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Archive for the India Category

Story of the diamond in the crown of Queen of England

1. August 2010 by admin.

Story of the diamond in the crown of Queen of England The following chapter has been adopted from “A Forgotten Empire: Vijayanagar; A Contribution to the History of India” Authored by Robert Sewell in 1907. CHAPTER A DiamondsHowever much it may at first sight appear that our chroniclers have exaggerated in their description of the wealth of the Hindu sovereign and his nobles, and of the wonderful display of jewels made on days of high festival by the ladies of their households, an account of which is given us by Paes, I for one see little reason for doubt.Nuniz distinctly states (p. 389) that the diamond mines, in their day the richest in the world, were farmed out on condition that all stones above twenty mangellins in weight — about twenty-five carats — were sent to the Raya for his personal use, and there must have been many of these. Barradas (p. 226 above) states that, according to rumour, even after the downfall of the empire the king at Chandragiri in 1614 A.D. had no less than three large chests full of diamonds in his possession; and every traveller and chronicler has something to say on the subject. The principal mines were on the north bank of the Krishna river, and in the Kurnool and Anantapur countries, notably at Vajra Karur. Generically these are known as “the mines of Golkonda,” and the phrase has passed into a proverb. Linschoten (ii. 136) writes (this is the original text): “They (diamonds) grow in the countrie of Decam behinde Ballagate, by the towne of Bisnagar, wherein are two or three hilles, from whence they are digged, whereof the King of Bisnagar doth reape great profitte; for hecauseth them to be straightly watched, and hath farmed them out with this condition, that all diamonds that are above twenty-five Mangellyns in weight are for the King himselfe (every Mangellyn is foure graines in weight).There is yet another hill in the Countrie of Decam, which is called Velha, that is the old Rocke, from whence come the best diamonds and are sold for the greatest price…. Sometimes they find Diamonds of one hundred and two hundred Mangelyns and more, but very few.” As regards the diamond “as large as a hen’s egg,” said to have been found at the sack of Vijayanagar and presented to the Adil Shah (above, p. 208), Couto (Decade VIII. c. xv.) says that it was a jewel which the Raya had affixed to the base of the plume on his horse’s head-dress. Garcia da Orta, who was in India in 1534, says that at Vijayanagar a diamond had been seen as large as a small hen’s egg, and he even declares the weights of three others to have been respectively 120, 148, and 250 MANGELIS, equivalent to 150, 175, and 312 1/2 carats (Tavernier, V. Ball, ii. 433). Dr. Ball has gone carefully into the question of the diamonds known as “Babar’s,” “the Mogul’s,” “Pitt’s,” “the KOH-I-NUR,” and others, and to his Appendix I. I beg to refer those interested in the subject. It is clear that this hen’s egg diamond could not be the same as Sultan Babar’s, because the former was taken at Vijayanagar in A.D. 1565, whereas Sultan Babar’s was received by his son Humayun at Agra in 1526, and could not have been, forty years later, in the possession of the Hindu king of the south.[651]Dr. Ball has shown that probably the KOH-I-NUR is identical with the “Mogul’s diamond.” Was, then, this “hen’s egg” diamond the same? Probably not. If we had been told that the “hen’s egg,” when found in the sack of Vijayanagar, had been cut, the proof CONTRA would be conclusive, since the KOH-I-NUR was certainly uncut in A.D. 1656 or 1657. But there is no information available on this point. The “hen’s egg” was apparently taken by the Adil Shah to Bijapur in 1565, and it is not likely to have found its way, still in an uncut state, into the possession of Mir Jumla in 1656.The KOH-I-NUR was found at Kollur on the river Krishna, probably in A.D. 1656. Mir Jumla farmed the mines at that time, and presented it uncut to the emperor, Shah Jahan. It is said to have weighed 756 English carats (Ball, ii. 444). It was entrusted to a Venetian named Hortensio Borgio, and was so damaged and wasted in his hands that, when seen by Tavernier in Aurangzib’s treasury in 1665, it weighed not more than 268 1/2 English carats. In 1739 Nadir Shah sacked Delhi and carried the stone away with him to Persia, conferring on it its present immortal name the “Mountain of Light.” On his murder in 1747 it passed into the hands of his grandson, Shah Rukh. Four years later Shah Rukh gave it to Ahmad Shah Durani of Kabul, and by him it was bequeathed to his son Taimur. In 1793 it passed by descent to his son Shah Zaman, who was blinded and deposed by his brother Muhammad; but he retained possession of the stone in his prison, and in 1795 it became the property of his brother Sultan Shuja. In 1809, after Shuja became king of Kabul, Elphinstone saw the diamond in his bracelet at Peshawur. In 1812, Shuja, being dethroned by Muhammad, fled to Lahore, where he was detained as a quasi- prisoner by Ranjit Singh, the ruler of the Panjab. In 1813 an agreement was arrived at, and Shuja surrendered the diamond to Ranjit Singh. Ranjit often wore the stone, and it was constantly seen by European visitors to Lahore. Dying in 1839, the KOH-I- NUR was placed in the jewel-chamber till the infant Dhulip Singh was acknowledged as Ranjit’s successor. In 1849 it was handed over to Sir John Lawrence on the annexation of the Panjab, and by him was sent to England to Her Majesty the Queen. In 1851 it was exhibited at the first great Exhibition, and in 1852 it was re- cut by an Amsterdam cutter, Voorsanger, in the employ of Messrs. Garrards. The weight is now 106 1/16 carats. It would be interesting to trace the story of the “hen’s egg” diamond after its acquisition by the Bijapur sultan, Ali Adil.H. de Montfart, who travelled in India in 1608, saw a very large diamond in the possession of the Mogul emperor. Jahangir at Delhi,[652] but this had been pierced. “I have seene one with the great MOGOR as bigge as a Hen’s egge, and of that very forme, which he caused expressly to bee pierced like a pearle to weare it on his arme…. It weighteth 198 Mangelins.”

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Gandhi - ‘Mahatma’ or Flawed Genius? National Leader or Manipulative Politician?

