did without the use of an army, but they were used for self-defense, enforcement of law and order, and to help in various humanitarian projects throughout India.
[8] We do not exactly know the circumstances of their death; we do know that pagan critics would use it to indicate not only the immorality of Constantine, but also his Christian advisors, who were said to entice him to Christianity as an easy way out of the consequences for his actions. We see this kind of argument being used to try to seduce a Christian to give up their faith in the works of John the Monk about the martyr Artemius

“For Constantine, as you yourself know, who was easily deceived by men and uneducated and proved to be stupid, introduced innovations in religion, and revoked the Roman laws and inclined towards Christianity. This was because he was in fear of his unholy deeds, and because the gods drove him from the flock as accused, and unworthy of their religion, being steeped in his family’s blood. For he killed his bothers who had done nothing out of place, and his wife Fausta, and his own son Priscus who was a good and worth man.”

-”Artemii passio” in From Constantine to Julian: Pagan and Byzantine Views, 240 -1.
[9] D.C. Ahir is right in suggesting there probably is some truth behind the legends which state Ashoka had to kill off family members to make his way to the throne. See D.C. Ahir, Asoka the Great, 18.
[10] “Beloved-of-the-Gods commands: The Mahamatras at Kosambi (are to be told: Whoever splits the Sangha) which is now united, is not to be admitted into the Sangha. Whoever, whether monk or nun, splits the Sangha is to be made to wear white clothes and to reside somewhere other than in a monastery,” Minor Pillar Edict 2.
[11] The obviously Christian Eusebius provides to us a vague picture of Constantine’s faith than Constantine himself did in his own speeches; it is through Eusebius we get a better picture of Constantine’s attempt to bridge the Christ as Logos with the pre-Christian philosophical tradition; Eusebius is the one who gives Constantine the title “friend of the Logos.” But as Drake points out, when Eusebius does this, it is in his own orations in praise of Constantine, given while Constantine was still alive, indicating that it was in part based upon what Constantine wanted to hear and want Constantine wanted to be heard throughout his empire; after Constantine’s death, Eusebius develops much further Constantine’s Christianity in his Life of Constantine. See Drake, Constantine and the Bishops, 378 -84.
For Ashoka, some of his edicts show us how he tried to establish a universal morality as the basis of his empire, and it was one which he thought could work to bring members of various religious traditions together, such as we find in Rock Edict 5:

“In the past there were no Dhamma Mahamatras but such officers were appointed by me thirteen years after my coronation. Now they work among all religions for the establishment of Dhamma, for the promotion of Dhamma, and for the welfare and happiness of all who are devoted to Dhamma. They work among the Greeks, the Kambojas, the Gandharas, the Rastrikas, the Pitinikas and other peoples on the western borders. They work among soldiers, chiefs, Brahmans, householders, the poor, the aged and those devoted to Dhamma — for their welfare and happiness — so that they may be free from harassment. They (Dhamma Mahamatras) work for the proper treatment of prisoners, towards their unfettering, and if the Mahamatras think, ;This one has a family to support,’ ‘That one has been bewitched,’ ‘This one is old,” then they work for the release of such prisoners. They work here, in outlying towns, in the women’s quarters belonging to my brothers and sisters, and among my other relatives. They are occupied everywhere. These Dhamma Mahamatras are occupied in my domain among people devoted to Dhamma to determine who is devoted to Dhamma, who is established in Dhamma, and who is generous.’”   From link: http://vox-nova.com/2009/10/31/some-reflections-on-the-constantine-and-ashoka-of-history/#_ftn7

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They hate us for Who we Are

On the near one-year anniversay of Obama’s election, former President George W. Bush gave his first official speech. He declined to comment on Obama or his administration. However, he had strong words for America’s enemies. From the (Qatar) Gulf Times, Oct. 31:

He said the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan must be won to stop a return to “brutal tyranny” in the nation.“If the Taliban, Al Qaeda and their extremist allies were allowed to take over Afghanistan again, they would have a safe haven and the Afghan people, particularly the Afghan women, would face a return to a brutal tyranny.” “This region and the world would face serious threats,” he added.

Bush said both the US and India were “involved in an ideological struggle against extremists who murder the innocent to advance a dark vision of extremism and control.”

“They attack political, financial and diplomatic targets because they hate our way of life and they hate our vision for freedom and human rights and human dignity and prosperity and peace,” Bush told the conference.

President Bush was addressing the Hindustan Leadership Summit. During the Question & Answer, he gave remarks on Iraq. From IndiaServer.com Oct. 31:

“The world is much better off without Saddam Hussein. There is no question about that. Hussein was a threat to the US… He was a brutal dictator. He used weapons of mass destruction against his own people.” he said.

MORE INFORMATION

Note - Libertarian Republican’s sister blog Worldwide Liberty is now headlining a three minute YouTube video of the Bush speech in India. It includes Q&A. The former President states that he believes Osama bin Laden to still be alive, but vanquished

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