21. July 2010 by admin.

Gandhi - ‘Mahatma’ or Flawed Genius? National Leader or Manipulative Politician? Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was born in 1869 in a stately and handsome three-storied home in Porbandar, grandson of the chief administrator of the small Princely State in coastal Gujarat. Acknowledging that he was born into a family of politicians, always involved in secret alliances and mutual promotions, in one letter, he wrote: “I knew then, and know better now, that much of my father’s time was taken up in mere intrigue.” In another letter to his nephew, Chaganlal, he acknowledged the notoriety of his political family: “…that is, we are known to belong to a band of robbers”. It is to Gandhi’s credit that he saw his family for what it was, and attempted to transcend it’s narrow Modh Bania outlook; but often, subconsciously learned behavior dies hard. The tendency towards backroom wheeling and dealing did not entirely escape Gandhi himself as he rose to become the Indian National Congress’s most influential political leader. (See Collected Works, vol. 24, p.170, vol. 12, p.381) Although most biographies of Gandhi focus on Gandhi’s political career after he returned from England in early 1915, and begin with his involvement in the Civil Disobedience Movement from the early 1920s, it is important to note that Gandhi arrived on the National Scene rather late, and in the first half of his political life was considerably beholden to the Raj. At a time when literacy in British India was barely 8%, Gandhi enjoyed the rare option of studying in Britain and spent the years 1888-1893 in London before taking employment in South Africa. Although Gandhi became politically active in South Africa, and led ‘Satyagrahas’ against unjust laws, Gandhi was hardly yet an anti-imperialist radical or revolutionary. In fact, in 1914, he was still very much in awe of the British empire, and Martin Green in his biography of Gandhi describes his state of mind as follows: “When Gandhi left South Africa, he still believed in the British empire. though tentatively. “Though Empires have gone and fallen, this empire may perhaps be an exception….it is an empire not founded on material but on spiritual foundations….the British constitution. Tear away those ideals and you tear away my loyalty to the British constitution; keep those ideals and I am ever a bondsman”.” (See Martin Green, Gandhi: Voice of a New Age Revolutionary, p. 208) It is especially notable that at the age of 45, Gandhi saw in the British empire a “spiritual foundation” - a sentiment many in the Indian Freedom Movement would have found astounding, even nauseating. As early as 1884, the most advanced Indian intellectuals were already quite clear that British rule in India was built on a foundation of economic pillage and plunder - and was devoid of any high social or moral purpose. “Nadir Shah looted the country only once. But the British loot us every day. Every year wealth to the tune of 4.5 million dollar is being drained out, sucking our very blood. Britain should immediately quit India.” So wrote the Sindh Times on May 20, 1884, a year before the Indian National Congress was born and 58 years before the ”Quit India” movement of 1942 was launched. But in 1914 Gandhi was quite far removed from the most radical elements of the Indian Freedom Movement. In 1913, poor emigrant farmers from the Punjab in California launched the Ghadar Party and released their manifesto calling for complete independence from British Rule. Several years earlier, before his internment, Tilak had cogently described the Indian condition under British colonial occupation as being utterly ruinous and degrading. Tilak, Ajit Singh, Chidambaram Pillai and their associates in the National Movement saw few redeeming qualities in the British dispensation, and saw colonial rule as being entirely inimical to India’s progress, asserting that the contradictions between the British oppressors and the Indian people were completely irreconcilable. Although Gandhi was critical of specific aspects of colonial rule, in 1914, his general outlook towards the British was more akin to that of the loyalist Princes than the most advanced of India’s national leaders. Particularly onerous was his support of the British during World War I. Even as the Ghadar Party correctly saw in WWI a great opportunity for India to deepen its opposition to the British, and liberate itself from the colonial yoke, Gandhi instead tried to mobilize Indians on behalf of the British war effort. Although many biographers of Gandhi have studiously omitted making any mention of such dishonorable aspects of Gandhi’s political life, Martin Green makes a brief reference to Gandhi’s attitude towards WWI when he was in England: “To return to London in wartime: Gandhi quickly raised his ambulance corps amongst the Indians in England. As before, he had offered his volunteers for any kind of military duty, but the authorities preferred medical workers”. Martin Green also observes: “Many of his friends did not approve the project. Olive Schreiner, who was in London, wrote him that she was struck to the heart with sorrow to hear that he had offered to serve the English government in this evil war - this wicked cause”.(See Martin Green, Gandhi: Voice of a New Age Revolutionary, p. 247) Gandhi’s ideas on non-violence did not then extend to the British Imperial War, and upon his return to India in 1915 attempted to recruit Indians for the British War effort. Gandhi’s position echoed that of the Maharajas, many of whom (like the Maharaja of Bikaner) played a pivotal role in supporting the British, both in terms of propaganda and providing troops. Gandhi’s attitude towards the empireemerges quite clearly from this statement of Martin Green:“Gandhi himself had twice volunteered for service in this war, in France and in Mesopotamia, because he had convinced himself that he owed the empire that sacrifice in return for it’s military protection.” (See Martin Green, Gandhi: Voice of a New Age Revolutionary, p. 267) Gandhi’s role in championing the British War effort did not however go unchallenged. At a time when Gandhi was still addressing “War Recruitment Melas”, Dr. Tuljaram Khilnani of Nawabshah publicly campaigned against War Loan Bonds. When Gandhi sought election to the AICC from Bombay PCC, the delegate from Sindh opposed his election in view of his support to the British war effort. The Ghadar Party was especially acerbic in it’s criticism of Gandhi and other such political leaders in the Congress who had not yet been able to sever their umbilical chord to the British Raj. But even as Gandhi was able to justify in his mind support for the imperial war, his attitude towards the revolt of Chauri Chaura (1921) brought about a very different and very harsh assessment. Labeling it a crime, he wrote thus:“God has been abundantly kind to me. He has warned me the third time that there is not yet in India that truthful and non-violent atmosphere which and which alone can justify mass disobedience….which means gentle, truthful, humble, knowing, never criminal and hateful. He warned me in 1919 when the Rowlatt Act agitation was started. Ahmedabad, Viramgam, and Kheda erred. Amritsar and Kasur erred. I retraced my steps, called it a Himalayan miscalculation, humbled myself before God and man, and stopped not merely mass civil disobedience but even my own which I knew to be civil and non-violent” . (See Collected Works, vol. 22, p.415-21) Gandhi’s Chauri Chaura decision created deep consternation in Congress circles. Subhash Chandra Bose wrote: “To sound the order of retreat just when public enthusiasm was reaching the boiling point was nothing short of a national calamity. The principal lieutenants of the Mahatma, Deshbandhu Das, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai, who were all in prison, shared the popular resentment. I was with the Deshbandu at the time, and I could see that he was beside himself with anger and sorrow.” (quoted from The Indian Struggle, p.90) To describe Gandhi’s decision as a “national calamity” was indeed right on the mark. To lay such stress on non-violence - that too only three years after he had been encouraging Indians to enroll in the British Army was not only shocking, it showed little sympathy towards the Indian masses who against all odds had become energized against their alien oppressors.For Gandhi to demand of the poor, downtrodden, and bitterly exploited Indian masses to first demonstrate their unmistakable commitment to non-violence before their struggle could receive with Gandhi’s approval (just a few years after he had unapologetically defended an imperial war) was simply unconscionable. Clearly, Gandhi had one standard for the Indian masses, and quite another for the nation’s colonial overlords. But this was not to be the first occasion for Gandhi to engage in such tactical and ideological hypocrisy. Although Gandhi’s defenders may disagree, not only were Gandhi’s ideas on non-violence applied very selectively, they were hardly the most appropriate for India’s situation. At no time was the British military presence in India so overwhelming that it could not have been challenged by widespread resistance from the Indian masses. Had Gandhi not called for a retreat after Chauri Chaura, it is likely that incidents such as Chauri Chaura would have occurred with much greater regularity - even increasing in frequency and intensity. This would have inevitably put tremendous pressure on the British to cut short their stay. As it is, British administrators were constrained to send back British troops as soon as possible, because many clamored to return after serving for a few years in India. Had India become too difficult to control, mutinies and dissension in the royal armies would have occurred more often, and the British would have had to cut and run, probably much sooner than in 1947.Some critics saw in Gandhi’s Chauri Chaura turnaround as indicative of his deep fear and distrust of the Indian masses - that Gandhi feared the spontaneous energy of the poor and the downtrodden more than the injustice of British rule. Certainly, the conservatism of Gandhi’s tactics lends credence to such views. As late as 1928, Gandhi resisted Nehru and Bose, and campaigned for the rejection of a resolution calling for complete independence at the session of the Indian National Congress. And unlike other leaders in the freedom struggle, Gandhi often entertained false hopes about the British. In a 1930 letter, Motilal Nehru chided Gandhi for resting his hopes on the Labor Government and the sincerity of the Viceroy. In much of Motilal Nehru’s correspondence with his son, (and with others in the Congress), there are expressions of frustration with Gandhi’s tendency towards moderation and compromise with the British authorities and his reluctance to broaden and accelerate the civil disobedience movement. There are also references in Motilal Nehru’s letters to how large contributions from the Birlas were enabling certain political cliques (led by Madan Mohan Malviya - a close confidante of Gandhi) to “capture” the Congress. That Gandhi was close to the Birlas is now widely acknowledged, and it is not unlikely that his conservatism was either encouraged by them, or may have been coincidental but was compatible with their desire for restrained and moderate resistance to the British. Motilal Nehru and Subhash Chandra Bose both complained of Gandhi’s tendency to ignore party resolutions when they went against his wishes, and to work with cliques rather than consult and cooperate with all party members. In a letter dated March 28, 1939, from Manbhum, Bihar - Bose complained bitterly to Nehru of Gandhi’s quiet campaign of non-cooperation with him. Bose had just won the Presidency of the Indian National Congress, defeating Gandhi’s chosen nominee, Dr Pattabhi. At first, Gandhi had tried to talk Bose out of running for the post, and tried to work out a backroom deal for Dr Pattabhi’s ascension (as he had done on many earlier occasions). But Bose was determined to seek the mandate of Congress activists, and won by a handsome margin in an election where the official machinery of the Congress had put all its weight behind Gandhi’s hand-picked nominee. Bose’s historic election signified the mood of the Indian masses, who were becoming increasingly impatient with Gandhi’s tepid nationalism. Bose had always strived to accelerate the freedom struggle, and the mass of Congress Party workers appreciated his sincerity and unswerving commitment to the national cause. In many ways, he was the best person to lead the Congress, with intellect and vision that exceeded Gandhi.But Gandhi, along with Patel and Nehru formed a tactical block against Bose, and prevented him from functioning effectively as leader of India’s preeminent national organization. In vain did Bose make his case with Nehru, who remained unmoved, and eventually, it led to Bose having to quit the Congress, and organize outside it’s tedious confines. One of the most problematical aspects of Gandhi’s philosophical disposition was his emphasis on matters religious over practical. In a 1918 speech concerning India’s future he espoused a position that truly secular Indians ought to find rather troubling: “I feel that India’s mission is different from that of other countries, India is fitted for the religious supremacy of the world….India can conquer all by soul-force”. (See Collected Works, vol. 14, p.53) To this day, Western analysts continue to evaluate India as though its only contribution to world civilization is in matters of religious exotica and spirituality. And many Indians unquestioningly accept such one-sided formulations. But to pigeon-hole India as this exotic land - full of religious devotion and piety does great injustice not only to India’s rich history of secular pursuits, but it also leaves many rational, scientific and technologically-oriented Indians bereft of any philosophical affirmation and intellectual leadership. On more than one occasion, Gandhi would begin with statements such as “God has warned me”, or “…spoken as such…..”. Coming from any ordinary person, such claims would normally be viewed with great suspicion and skepticism because they can only be accepted on faith, never independently verified. In fact, any ordinary person who claimed as often to have a ‘hotline’ to ‘God’ might even be seen as a lunatic, as someone prone to hallucinations. But from Gandhi, such utterances were quietly tolerated or accepted. That Gandhi espoused such religious-centric views is not surprising considering the milieu in which he was raised and educated. Most British-educated Indians were kept completely ignorant of India’s rich history of rational thought and (pre-industrial) scientific endeavour. So it was inevitable that Indians would seek inspiration from religious texts - Hindus from the Gita, Muslims from the Quran, Sikhs from the Granth Sahib. But unlike Tilak who derived from the Gita, a call to action, a call to rise against injustice, Gandhi found in the Gita an appeal to pacifist idealism. In a world that was rife with violence, Gandhi’s insistence on non-violent purity was, in practical terms, an exercise in infantile futility. Not only did it delay the onset of freedom, it led to particularly disastrous consequences during partition, and in Kashmir. Whereas the Muslim League was armed, the Congress was not and entirely dependant on the British police and military apparatus. When the partition riots first began in West Punjab and East Bengal, the Congress had no means to defend the hapless victims. Being unable to prevent the slaughter and rape, or protect the stream of Hindu and Sikh refugees, it lost the moral authority to prevent a communal backlash in India. A similiar situation prevailed in Kashmir. The Muslim League sent in its armed hooligans even as Kashmir’s most popular political party, the National Conference had decided to throw in its lot with secular India. In Baluchistan and the Frontier Province, majority sentiment was in favor of unity with India. Had the Congress been armed, it could have at least held out for for a better deal, and at least some of the horrors of partition may have been averted. There were many other serious incongruities in Gandhi’s world view. As one reads through Gandhi’s letters and sundry writings, time and time again, he uses the term ‘Dharma ‘in the context of how Indians should behave vis-a-vis the British, and the term “right” in the context of what the British could do to their Indian subjects. In Gandhi’s ethical framework, not only did the conquered have very limited rights, they were burdened with all types of duties under the rubric of ‘Dharma ‘. Conquered Indians were repeatedly lectured on how they must be concerned with the highest morality when dealing with their British oppressors - even as the British conquerors were little restricted by any ‘Dharmic’ pressures, and enjoyed the ultimate authority to take away the life of Indians they chose to put on trial for ’sedition’.In all other theories of democratic liberation, ethical and moral codes emanated from one essential principle - which is the fundamental right of enslaved people to be free from alien exploitation. But in Gandhi’s moral framework, the need of the Indian masses to liberate themselves from a brutally unjust colonial occupation did not come first, it was subject to all kinds of one-sided conditionalities. For instance, in the context of Bhagat Singh’s hanging, even as Gandhi condemned the British government, he observed: “The government certainly had the right to hang these men. However, there are some rights which do credit to those who possess them only if they are enjoyed in name only.” (See Collected Works, vol. 45, p.359-61, in Gujarati) Whether Gandhi was confusing the term “right” with the term authority or might, or he actually granted the colonial government the “right” to execute Indian freedom fighters is hard to tell. But in general, it appears that Gandhi had not worked out in his mind the true essence of natural human rights, and desirable human duties in a civilized society. Nor had he come to realize that in any democratic dispensation, governments cannot be assigned any inherent rights, for they are only the proxies of the people who elect them, and they only have duties and obligations to ensure the rights of the people, and to prevent the exercise of those individual rights that might violate, restrict or inveigh on the rights of others. In the context of Bhagat Singh, the British government was under no popular obligation to execute him. On the contrary, his actions had widespread support, and there were fervent appeals for the commutation of his sentence. In such a context, Gandhi could have only spoken of British authority - and that too a stolen and usurped authority to execute Bhagat Singh. Had he been truly moved against Bhagat Singh’s death sentence, he would have spoken of how the British were able to execute him only because of their military might - that their action had no ethical or moral sanction. A true revolutionary - (such as Bhagat Singh) would not have granted the exploitative colonial regime any “rights” whatsoever. In fact, it would have been the right of the Indian revolutionary to resist colonial rule by any means necessary. If Indians obeyed British orders, it was only out of practical necessity, out of an instinct to survive. But if some were prepared to risk their lives in confronting the British military occupation, it was their inalienable right to do so. Indians had duties and obligations towards each other, but none to the British occupiers and exploiters. From a revolutionary, moral, ethical, or national perspective, there was no necessity to grant the British colonial authorities any rights whatsoever, because their very presence was illegal and obtained without the democratic consent of the Indian masses. Indians, therefore, had no moral duty, or ‘Dharma‘, obliging them towards obeying their orders, or respecting the lives of the Britishers who had occupied Indian territory by force. But Gandhi was never completely able to overcome a deeply ingrained tendency towards tolerating or accepting the “rights” he saw intrinsically bound with authority figures. In the feudal order that Gandhi was born in, the masses had no inherent rights, only duties towards the sovereign. And Gandhi was never able to completely reject this iniquitous paradigm. He was never fully able to complete the transition to a democratic order in which citizens enjoyed inalienable rights in addition to bearing duties towards each other. He did not fathom that in a democratic society, the role of the state was to ensure the rights of the people, not to exercise any arbitrary hegemony over them. Moreover, in a democratic state, the masses could not be burdened with unnecessary duties, only those that obliged them to respect the rights of others, and required them to provide services in exchange for what they received from the state, or others in society. While many of the qualities Gandhi sought to elicit from the masses were commendable and desirable qualities to strive for - one could not make such qualities conditions for granting the masses certain fundamental rights - such as freedom from hunger, homelessness and exploitation. And if the poor masses were enjoined to be more noble in character, then such requirements also had to be made mandatory for authority figures. In these (and other such) ways, Gandhi’s formulations were theoretically and practically inadequate.While there will always be admirers of Gandhi, intimate contact with his record reveals him to be a seriously flawed leader, popular more due to the particular conditions and circumstances of colonial (or post-colonial) India (and his unwavering leadership during the Quit India Movement), rather than the visionary or enlightened nature of his general tactics and formulations. The India of the future might well need to look beyond the myth and mystique of “Mahatma Gandhi” if it hopes to build a more just and harmonious order.

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More On Naxalite Threat

17. July 2010 by admin.

Background on a Rebellion

The Naxalites get their name from their place of origin, the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal, where in May 1967 a local Communist Party leader promised to redistribute land to the peasants. This was not the first time such a proclamation by a Party member had been made in eastern India, but earlier attempts to foment a peasant rebellion in the region had faltered. This one, however, triggered a wave of violence in which workers intimidated or killed landowners, in many cases running them off their land and reclaiming it as their own. The actions were based on sentiment among the peasants (made up largely of tribal members) that they were merely taking back what they had been forced to give up to wealthy prospectors from central India. These newcomers had gained the land from the local tribes, the peasants believed, through schemes in which the land was taken as collateral for the tribes’ outstanding debts.On a grander geopolitical level, the Naxalites can be viewed through the prism of Chinese-Indian rivalry. The Naxalites adopted the ideology of Mao Zedong, the Chinese revolutionary and leader who converted China to communism and who had just begun the Cultural Revolution there in 1966. In the beginning of the Naxalite movement, there was mutual rhetorical support between the Maoist regime in China and the Naxalites in India. While there was little evidence of material support (and there is no indication of such support today), the advent and growth of the Naxalite movement certainly did serve China’s goal of weakening its largest neighbor to the south.India was able to dampen the Naxalite movement significantly in 1971, but the regional belief that the government in New Delhi had robbed tribal groups of their land in eastern India persisted. The Naxalite movement continued in a somewhat dormant phase throughout the 1970s, ’80s and early ’90s. Violence resumed again in the late ’90s and has been escalating in the years since.The increasing violence corresponds with India’s economic growth, and this is not coincidental. India has experienced a boom in economic growth over the past 20 years that has seen per capita income rise roughly 100 percent. By comparison, it took India 40 years to complete its last doubling of per capita income. Foreign investors have sustained this growth by pumping billions of dollars into India’s economy. However, economic growth in India has not trickled down, a political liability that the Naxalites have leveraged both to revive their movement and challenge India’s more mainstream political parties.

(Red Corridor of Naxal Movement)

Geography and Development

India as a whole has a disparate geography and some 1.1 billion inhabitants, and the government in New Delhi thus has a tough time extending its writ throughout the land. The Naxalites are not the only militant movement in India; groups in northwest and northeast India also take advantage of the terrain and the distance from New Delhi to challenge the government for control of the territory they inhabit. The Naxalites specifically inhabit an area known as the “Red Corridor,” which stretches from West Bengal state southwest to Karnataka state. The most violent states in this corridor have been Chhattisgarh, West Bengal and Orissa. The region is defined by rolling hills covered in dense jungle and has few improved roads, which allows the Naxalites to control access. The dense jungle also protects them from government aircraft.The region’s geographic isolation has created a tribal mentality, and while the government lumps militant groups in the area under the Naxalite umbrella, the militant community is actually quite diffuse, with small units acting with varying levels of autonomy throughout the region. For example, there is little indication that a unit from Chhattisgarh would also be able to conduct operations in West Bengal. Transportation is expensive and dangerous, so people tend to stay close to home and defend it fiercely. This makes it difficult for outsiders to gain influence in (and access to) the area.It also means the area is extremely poor. Although the region has an abundance of raw materials in its hills and forests, the state of India has been hard-pressed to get at those resources because it cannot effectively control them. And while Naxalites call for the improvement of the lives of the people they claim to represent, they have resisted any government attempt to develop the area’s economy. Indeed, the low level of trust between the Naxalites and New Delhi creates the conundrum of how the government can possibly provide security without developing sufficient infrastructure and how infrastructure can possibly be developed without sufficient security. An example of this can be seen in the Naxalites’ constant sabotaging of area roads by planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) under road surfaces or simply digging roads up. Roads are necessary for development, but Naxalites view roads as a means for the government to send its forces into their territory.Eager to stimulate growth in the region, the central government promised foreign investors land without communicating, much less negotiating, with locals inhabiting the land, which naturally led to disputes between the locals, the foreign companies and the government. A famous example of an ongoing dispute involves the South Korean steel conglomerate POSCO, which is in the process of acquiring some 4,000 acres in Orissa state on which to build a $12 billion steel mill. The project has been delayed by protests and violence by locals opposed to the project, and police have been unable to secure the area to permit construction. Only now, some five years after the government promised the land to POSCO, is local compensation being negotiated.India’s economic success has meant that foreign investors like POSCO are increasing their presence in India, which means that locals like the Naxalites are faced with both a threat and an opportunity. Outside business interests (whether investors from South Korea or wealthy prospectors from central India) in partnership with the government pose the greatest threat to the Naxalite movement. On the other hand, outside investment could bring jobs and development to an area that is desperately poor. But Naxalites are skeptical of letting the government control anything in their region, and successful economic development would have a calming effect on the region’s radicalized militants. Movements like that of the Naxalites have an array of motivations for why they do what they do, but self-preservation is always a very high priority.The other opportunity is to force the central government or foreign investors to pay the group directly for any land in the region. Naxalites can raise the stakes by organizing more militant force to deny access to certain areas, sabotage transportation and commercial activity and otherwise mobilize the locals. This would essentially be a large-scale protection racket. The model has been implemented and followed successfully by other militant groups, most notably Nigeria’s Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which manages to extract concessions from energy giants operating in Nigeria’s oil-rich but dismally poor Niger Delta, and even from the Nigerian government itself. While Maoist leaders in eastern and central India do make statements about how commercial projects in the area need to provide locals with jobs, it is clear that Naxalites are also trying to enhance their capability to pursue the second option.

The Threat

Naxalites are honing the capability to construct and deploy IEDs, conduct armed raids and maintain an extensive, agile and responsive intelligence network. As seen in the examples above, Naxalite fighters can be opportunistic in their attacks. The April 6 raid on the soldiers in Dantewada and the May 17 bus attack were both actions that took advantage of opportunities to target and kill police forces. The April 6 raid was the culmination of two or three days of stalking the CRPF unit in the forest and waiting for the right time to strike. The May 17 bus attack was organized in a matter of hours, with spotters noticing the police on the bus and alerting other cadres who planted the device further down the road. This flexibility and autonomy among its various component parts, along with the group’s local support and indigenous knowledge of its turf, make the Naxalites a dangerous adversary against the slower moving, more deliberate and more predictable CRPF.New Delhi insists that, according to the constitution, the Naxalite problem is one of law and order and, thus, a responsibility for the states to address. New Delhi has deployed the CRPF, but it has not gone so far as to deploy the military, something that many Indian politicians have called for as the only solution to the problem. While military advisers have been sent in to train local and federal police forces in the Red Corridor, they have not engaged in any known anti-Naxalite operations. India has unpleasant memories of past deployments of its military forces to address domestic threats. In the 1980s, use of the army to deal with Sikh militancy was criticized as being too heavy-handed. Military action at the Golden Temple in Amritsar, codenamed Operation Blue Star, also fanned the flames of Sikh militancy and sparked a series of serious reprisal attacks that included the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who had ordered the operation.Also, the Indian military insists it is currently focused on fighting Islamist and separatist forces in Jammu and Kashmir in northwest India, along the disputed border with Pakistan, and is dealing with multiple ethno-separatist movements in the northeast region of India surrounded by China and Bangladesh. While Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has labeled the Naxalite issue the biggest threat to the country’s internal security, incidents like the 2008 Mumbai attacks provide evidence to most Indians that Pakistan and the militants who hide there pose a greater external threat.In the end, Naxalism is fairly contained. Despite threats and indications from Naxalites that they will attack urban targets throughout India, the group has yet to demonstrate the intent or ability to strike outside of the Red Corridor. But the group’s leaders and bombmakers could develop such a capability, and it will be important to watch for any indication that cadres are developing the tradecraft for urban terrorism. Even if they do not expand their target set and conduct more “terrorist-type” attacks, the Naxalite challenge to the state could materialize in other ways. The Naxalite organization is a sophisticated one that relies not only on militant tactics but also on social unrest and political tactics to increase its power. Naxalites have formed sympathetic student groups in universities, and human-rights groups in New Delhi and other regional capitals are advocating for the local tribal cause in rural eastern India.Instead of using violence, these groups stage protests to express their grievances against the state. And they underscore the Naxalite ability to use both militant violence and subtle social pressure to achieve their goals. Even if the government did decide to deploy the military to combat the Naxalites in eastern India, it would face a tough fight against a well-entrenched movement — something New Delhi is not likely to undertake lightly or any time soon.

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Sins Committed By Indian National Congress

8. June 2010 by admin.

SINS COMMITTED BY CONGRESS

Written By Jaan

Sin No. 1 - Offences of Congress before partition
In the year 1919, the Muslims from Hindustan started ‘Khilafat’ movement to enthrone the Khalifa of Turkstan who was deposed by the British after the First World War. The Congress, with Gandhi as its President, took part in that movement although it was in no way connected to the freedom fight of ‘Bharat’ and therefore, the demon of fanatic Muslims bottled by Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj was let lose once again in Indian politics.

Sin No. 2 - Offences of Congress before partition
Owing to the sermons given by the Congress, Hindus got in the habit of being under intimidation of those who refused to bow before ‘Bharatmata’, those who called worshippers of idols of Sree Ram and Sree Krushna as ‘kafirs’, those who used to treat Hindu women as a thing for taking advantage of and those who troubled ‘Gou-mata’. At the time of partition, those who asked Hindus to retaliate against Muslims were termed as maniacs by the Congress. Only the Congress is responsible for committing one of the highest sins of creating such collective impotency among Hindus !

Sin No. 3 - Offences of Congress before partition
From August 1921, the ‘Moplas’ started attacking Hindus in Malabar, Kerala, who were unprepared because of the Congress’ ‘Khilafat’ movement. Hundreds of Hindus were killed, Hindu women were raped even during day time and hundreds of houses were burning for days together. There is no count of the Hindus who were circumcised. Hindus were in no position to retaliate due to Gandhi’s false idea of Hindu-Muslim unity. These atrocities against Hindus went on for 4 months but Congress and Gandhi said “‘Moplas’ acted as per their religion; ‘Moplas’ are valiant” and completely ignored oppressed Hindus!

Sin No. 4 - Offences of Congress before partition

A convention was held by the Congress at Lahore, in the year 1929, under the presidency of Nehru. That was the first time, the Congress passed a resolution, for complete freedom of Hindustan. During the first 20 years of its formation, the Congress, that was afraid to even utter the word ‘freedom’ in front of the British, slowly started demanding colonial self-government. It took 45 years for Congress to demand complete freedom for ‘Bharat’ since its inception. Such lack of prudence on the part of Congress led to delay of 50 years in acquiring freedom for the country.

Sin No. 5 - Offences of Congress before partition
Congress had boycotted the census of 1931 and 1941 as there used to be a noting of ‘caste’ in the same. The scheming Muslims took advantage of the situation. At the time of partition, the British earmarked border of the two countries based on the population of Hindus and Muslims as per those censuses and allocated more land to Pakistan !

Sin No. 6 - Offences of Congress before partition
Barrister Jina complained to the Congress that singing of the national song ‘Vande Mataram’ insulted Muslims and hoisting the ‘tri-colour’ flag of Congress at public places hurt their religious sentiments. The complaint was immediately taken note of by Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee instructed all the regional Committees to ban display of both the things at public places as advised by Gandhi.

Sin No. 7 - Offences of Congress before partition
During the conference held by the Muslim League at Lahore in 1940, a resolution was passed demanding Pakistan. The Congress never realized the ambition of separate power of Muslims and it committed unpardonable sin of partition of ‘Bharatmata’. During the general election of 1945, Congress promised that there would be no partition; but it did not keep its promise.

Sin No. 8 – Offences of Congress before partition
On 16th August 1946, Muslim League started oppression of Hindus by undertaking an ‘Action Plan’ at Naukhali in Bengal for creation of Pakistan. The Congress Government led by Nehru did nothing to stop the oppression. In retaliation to the dreadful incidents taking place in Bengal, Hindus from Bihar started destruction of Muslims in number of villages. As Muslims stood at the receiving end, Gandhi talked to Nehru over phone. Nehru rushed to Bihar and threatened to bomb the Hindu areas. He deployed army to protect Muslims !

Sin No. 9 - Sins committed by Congress at the time of Partition
Congressmen never waged a war for freedom. Even before partition, Congress leaders were busy in appeasement of Muslims and groveling before the British. They committed the sin of dividing ‘Bharatkhand’ in two (actually 3) parts by creating Pakistan and grabbed the power. On 15.8.1947, only the Congress was celebrating festival of freedom. Everywhere, there were heaps of dead bodies; but the Congress was portraying to the whole nation that they had acquired freedom with their non-violence movement.

Sin No. 10 - Sins committed by Congress before Partition
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar writes in his book titled ‘Pakistan vishayiche vichar (Thoughts about Pakistan)’, ‘If the partition of the country is to be accepted, it should be accepted on the pre-condition of exchange of Hindu – Muslim citizens.’ His invaluable and basic advice was, however, discarded by Nehru’s Congress Government. He declared ‘Bharat’ as a secular country instead of giving it the status of a Hindu Nation. As such, ‘Bharat’ came to be known as the country of mainly followers of 3 religions i.e. Hindu, Muslims and Christians although Hindus were in majority.

Sin No. 11 - Sins committed by Congress before Partition
The number of people who died due to the decision of partition taken by the Congress was much higher than the people killed by dictators. The homeless Hindus from Pakistan were not given any protection by the Congress Government, therefore, nearly a million Hindus were killed and fifteen million Hindus became homeless. A train full of Hindu refugees started from Rawalpindi station to come to Delhi; but just after it left the station, Muslim butchers stopped the train, opened every compartment and methodically started destruction. They did not feel anything to pull a child from its mother’s lap or a sister clinging to her brother. They ripped off the legs of small children and banged them; this action was the extremity of brutality. Young girls were dragged out and their legs were tied, one’s left leg and another’s right leg, so that they did not run away. The Hindu women who were abducted till 15th August, were later disrobed and taken out in a procession. Owing to the indifference and inaction of the Congress Government, only in Lahore, there were 900 women, who were disrobed and taken out in a procession by the Muslim beasts.

Sin No. 12 - Sins committed by Congress before Partition
River Sindhu, on the banks of which our culture flourished, where our sages recited ‘Vedrhucha’, was taken away from us due to partition of this country by the Congress. The River Ganga which is always hailed in all our religious ceremonies, one-fifth part of such River went to East Pakistan (Bangla Desh); even River Brahmaputra, that meets River Ganga, became unhappy as she had to flow through Bangla Desh. The birth place of Panini who wrote the grammar of Sanskrut, the language of Gods, ‘Nankana’, the birth place of Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikh Sect, went to Pakistan. Lahore, the place established by Luv, the son of Prabhu Ramchandra, city Dhaka which got its name from the Goddess Dhakeshwari, all these too went to Pakistan !

Sin No. 13 - Sins committed by Congress before Partition
Congress did grave injustice to Hindus living in Pakistan by deciding about partition of this country. Hindus owned 90% of the land in Pakistan. In cities like Karachi, Lahore, Multan, Peshavar, Rawalpindi, Quetta, Layalpur etc., affluent Hindus had hundreds of palatial houses, lending business, shops, mills, charitable organizations, hospitals, schools, and colleges etc. Punjab University in Lahore was built on 5000 acres of land belonging to a rich Hindu named Gangaram. There was a hospital known as Sir Gangaram Hospital there. The property owned by this family in Lahore was worth 500 millions of rupees. The famous markets like Raja Bazar in Peshawar, Anarkali in Lahore, Saddar in Karachi, Sindh Bazar in Hyderabad, Punjab Bazar in Multan, Hindumal Bazar in Quetta had 95% of shops owned by Hindus. Today, there is not a single Hindu shop. All the jute mills and rice mills in Bangla Desh were owned by Hindus. There too, today nothing belongs to Hindus.

Sin No. 14 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
Without taking consent of Hindus, Congress committed the sin of creating Pakistan dividing (in fact, making 3 parts) of India and ascended the throne of power.

Sin No. 15 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
25% of the population of Lahore was Muslim. When Hindus objected to this decision, Radcliffe, the ‘Partition Officer’ asked, “How can Hindustan be given both the cities viz. Kolkata and Lahore?” 38% of land of Punjab was given to 45 % of Hindus (that included even Sikhs) and 62% land was given to 55% of Muslims. The Congress, however, raised no objection to this decision.

Sin No. 16 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
In the Tharparkar District in Sindh, 94% of the population was Hindu. There, the Partition Officer Radcliffe said that partition of the country could not be done as per the districts; but the demand to mark ‘Silhet’ under Pakistan was immediately agreed to although the Muslims in the area were 51%. The Congress leaders raised no objection against these decisions.

Sin No. 17 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
In ‘Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT)’ comprising of 13000 sq. km. area in Bengal, 98% of the people were Buddhists, Hindus and Christians.
In the year 1947, those people opted to remain with Hindustan. On 16.8.1947, the Partition Officer Radcliffe declared that the said part was allocated to Pakistan without discussing the matter with the local leaders and without giving any reasons. Indian leaders did not object to even this decision. On 20.8.1947, Pakistan sent its army and quashed the opposition.

Sin No. 18 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
Muslims do not address the land of this country as ‘mother’ and in the song ‘Vande Mataram’, tribute is paid to Goddess Durga; therefore, the Congress Government decided that ‘Vande Mataram’ would not be our the national song. The Congress omitted the praise of Goddess Durga from the song giving it the status of second national song and the song praising the British King as India’s ‘Adhinayak and Bhagyavidhata’ i.e. ‘Jan Gan Man’ became the national song!

Sin No. 19 - Sins committed by Congress after Partition
After partition, Congress conferred higher posts to those Muslims who were loyal to Pakistan. The former Governor of Maharashtra Ali Yavar Jung was an advocate of Nizam, his loyalty was with Nizam and he was given the post of Governor of Maharashtra! Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad was the first Education Minister of India who returned to India with a dream of ‘Pan Islam’ from Arab countries. He wanted all of Bharat to become Pakistan and therefore, he was against creation of Pakistan. Barrister Asaf Ali was made an ambassador in USA who wrote wrong address and sent the shipment of weapons to Karachi, Pakistan. It was Indian money, Indian ambassador, sending weapons to Pakistan i.e. loyalty to Pakistan. How terrible was all these things?

Sin No. 20 - Sins committed by Congress in the aftermath of Gandhi’s killing !
‘Killing of innocent Brahmins after the death of Gandhi, killing of Sikhs after the death of Indira Gandhi, these killings were carried out on the suggestions of Congress leaders!’

Sin N0. 21 - Sins committed by Congress in the aftermath of Gandhi’s killing !
Veer Savarkar, who devoted his life to gain independence and who suffered a punishment in the Black waters of Andaman, was forcibly imprisoned for one year by the government led by Nehru after accusing him of being involved in the assassination of Gandhi. The Nehru government said in court that Veer Savarkar was either responsible for the assassination of Gandhi or he had full knowledge of this act forehand. Even after such accusations, the court decided and declared that Veer Savarkar was not involved in the assassination of Gandhi and set him free. Unfortunately even today Congressmen object to the release of Veer Savarkar from the case related to Gandhi’s assassination and talk suspiciously; is this not Contempt of Court ?

Sin No. 22 - Sins committed by Congress in the aftermath of Gandhi’s killing !
In relation to Gandhi killing, on the instructions of Nehru, Sarsanchalak Pujya Golvalkar Guruji was imprisoned without any reason for 18 months. In relation to Gandhi killing Nehru banned Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) for 18 months and arrested seventeen thousand swayamsevaks and subjected them to torture. All over the country there were demonstrations against this injustice; on the instructions from Nehru the police severely lathi charged and beat thousands of swayamsevaks. A number of swayamsevaks died as a result of this police action. To explain the non-involvement of RSS and its explanation Pujya Golvalkar Guruji requested a meeting with Nehru repeatedly. All requests were always denied and Pujya Guruji was repeatedly insulted !

Sin No. 23 - Sins committed by Congress with relation to Kashmir !
Just approximately 3 months after the creation of Pakistan, Pakistan attacks Kashmir with all its military might. Hari Singh, the King of Kashmir requests Nehru for help. Nehru put forth a precondition namely ‘If you hand over the reins of Kashmir to Sheikh Abdullah, only then I will provide help.’ Before the Indian army which had gone to help in securing Kashmir, could secure Kashmir fully Nehru orders the army to stop all operations. Nehru himself handed over a large part of Kashmir to Pakistan and handed over Kashmir, a Hindu kingdom, to Abdullah in order to please Muslims. The wound inflicted on Kashmir has been kept bleeding continuously. King Hari Singh did not get even a single penny from Nehru !

Sin No. 24 - Sins committed by Congress with reference to Kashmir
Congress did not defend Kashmir from Pakistani militants and raised question of Kashmir in United Nations. It gifted one third of Kashmir to Pakistan and made another partition of India after partition of 1947.

Sin No. 25 - Sins committed by Congress with reference to Kashmir
The article 370 initially adopted on temporary basis for Jammu and Kashmir was made permanent by the power-hungry Congress instead of discarding the same after some time. This article was made applicable to even States like Nagaland, Mizoram and few other States. Kashmir is an integral part of India but even the President of India cannot buy any property in Kashmir. What kind of integration is this? Kashmir is a place where Muslims are in majority and therefore, the Congress has made such special Constitutional provision.

Sin No. 26 - Sins committed by Congress with reference to Kashmir
The Congress Government did not provide protection to Kashmiri Hindus in the year 1990 when the Muslim fanaticism had crossed all the limits; as a result, 400000 Kashmiri Hindus had to leave their own land. Their apple orchards, farms where they used to grow ‘Basmati’ rice, their houses and shops have been grabbed by Muslims and the Congress Government has not given any compensation to them so far. These 400000 Hindus are now leading life of a refugee in their own country and have been facing lot of hardships. In the refugee camps erected for them 20 years back, no electricity, water, cleanliness, facility to get education or avenue to earn own living have been provided by governments of any of the parties. In fact, Kashmiri Hindus have not been rehabilitated in Kashmir even after all these years.

Sin No. 27 - Sins committed by Congress with reference to Kashmir
Congress Government started bus service from Srinagar to Muzaffarbad but the terrorists blew up 18 government offices to register their protest. The Central Government and the State Government of Jammu and Kashmir, however, kept mum in the matter.

Sin No. 28 - Sins committed by Congress with reference to Kashmir
Jammu-Kashmir (J & K) has population of ten million and get aid of Rs.2400 millions i.e. Rs.24000/- per head; but the aid given to other States is not even 5% of what is given to J&K. The assistance provided to J&K by the Central Government is 7-10% more than what other States receive because there are Muslims in majority in that State. The Congress Government is pouring money in J & K and in a way levying a type of ‘Jizia’ tax on Hindus as it is the money paid by Hindus by way of taxes on their earnings after putting lot of hard work.

Sin No. 29 - Sins committed by Congress during the period of assassination of Gandhi
In the war against Pakistan fought in the year 1965 on the issue of ‘Kutchh Desert’, India had won 5000 sq. kms. of land sacrificing 3200 of her soldiers; but the Congress Government returned the same to Pakistan by entering into ‘Tashkent Agreement’.

Sin No. 30 - Sins committed by Congress during various wars
In the war fought in the year 1971, India created Bangla Desh at the cost of sacrificing 4000 soldiers; but Indira Gandhi was deceived by the ‘Shimla Agreement’. Congress Government lost the golden opportunity of to solve Kashmir problem. India returned 93000 prisoners of war to Pakistan so also the land won in the war; but Pakistan has not returned India’s 100 prisoners of war even now. They are still rotting in the Pakistani jails. None of the Congress Governments has so far made any effort towards their release.

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Remembering a War: Sino-Indian War of 1962

26. May 2010 by admin.

Remembering a War: Sino-Indian War of 1962

The Rediff Special/Claude Arpi

If someone asked me what is the greatest scam since Independence, I would have some difficulty answering. I might initially consider the ‘Jeep case’ involving Krishna Menon, or the smoking guns of Bofors.

But in the end, the one that I find the most stupid, and perhaps the most harmful to India’s interests in the long run, is the confiscation of history by government babus under the Public Records Act.

These rules vaguely state that “unclassified public records more than 30 years old should be made available to any bona fide research scholar, but subject to such exceptions and restrictions as may be prescribed”.

Because of the last part of the sentence, the people of India are today not able to know about their recent history. One of the main casualties is the 1962 war with China. As a sad result of this policy, the Chinese version of history is often prevalent, even in India.

A few weeks after the debacle of October-November 1962, Lieutenant General J N Chaudhuri constituted a committee to study the causes of the ‘Himalayan blunder’. An Anglo-Indian general called Henderson Brooks was requested to go through the official records and prepare a report on the war. Sometime in 1963, the general presented his study to Nehru and a couple of his ministers. The report was immediately classified ‘Top Secret’.

One can understand that at that time the prime minister did not want the report made to be public, as he may have had to take responsibility for the unpreparedness of the army and, most probably, resign.

The tragedy is not that the report was ‘classified’ in 1963, but that it continues to remain classified today. Forty years later, nobody has still seen the report. That is, except for one person: a British foreign correspondent named Neville Maxwell. The rumour is that a senior minister passed on the report to him.

Nine years after the war, when Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing to prepare President Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972, he stayed five days in China and had a series of 10 crucial meetings with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier.

The transcripts of these talks, which were recently ‘declassified’ by the US administration, are mind-opening, particularly in the above context. Here are some of Kissinger’s remarks to Zhou Enlai: “I read the book by Maxwell that the prime minister recommended to me last time, and it is our view, certainly at the White House, that the Indians are applying the same tactics to that situation as they did to you.”

Kissinger refers to Maxwell’s book India’s China War, which shows India as an aggressive nation that bullied China during the 1962 war. Later in the discussion, the Chinese premier comes back to Maxwell’s book: “We [the Chinese] understand best the traditions of India. After having read the book of Maxwell you also believe it [that bullying others] is the traditional policy of India.”

It is amazing that Maxwell, thanks to the Government of India’s propensity for secrecy, is the only person who has managed to see the Henderson Brooks report. Maxwell stated himself in the Economic & Political Weekly in 2001: “The report includes no surprises and its publication would be of little significance, but for the fact that so many in India still cling to the soothing fantasy of a 1962 Chinese ‘aggression’.”

Yes, the theory put forward by the Chinese and Maxwell is that the war was only due to Nehru’s aggressive policy and China had no other choice but to launch a ‘pre-emptive attack’ on October 20 on the slopes of Tagla ridge.

Not only did India lose the Aksai Chin and other territories in Kashmir in the 1950s, but India became the bully, the ‘expansionist’ nation.

One can only be sad that 40 years after the event, the Government of India is still adding water to the Chinese half-baked history mill by continuing to hide what is most probably a quite insignificant report.

The burial of the Henderson Brooks report, however, raises several other questions. When one reads Indian newspapers, one gets the impression that the people of India (or at least the journalists of India) are greatly interested in history. For the past few years, not a day has passed without one comment or another on the history textbooks that have been revised by the NCERT; or the HRD minister who is supposedly spending his time ‘rewriting’ Indian history, or adding colour to historical facts.

But tell me, what is wrong in ‘rewriting’ history books when it is necessary? The great son of India, Gautama Buddha, once told his disciples: ‘As the wise test gold by burning, cutting and rubbing it on a piece of touchstone, so are you to accept my words only after examining them and not merely out of regard for me.”

As long as there is new information, new inputs or documents, history needs to be researched and researched again, in the Buddha’s fashion. Is it not in the interest of a nation to know her past?

The great misfortune in the case of the 1962 war is that there is no will from the government’s side to give the means to those inclined to do this research to obtain a truer picture of the past.

Personally, I faced a similar problem when I tried to research my two pet subjects: Tibet and Kashmir. Going through the painful exercise of trying to access some documents at the time of the Chinese invasion of Tibet (1950) was a nightmare.

At the National Archives of India, I was told that all documents for the NEFA area (which included Tibet and Bhutan) were ‘classified’ after 1913 and nobody could access them. For ‘Gilgit area’ [read Kashmir], the date is 1923. This colonial terminology gives an indication of the backwardness of the historical studies in India. Have not the British left India 55 years ago?

What about the famous ‘Nehru’s Papers’? They are kept in the Nehru Library by a private trust, chaired by the leader of the opposition, and you have to obtain her consent to see them. In any case, you cannot see them, as they are ‘restricted’.

Only ‘official’ historians are able to study them. The very helpful staff can only tell you: “Sorry, sir, this is the rule.” India must be the only nation where the prime minister’s official papers belong to his family and not the state!

In my case it was even more stupid because most of the political files regarding Tibet from 1914 till as late as 1952-53 were freely available for researchers in the India Office Library and Records in London. The moral of the story: go to London to study Indian history.

Different reasons are given as to why historical documents should not be ‘declassified’. The most current and irrelevant argument is that these old documents are of a ’sensitive’ nature and their circulation may jeopardize India’s security.

I believe that some years ago, a ‘group of secretaries’, the most dreaded order of the babu species, stopped the publication of the report of the 1965 war because: “it gave information about certain aspects of command and control.” Luckily, a Good Samaritan managed to get hold of a copy and post it on an Internet site.

But something is even more incongruous. While the Government of India is holding the Henderson Brooks report close to its chest, a very historic international conference was held in Cuba recently.

Many will remember that the week the Chinese troops entered in the Northeast and in Ladakh, humanity was coming very close to its first nuclear war. This was the Cold War’s climax: the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in Cuba over the installation of ballistic missiles targeting American cities threatened to degenerate into World War III.

To commemorate the stupendous events of the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban government, with the National Security Archive of George Washington University, organized a conference titled “The October Crisis: Political Perspectives 40 Years Later”.

Some of the veterans who participated in those historic days were invited to discuss the conflict between Khrushchev and Kennedy.

During the last session of the conference, the participants, including Cuban president Fidel Castro and former US secretary of defence Robert McNamara discussed some newly declassified documents.

The documents show that the Soviet nuclear-armed tactical weapons in Cuba stayed there after the missiles were withdrawn, and may even have been intended for Cuban custody.

“Documents released today included verbatim Soviet records of the contentious meetings between top Soviet leader Anastas Mikoyan and top Cuban leaders, including Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, during Mikoyan’s trip to Cuba in early November; Soviet orders first preparing the tactical weapons for training the Cubans and then, on November 20, ordering their withdrawal; and a prophetic summary of the crisis written by the British ambassador to Cuba, who predicted that the crisis could ultimately rebound to the benefit of the Castro regime and the long-term survival of Communism in Cuba,” said a press release.

Some may think that Cuba is a totalitarian banana republic, but Fidel Castro did organise the conference and participate in it.

We cannot dream of such a debate in India today. Why? I have no answer.

We have in Delhi many universities, policy centres, think-tanks, a host of retired ‘thinking’ generals (as if the serving generals are not able to think). Why can’t any of them take up the challenge and open a debate on what really happened in 1962? Many fields of research have remained untouched. To give a few examples:

*When was Aksai Chin really occupied? Why did the government react so late?

*The relation between the 1959 uprising in Lhasa and the 1962 war (one very symptomatic fact is that the Chinese followed the same route as the Dalai Lama took when he escaped to India in 1959) as well as the Panchen Lama’s petition against the party in 1962;

*The importance of the split between Moscow and Beijing, which came into the open in October 1962; and Moscow’s sudden change of stance vis-à-vis India in the midst of the conflict;

*The relation between the Cuban crisis and the 1962 Indo-China war;

*When did China prepare the 1962 operations and what were her real motivations;

*The internal political factors in China and Mao Zedong’s own motivations (he was facing strong opposition from within the Communist Party after his disastrous Great Leap Forward and was sidelined);

*The reasons for the sudden unilateral withdrawal by the Chinese;

*The role of the Indian Communists during the war;

*The non-intervention of President Ayub Khan.The recently ‘declassified’ documents available in the Russian, Cuban, and East European archives, as well as the already available materials collected by organizations such as the National Security Archives or the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington, DC, could certainly be of great help.

But is India interested? This seems to be the main problem. If the media and the public had made the same amount of noise for the Henderson Brooks report and other archival materials to be released as they have done for the so-called ‘rewritten’ textbooks, we would have had a truer picture of 1962 war history today. No harm in hoping!

(Claude Arpi, author of The Fate Of Tibet (HarAnand), which has also been translated into French, writes regularly for rediff.com)

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Sino-Indian Dispute

26. May 2010 by admin.

THE SINO/INDIAN DISPUTE

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THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER examined in some detail the background to the Tibetan question. This detail is necessary if we are to understand the very important role which Tibet has played in the evolution of Sino/Indian relations. Ever since its establishment in 1949, the attitude of the Communist Chinese Government towards India has been bound up with the Tibetan issue. India had, on gaining independence in 1947, inherited the British “special position” in Tibet, along with the Mission in Lhasa and trade agencies in larger towns. It had retained the services of British officials stationed in Tibet. When, in 1949, Tibetan leaders made their bid to contact foreign Governments, they first contacted these officials, and it was only a short step for the suspicious minded Chinese to regard this as evidence of Indian collusion with the British. The Communist Chinese also had ideological reasons for believing that such collusion existed. At the time of their coming to power, Moscow was propagating the line of a world divided into two camps, with the Indian Government depicted as a tool of British imperialism and firmly situated in the opposing camp. The Communist Chinese leaders, who previously had had little contact with the outside world, faithfully repeated these accusations against Nehru and his Government. Following the Chinese occupation of Tibet in late 1950, Peking’s suspicions of the Indians were further aroused when Nehru, in notes to the Chinese Government, expressed the “surprise and regret” of his Government at the Chinese action. He described as “deplorable” the Chinese use of force in Tibet.¹ Standard diplomatic practice stipulates that a state does not criticise the behaviour of another state acting within its own territorial boundaries unless there are special reasons for so doing. The Indians justified their criticism of the Chinese on the ground of their special interest in Tibet, from which the Chinese inferred that the Indians were implying some restriction on Chinese sovereignty. A sharp reply was received from the Chinese accusing the Indians of unwarranted interference and claiming that the policy of the Indian Government was “affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet”. Nevertheless, whatever suspicions the Chinese may have felt about the Indians in 1949-50 must to some extent have been allayed by subsequent developments. India opposed the 1950 Tibetan appeal to the United Nations; it was one of the few non-communist countries not to condemn China’s intervention in the Korean War; it sought to have China seated an the United Nations. The culmination of these moves to improve relations with China was the signing, in April 1954, of an agreement by which India recognised without qualification China’s sovereignty over Tibet and conceded many of India’s former rights there. A few months later the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, paid a successful visit to India, and in October of the same year Nehru visited Peking. The very considerable improvement in Sino/Indian relations from 1950 to 1954 was on the Indian side almost entirely the result of efforts by Nehru, who saw friendship between China and India as the starting point of a new order in world affairs. It must have been obvious to the Chinese that considerable opposition to Nehru’s pro-China policies, at least as far as Tibet was concerned, existed both within and outside the Indian Government. It should also have been clear that problems were going to arise over wide discrepancies in the claimed Sino/Indian border, as shown in maps published by both sides. However, as long as Nehru’s China policy appeared to produce results, his opposition in India remained silent. It was important for both Nehru and the Chinese that this policy continued to appear to give results, and hence the efforts made by both sides to keep intact the edifice of good relations. The Chinese, under the 1954 agreement, allowed India to maintain certain trade and pilgrimage rights in Tibet. They sought to play down the significance of border differences, stating that they had simply inherited their claimed Sino/Indian frontier from the pre-1949 Nationalist Government and that it would be “revised” in due course.² Nehru, for his part, avoided public mention of the reality and extent of border differences, and it seemed that both sides were moving towards a compromise settlement of the question. What were these differences, and what evidence was there that both sides were in fact prepared to compromise? The Sino/Indian border can be divided into three sectors: (i) an eastern sector where 99,000 square kilometres of territory described by the Indians as the Northeast Frontier Agency, or N.E.F.A is in dispute: (ii) a middle sector where some 2.000 square kilometres of territory on either side of the main Himalayan passes is disputed: and (iii) a western sector where the Indian province of Ladakh borders on Tibet and Sinkiang and where both the Indian/Tibet and Indian/Sinkiang borders are disputed, in particular the ownership of some 30,000 square kilometres of high plateau country known as the Aksai Chin.

map1

To an outside observer looking at the frontier as it stands, an apparent basis for a compromise settlement would be for China to drop its claim to the N.E.F.A. in exchange for India dropping its claim to the Aksai Chin, with both sides making concessions over the middle sector and the Ladakh/Tibetan border. Such a settlement accords with the realities of both geography and administrative control two important criteria in the settlement of border disputes. The N.E.F.A. lies to the south of the Himalayan watershed and is controlled by India. The Aksai Chin, for the most part, lies to the north of the main range, and the Chinese claim to have controlled the area since 1950. In 1956-7, they built a strategic road across the Aksai Chin, linking Sinkiang with Tibet. That the Indians learnt about the road only from a map published by the Chinese in 1958 is substantial evidence that India was not in control of the area. The historical basis of the border is more confused. The Indian claim to the N.E.F.A. rests almost entirely on acceptance of the McMahon Line, a line agreed to by the Tibetans and British in 1914 as the border in this area. In the Aksai Chin area no agreement has ever been reached on the alignment of the border. Nevertheless, if both sides were to take a generous view of the historical data, a basis for a N.E.F.A./Aksai Chin exchange could be found. During the post-1954 honeymoon period of Sino/Indian relations, both sides did in fact seem prepared to take a generous view of the situation and to move towards a compromise settlement. In 1956, Chou En-lai admitted privately to Nehru that, although lie thought the McMahon line “was not fair”, nevertheless China would accept the line as the border with India after they had “consulted with the Tibetan authorities”.³ Chinese recognition of the McMahon Line was also implied when its eastern extension was accepted as a basis for border negotiations with Burma, and by Chinese de facto acceptance of the line as the dividing line between Chinese and Indian forces in the area. Nehru, for his part, appeared willing to play down the Indian claims to the Aksai Chin. He tried to delay disclosure if the news that the Chinese had built a road in the area. After the news had been revealed, he sought to play down the economic significance of the area, describing it as a “barren tundra”. He even went so far as to cast doubt on the validity of the Indian claim to the area. In statements to the Indian Parliament during early 1959, Nehru pointed out that “during British rule, this area was neither inhabited: nor were there any outposts”, adding that “this place, Aksai Chin area, is distinguish completely from other areas. It is a matter for argument which part belongs to us and which part belongs to somebody else. It is not clear”. Nehru’s efforts to take the heat out of the Aksai Chin question were not entirely successful. (One of his critics even suggested building an atomic reactor in the area to promote its economic development.) News of the Chinese road in the area appeared to trigger off long-suppressed Indian sensitivity over the border issue, and, in August 1958, the Indian Government made a formal claim to the disputed territory in all three sectors. In a letter to Nehru of January 1959, Chou En-lai claimed that the Aksai Chin was Chinese territory and added that the McMahon Line was a “product of British aggression”, illegal, and had “never been recognised by the Chinese Central Government”. He proposed that the existing status quo he maintained, however, pending a negotiated settlement of the dispute, and added that China would take a “realistic attitude” over the McMahon Line.*

*The Indians have since claimed that Chou’s 1959 denunciation of the McMahon Line represented an about-face in his attitude as expressed in 1956. Once the Indians had lodged a formal claim to ail the territory in dispute, however, it was only to be expected that the Chinese would move to establish the basis of their claim in the N.E.F.A. and so provide a bargaining counter against the Indian claim to the Aksai Chin. Moreover, it is difficult to see any significant difference between the Chinese 1956 and 1959 positions.

The Tibetan uprising of March 1959 upset the delicate balance of Sino/Indian relations. Reports of Chinese military action to suppress the uprising, together with the sight of thousands of Tibetan refugees crossing into Indian territory, quickly aroused feelings of alarm and anger in India, particularly among those who believed their country had an historic interest in Tibet. Nehru’s Right-Wing critics charged that India should never have allowed the Chinese into Tibet in the first place. Nehru, influenced possibly both by Indian public opinion and his own feelings on the question, came out in open condemnation of Chinese behaviour in Tibet.

map2

The Chinese reacted even more strongly than they had in 1950. Nehru, in addition to condemning the Chinese, had spoken of his sympathy with “the aspirations of the Tibetans for autonomy”. He had given asylum to the Dalai Lama, who was also allowed facilities to make his 1959 appeal for U. N. action over Tibet. And finally, the Chinese had reason to believe that the Tibetan guerrillas were receiving arms from across the Indian border. ⁴ In May 1959 the Chinese published a long article urging, almost begging, Nehru not to be swayed by his reactionary Right-Wing critics and to return to the path of Sino/Indian friendship. With a frankness and detail probably unmatched by any other Chinese statement on foreign policy, the article set out the Chinese case over Tibet, and accused the Indians of unjustified interference. Indian trade with Tibet was greatly restricted. Clashes involving casualties occurred at several points along the disputed border as the Chinese Army extended its control over border areas in an effort to restrict the move- court of Tibetans across the frontier.*

*Whether the sites of these clashes lay in Chinese or Indian territory has been argued at some length. At least one of these points, however, Tamaden, lay to the north of the McMahon Line, clearly within Chinese territory, and was subsequently evacuated by the Indians.

These border clashes, following in the wake of the Tibetan uprising, appeared to put an end to Nehru’s willingness to compromise over the border dispute. Having earlier in 1959 cast doubt on the Indian claim to the Aksai Chin, in September he stated before the Indian Parliament that the Chinese claims were “absurd” and would mean “handing over the Himalayas to them as a gift”. A Chinese call in November 1959 for negotiations and a twenty-kilometre military withdrawal from the McMahon Line in the east and the “line of actual control” in the west to prevent a recurrence of border clashes was met with an Indian demand for a prior Chinese withdrawal from the Aksai Chin. A Chinese reply pointing out that this should also be paralleled by an Indian withdrawal from the NE.F.A. was ignored. In the end the Chinese appeared to settle for a freezing of the existing status quo - without negotiations or a twenty-kilometre withdrawal.*

*The Chinese claim to have made a unilateral twenty-kilometre withdrawal, leaving only civilian-manned posts along the line of actual control.

However, if the Chinese were happy to keep things as they were (keeping also their road across the Aksai Chin), Nehru and his Government were not. Throughout 1960-61 Indian opinion progressively hardened, and demands for the Government to do something about Tibet and the disputed border increased. The army was given full control over the frontier districts and it proceeded to build up its strength in these areas. During the summer (northern) of 1962, Indian military patrols repeatedly crossed the Chinese-claimed line of actual control in the western sector of the frontier. Posts were established well behind the Chinese forward positions in territory claimed and occupied by the Chinese. Frequent and insistent Chinese protests were met with the bald statement that the Indians were merely operating in Indian territory. By August 14, Nehru was able to announce that India had three times as many posts in the western sector as the Chinese. He asked for a free hand to continue the build-up of Indian strength in the area. The Chinese had repeatedly warned that a continuation of such activity would end in hostilities. On July 9, they had warned the Indians “to rein in on the brink of the precipice”. On August 4, they called for immediate negotiations on the border. The Indians replied that negotiations could not be held until the Chinese had ceased their occupation of “every square inch of sacred Indian territory”, and that the Chinese must first “vacate their aggression” in the Aksai Chin. The Chinese replied on September 13 proposing talks to begin on October 15 “without preconditions”, that is, without a Chinese withdrawal from the Aksai Chin. The Indians refused the offer. While Indian military pressure was building up along the Chinese-claimed border in the western sector, a curious situation was developing along the McMahon Line in the eastern sector. The Indians claim that at its western end the McMahon Line was not accurately drawn: that it was meant to have followed the crest of a line of hills known as the Thag La ridge. The Chinese claim, and have produced the original McMahon Line from the Tibetan archives to prove their point, that the line as originally drawn lies approximately twelve miles south of this ridge along the southern side of a small river valley. (Western maps show the McMahon Line in conformity with the Chinese claim.) The area between the Indian and Chinese versions of the McMahon Line is described by the Indians as the Dho La strip.*

* This was not the only unilateral revision of the McMahon Line carried out by the Indians. In his letter to Chou En-lai of September 29, 1959, Nehru admitted that in the Migyitun area (to the east of the Dho La strip) the border shown on Indian maps “differs slightly from the boundary shown in the Treaty map”. He claimed that when the McMahon line was drawn, “the exact topographical features in this area were not known”. The Indians have also now come to admit that “blind adherence” to the original McMahon Line would leave the Dho La strip on the Chinese side at the border. ⁷

It is not clear who first occupied the Dho La strip. The Chinese claim that the area had always been under their control and that Indian troops moved in during 1962. The Indians claim they had long occupied the area and that the Chinese began a to establish posts in the area after September 8, 1962. What is clear is that on October 12, 1962, Nehru announced in the Indian Parliament that he had given the order to drive the Chinese out of the Dho La strip. Eight days later, on October 20, the Chinese attacked in force across the Thagla La ridge and into the disputed strip, while advancing their troops into the Chinese-claimed territory in the western sector where the Indians had earlier established posts. Four days later, the Chinese called for a ceasefire to be followed by a withdrawal of both sides from the line that separated them at that moment (the so-called October 24 line of actual control). Failing to get a satisfactory response from the Indians, they advanced troops south of the Dho La strip into the N.E.F.A., defeating Indian military forces in the area. Two weeks later, they withdrew to the positions occupied on October 24. The main point of contention between the Chinese and Indians ever since has been whether the Chinese should maintain their October 24 positions or withdraw further to the positions they occupied before fighting broke out. Sino/Indian Hostility: a Case Study in Mutual Misunderstanding. The Chinese attack of October 1962 has led to an almost complete breakdown in relations between China and India. The level of each country’s diplomatic representation in the other has been greatly reduced. Many thousands of Chinese nationals have been expelled from India. The few Indian nationals living in China have, in one way or another, been forced to leave. Border incidents have continued. Both sides have launched extreme propaganda campaigns against each other, the Chinese denouncing Nehru as a representative of the “big bourgeoisie” and a tool for U. S. aggressive designs against Tibet, while the Indians denounce the Chinese for having aggressive, imperialist designs against Indian territory. Both sides have gone to great lengths to discredit each other inter- nationally. Both sides have increased their military preparedness along the Himalayan frontier, particularly India, which has doubled its military budget to a level it cannot afford. The question thus arises: Who is primarily to blame for the hostility in Sino/Indian relations? From the account already given, the primary cause of the hostility was the post-1959 dispute over the Sino/Indian border leading to the Chinese attack of October 20. But why the sudden emergence of such a dispute between two countries previously enjoying good relations? Reverting to the terminology of our previous discussion on hostility between states, both sides see the breakdown in relations as being caused by the active hostility of the other side. This hostility, they claim, is both ideologically and national- interest based. The Chinese are accused of having acted in a hostile manner out of a desire to acquire territory and out of strong ideological dislike for the Indian Government. The Chinese claim the Indians have designs against Chinese territory and that their Government is under the influence of anti-Chinese and pro-U. S. reactionary elements. Both sides realise that they have somehow or other to explain why the other side suddenly, in 1959, decided that its interests were no longer served by the maintenance of normal relations. The Indian explanation is that Chinese pre-1959 policy was designed to lull India into a false sense of security and so facilitate Chinese ambitions. The Chinese explanation was that reactionary elements began to gain the upper hand in the Indian Government in 1959, and point to the post-1959 increase in U. S. aid to India as evidence. In fact there is good reason to believe that the hostility shown by each side towards the other was reactive rather than active: that each side was reacting to the believed hostility of the other. To take the Chinese side of things first. In terms of the account already given, it seems likely that the Chinese attack of October 20, 1962, was primarily a reaction to Indian military pressure along the disputed frontier during preceding months. It could be argued, however. that the behaviour of the Chinese before October 20, and in particular their propaganda attacks against the Indians from 1960 onwards, cannot be explained simply as a reaction to previous events: that overall Chinese behaviour must therefore include some aggressive component. The Chinese had in fact made their first hostile move against the Indians back in 1959 when they restricted Indian trading and other rights in Tibet. The Chinese had also, according to the Indians, extended somewhat the area they claimed in the western sector.* And they had, according to the Indians, been responsible for the 1959 border clashes already mentioned.

*The Indian charge is based on alleged differences between the frontier claimed by the Chinese to 1956 and that shown on a map of the claimed Sino/Indian frontier handed to the Indians by the Chinese in 1960. The Chinese deny any difference between the two lines.

Unless these apparently hostile acts of the Chinese can be explained in reactive terms., in terms of their reacting to previous Indian actions, then it would seem that the Chinese had taken the initiative in hostility towards India and were largely responsible for the eventual breakdown in relations. The hardening of the Chinese attitude towards India in 1959 was clearly related to Tibetan developments in that year. In judging the behaviour of the Chinese, we need, in effect, to ask whether their sensitivity over Tibet was sufficient to explain this hardening of attitude. To accept that the Communist Chinese are, in fact extremely sensitive toward Tibet does not necessarily imply a simple acceptance of Chinese propaganda. What we know of Chinese thinking and behaviour, strongly suggests that this sensitivity does exist. If all non-communist Chinese believe that China has the right to consider Tibet as an integral part of her territory, we should accept that Communist Chinese are equally convinced. If many non-communist Chinese believe (as they do) that Britain had designs against Tibet, we should accept that Communist Chinese, educated to believe in the evils of US Western imperialism, will be at least equally fearful. We do not need accept that these views are correct; we may even consider they are absurd. But if we are going to get anywhere in trying to understand China’s behaviour, we should start from the assumption that these views may be sincerely hold in Peking. Nor may it be so absurd for the Communist Chinese to think along these lines. The Chinese legal claim to Tibet, it has been argued, appears difficult to refute. As for fears of foreign designs, if the British had earlier convinced themselves that the activities of one Russian agent in Lhasa could lead the politically unstable Tibetans to ally themselves with Tsarist Russia, the Chinese could be excused for thinking that the presence of a British Mission in Lhasa dealing directly with the independent-minded Tibetans and arranging on occasion for the supply of arms from India was evidence of British ambitions eventually to detach Tibet from China, and that India may have inherited these ambitions. Similarly, it would not be entirely surprising if the Chinese viewed the supply of foreign arms to Tibetan guerrillas from northern India in 1959 as confirmation that such ambitions existed. Finally, the Chinese were hound to be impressed by the demands of the Indian Right Wing for action against the Chinese in Tibet.*

* For example: some weight could be attached to the fact that the then Chief of the Indian Army Staff wrote a not unenthusiastic foreword for a book published in 1961 entitled The Chinese Aggression. The author of the hook, a Dr. Satyanarayan Sinha, predicted that the “clash of the Indochinese weapons for the possession of the Himalayas will lead to making Tibet an independent country again”, and suggested ways in which this could be done.

These, then, are the reasons for believing the Chinese may he sensitive about Tibet. Chinese behaviour provides further confirmation. British officials captured in Tibet in 1950 were subjected to long imprisonment and continual interrogation - treatment far more severe than that meted out to British nationals who fell into communist hands elsewhere in China. And there was Nehru’s sad admission to the Indian Parliament in 1959 after talks with Chou En-Iai, of the Chinese having “some sort of kink in their minds… of foreign countries, United Kingdom or America, somehow making incursions into Tibet”. In sum, therefore, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude that the Communist Chinese sincerely believed they had a right to Tibet and that their position in the area was threatened from the direction of India. In which case they would have interpreted Indian behaviour in 1959 as an indication of hostility to which they felt compelled, or entitled, to react. However, if Chinese behaviour in 1959 can be explained in reactive terms, can the same be said about the Chinese attack of October 1962? Even if the Indian claim to the Dho La strip was doubtful, does not the violence and intensity of the 1962 attack suggest that China was doing more than retaliate for any wrongs she may have believed the Indians to base committed? By 1962, the Chinese were confronted not only by Indian agitation over Tibet, but also by two further aspects of Indian behaviour which would even more easily have been misunderstood. They were: (i) the Indian military build-up along the Sino/Indian border in 1961-2 and (ii) rigid Indian insistence that, as a precondition to border negotiations, the Chinese must first evacuate the whole of the Aksai Chin. At the time, the Indians justified their position on negotiations and their military build up in terms of the correctness of their border claims. Indeed, the official Indian position was that the line claimed by India as a border had already been defined historically, and that the only purpose of negotiations was to demarcate on the ground the exact alignment of this border. From this it followed that they were justified (a) in regarding rival Chinese claims, and the occupation of the Aksai Chin, as evidence of Chinese hostility, and (b) in insisting that occupied territory had to be vacated before there could be negotiations. In the meantime the Indians had no alternative but to use military means to counter the Chinese “aggression”. If India was in fact the injured party in the territorial dispute, the Indian attitude over the disputed border would have been explicable at least to an impartial observer, and possibly even to the less impartial Chinese. There would be less justification for the Chinese reacting in the way they did. But was this the case? To answer this question we need to take a closer look at the historical background to the Sino /Indian frontier, and shall begin with the eastern sector, or N.E.F.A. Until the 1920’s, the region now known as the N.E.F.A. was largely unexplored. It was, and still is, inhabited by tribes of Tibeto-Burmese origin, some of which enjoyed trade and tributary relations with Tibet. Certain areas in the north of the region, the Tawang district for example, were inhabited by Tibetans and were under administrative control from Tibet. The McMahon Line was negotiated with the Tibetans in 1914 at the time of the Simla Conference. It was drawn as far to the north as possible, since the British at the time sought to forestall a feared Chinese expansion into the foothills bordering the Assam plains. The Tibetans, as mentioned in the previous chapter, accepted the McMahon Line as part of a bargain whereby the British would press the Chinese to concede territory elsewhere to Tibet. Even so, the Tibetans were not entirely happy about losing territory south of the McMahon Line, the Tawang district in particular. Their acceptance of the line was conditional on possible future adjustments in their favour. No such adjustments, were ever made. The British also failed to extract the promised concessions from the Chinese, since the latter refused to accept the Convention produced at the Simla Conference. Thus, even as a Tibetan/British frontier, the McMahon Line does not have full validity, particularly as the Tibetans subsequently, in 1936, made a formal request to the British for revision of the line in their favour a request which the British ignored. As late as 1946, the Tibetans were still collecting taxes in the Tawang area. And, in 1947, the Tibetans approached the newly established Indian Government, seeking the “return” of “Tibetan territories” from Assam to Ladakh*⁸.

*The Indian reply to this approach may be of interest in the light of complaints to be voiced later by the Indians over the manner in which the Chinese spoke of their border claims being inherited from previous Chinese Governments “The Government of India should be glad to have an assurance that it is the intention of the Tibetan Government to continue relations an the existing basis until new Agreements are any reached . .. This is the procedure adopted by all other countries with which India has inherited Treaty relations from His Majesty’s Government”. ⁹

The validity of the McMahon Line as a Chinese/Indian frontier is considerably more doubtful. True, in rejecting the draft Simla Contention, the Chinese did not specifically object to the McMahon Line as drawn on the map of Tibet attached to the Convention. But, as the Chinese point out, the then Chinese Government had no way of knowing what this line was supposed to represent, since the terms of the McMahon Line agreement were for some reason kept secret by the British and Tibetans until 1929. It could, in theory, have been a border between Tibet and a Chinese-owned N.E.F.A. Moreover, Chiang Kaishek’s Government was later to make it clear to the British (and the Indians after 1947) that it did not accept the McMahon Line. The Chinese have also pointed out that, since neither the British nor the Chinese regarded Tibet as a sovereign entity, the Tibetans were obliged to obtain Chinese approval for any frontier negotiated with a foreign power. * Failure to obtain this approval, both at the Simla Conference and later, meant that the McMahon Line never at any stage enjoyed international legality. And finally, as the Chinese never tire of pointing out, many Western and Indian maps, including one reproduced in a book by Nehru himself, Discovery of India, have, even in recent years., shown the Sino/Indian border as running along the edge of the Assam plain in conformity with the traditional Chinese claim.

*The 1906 Convention between Britain and China (see page 95) had required China to accept responsibility for Tibet’s foreign relations. “The 1907 Anglo/Russian Convention required Britain ‘not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government”. Negotiations with the Tibetans over the McMahon Line were thus a breach of both conventions - a possible reason why the terms of the McMahon Line agreement were kept secret.

For the Communist Chinese to appear to be willing to drop their N.E.F.A. claim is no small concession in view of the very considerable doubts as to the validity of the McMahon Line. Indeed, the Nationalist Government in Taiwan feels so strongly shout the justice of the Chinese clams that its official newspapers have accused Peking of being willing to abandon “sacred” Chinese territory. They have predicted that the present Communist Chinese leaders will be condemned by future generations of Chinese for their betrayal of China’s interests. Nevertheless, the Indian position was that the Chinese should not only drop their claim to the N.E.F.A. but to the Aksai Chin also. How strong is the Indian claim in the western sector of the disputed frontier? The province of Ladakh, which lies on the Indian side of the disputed western sector, was originally a semi-independent state with a complex tributary relationship with Tibet. It was far from being clearly defined Indian territory. These links with Tibet were severed as a result of the 1841 invasion of Tibet from Kashmir, and Ladakh was incorporated into India. In the agreement which followed the invasion, the Ladakh/Tibet border was defined simply as following “the old established frontier”, and it was only subsequently that British cartographers decided where this frontier should lie. A small area lying between the Chinese-claimed and Indian-claimed frontiers is in dispute. By far the larger area in dispute, the Aksai Chin, lies for the most part north of the Ladakh/Tibet frontier, and its ownership depends on a definition of the Ladakh/Sinkiang border. At the end of the nineteenth century, the British decided an effort should be made to define this border, and in 1899 a note was delivered to the Chinese suggesting a possible alignment. This alignment is shown on the map above, and it will be seen that it leaves with China much of the territory at present in dispute. The Chinese never replied to the note. Shortly afterwards, the British attitude changed. Alarmed by growing Chinese weakness in Central Asia, and fearing Russian expansion into the area (fears similar to those being entertained in connection with Tibet), the British felt they should establish the border as far north as possible to forestall any southward advance by the Russians. British maps began to show the border as lying far to the north along the Kun Lun mountains. Chinese agreement was never sought for this claimed border (despite the fact that the British recognised Chinese sovereignty in Sinkiang) ; presumably it was only being put forward as an emergency measure in case the Russians attempted to seize Sinkiang. By the 1920’s the Russian threat had disappeared, and it was deemed safe to drop this particular claim. In subsequent years, British and Indian maps showed a variety of claim lines some coinciding with the present Chinese claim line, some the claim line along the Kun Lun mountains, and some an in-between claim line which ran south of the Kun Lun mountains but which included the Aksai Chin as Indian territory. Maps showing this last claim line were in general use at the time of the 1947 transfer of power, and appear to constitute the basis of the present Indian claim to the Aksai Chin. However, the only border to have ever been officially proposed to the Chinese by the British in this area was that of 1899, and, as already mentioned, this border left most of the Aksai Chin with China. Whatever the merits of rival Chinese and Indian claims to the Aksai Chin area, it does seem clear that the Indians can hardly speak of the frontier they claim in this area as being already defined by history and therefore subject only to demarcation. In this connection a rather curious aspect of the Indian position should be mentioned - an aspect which has been overlooked by most students of the Sino/Indian dispute. Numerous Indian authorities, including Nehru himself, have claimed historical validity for their version of the Indian! Sinkiang frontier on the ground that the line proposed by the British in 1899 “ran along the Kun Lun range to a point east of 80° longitude, where it met the eastern boundary of Ladakh”. In fact, the 1899 line ran well to the south of the Kun Lun mountains, and the text of the proposal speaks only of the tine meeting “the spur running south from the Kun Lun range, which [the spur] has hitherto been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a little east of 80° east longitude”.* A misquotation of these dimensions is rather serious, particularly when it is used to justify an official claim to some 30,000 square kilometres of territory, and when, on the basis of this claim, negotiations are refused in favour of a military solution of a complex border dispute.

*The only observer who appears to have noted this misquotation is Alastair Lamb. In his book, The China-India Border, he gives the full text of the British note of 1899 and lists some of the Indian authorities who have misquoted the 1899 proposal. Distribution of his book within India has been banned.

It would seem, therefore, that an impartial observer who takes into account not only the historical background of the border dispute, but also the equally relevant criteria of geography and administrative control, would agree that the Chinese are not being unreasonable when they call for border negotiations on the basis of the present status quo. If, as seems to be the case, the Chinese are prepared to do a N.E.F.A./Aksai Chin exchange leaving India in control of far the largest and most valuable of the territories in dispute, he may even feel that the Chinese are being quite generous. And if our impartial observer were to reach such a conclusion, it seems highly likely that the Chinese would be convinced of the reasonableness of their position and the unreasonableness of the Indian demand for a unilateral Chinese withdrawal from the Aksai Chin. If the Chinese were in fact convinced that they were in the right over the border dispute, they would in all probability have interpreted the Indian military build-up along the disputed border in 1961-2 as evidence of active hostility. Striking confirmation that this was the case is contained in the “Tibetan Documents” - official Chinese documents which were captured by Tibetan rebels in 1961 and which subsequently found their way to the U.S., where they have been translated and published. These documents were intended as background briefing to senior Chinese military commanders stationed along the Sino/ Indian border. As such, their contents cannot be dismissed simply as propaganda. The documents warned of U.S./Indian collusion to build up pressure along the Tibetan frontier as a prelude to a joint attack against Tibet. Military commanders were instructed to observe strictly the twenty-kilometre troop withdrawal from the line of actual control and to avoid clashes with advancing Indian patrols since this would provide the “imperialists” with the pretext they needed to justify their planned attack.*

*This instruction, incidentally, could explain why in the months before October 1962 the Chinese took no military action to prevent the incursions of Indian patrols along the western sector. The Chinese attack of October 20 could thus he interpreted in much the same terms as the 1950 Korean intervention, as a carefully considered resort to force to deter a feared enemy from further advance, taken only after repeated warnings had failed to deter his advance.

Were the Indians themselves convinced of the reasonableness of their position? To understand the Indian position we need to take account of the intense nationalism which underlies Indian politics. Even before 1959 Nehru was being strongly criticised for his apparent refusal to take a hard line with the Chinese over Tibet and the disputed border. After 1959, Nehru may have felt that he had no choice but to take an uncompromising stand towards China if he was to prevent the Indian Right-Wing from exploiting nationalist passions which had been aroused throughout the country. In addition, he had himself suffered a serious blow to his own prestige. Thus it is possible to conclude that Indian behaviour throughout 1961-2 was influenced by a sense of wounded nationalism and wounded pride, which in turn were a reaction to the events of 1950. If, in fact, we can assume that Indian behaviour was emotionally based, we have a ready explanation of its seemingly unnecessary rigidity. To observers of Sino/Indian relations in the period prior to October 1962 (of which the author was one), it seemed highly likely that the Indian policy of military pressure along the disputed border, together with intransigence over the Aksai Chin and the Dho La strip, would inevitably provoke a Chinese military response in which the Indians could be the only losers. That Nehru and his advisers had seriously misassessed the probable Chinese reaction to Indian policies and that this misassessment was at least partly a result of the emotional manner in which they had reacted to previous events, has been recently confirmed The former Commander of Indian Military Forces in the N.E.F.A., Lieutenant-General B. M. Kaul, in a book entitled The Untold Story and published in 1966, has given some of the background to events of 1962. Kaul states that Nehru believed the revolt in Tibet indicated a “break in the morale of the Chinese people and armed forces and that if India dealt with the Chinese it would get the better of them”. *¹⁰ Kaul also states that the Indian Government decision to move against the Chinese in the Dho La strip was made on September 22, and by way of explanation adds: “Nehru and his Government were deeply concerned about public opinion which was worked up at the time”. The decision was queried by the Army Chief, General Thapar, who on October 2 warned that the use of force against the Chinese was bound to have serious repercussions. Nehru assured Thapar that “he had good reasons to believe the Chinese would not take any strong action against us”. Kaul adds that on October 11, nine days before the Chinese attack of October 20, he made an unsuccessful approach to the Government to establish “whether I should launch an attack on the Chinese despite their superiority and the possibility of a reverse”. What conclusion can be drawn from all this? Our original aim was to find out whether China had in fact followed a policy of active hostility towards India. If we accept that both sides appear to have been reacting defensively - the Chinese out of undue sensitivity over Tibet and fear of “imperialist” designs against their territory, the Indians out of a sense of wounded pride and nationalism - then it would seem that neither side has taken the initiative to promote hostility: that both sides would have preferred good relations. That both sides would in fact have preferred good relations seems clear from the record of Sino/Indian relations up until 1959. Little of this has been accepted in the West, where China is widely condemned as the aggressive party in the dispute. Explanations for Chinese behaviour range widely. The fact of Chinese withdrawal from the N.E.F.A. following defeat of the Indian forces there has not discouraged those who favour the “expansionist China” explanation. Others see the Chinese as wanting (a) to drive India into a pro-Western alignment in order to destroy her non-aligned image, despite the fact that a pro-Western Government on China’s southern border means an increased danger to Chinese security, (b) to retard Indian economic growth which was said to be outstripping the Chinese rate of growth, despite the fact it costs China far more than India to maintain troops in the Himalayas and that foreign aid to India has sharply increased since 1962, (c) to overthrow Nehru’s Government and replace it with a pro Chinese Government, despite the fact that the 1962 conflict was used as grounds for the imprisonment of the pro-Chinese communist opposition in India; and so on. If one consistent feature emerges from this catalogue of misunderstanding it is the Western refusal to examine impartially the Chinese case in a dispute involving relations with another country. But that is the subject of another chapter.

REFERENCES

1. Most of the correspondence between the Chinese and Indians from from 1950 onwards has been published in a series of Indian Government White Papers, and it is from this source that many of the quotations etc.., which appear in this chapter have been drawn For background to the territorial dispute, the reader is recommended to Alastair Lamb’s The China-India Border (1964). 2. Letter from Nehru to Chou En-lai of December 52, 1958, recounting conversations held in October 1954. 3. Ibid. 4. George N. Patterson, “Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and Towards the Himalayan Border States”, The China Quarterly, October December, 1962, and “The Himalayan Frontier”, Survival, September 1963. 5. “The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy”, Peoples Daily, May 6, 1959. 6. Letter from Nehru to Chou En-lai, September 26, 1959. 7. See The Chinese Threat (1963), Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi. 8. Tibet and its History,. op.cit., p. 174. 9. Peking versus Delhi, op.cit., p. 174. 10. See review of Kaul’s book in The Hindu Weekly Review, January 10, 1967.

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Tibet, China, India: The Lies, Myths and the Facts

26. May 2010 by admin.

Tibet, China, India: The Lies and the Facts

The Dalai Lama is a wonderful chap. He is wise and full of good humour and has led a peaceful resistance movement for half a century. His antagonist, the Chinese government, is hard to sympathise with. The regime has committed gross crimes in the past and continues to deny its citizens certain basic human rights. It is not surprising, then, that the Dalai Lama’s cause finds favour across the globe. The demand for Tibetan independence, unfortunately, is backed by arguments that twist history, misinform the public and are on occasion willfully deceptive.

Greater Tibet

Take a close look at this image. It is the map of Tibet according to the Tibetan government-in-exile based in Dharamsala. This is the area that the organisation led by Tenzin Gyatso, the current Dalai Lama, wants to liberate from Chinese rule.

The map will mean little even to most who actively proselytise the cause of Tibetan independence, so let me explain its implications. The area which is generally known to the world as Tibet is the bit in yellow, the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The other provinces on the map never had Tibetan majorities and were never under Tibetan rule apart from a brief period when Tibet became an imperial power, and controlled, also, a large swathe of areas now within the Indian republic. It is absurd for the Tibetan government-in-exile to claim that all of these regions, which constitute together a fourth of the total area of the People’s Republic of China, belong in an independent Tibetan state. Is it any wonder that the Chinese government looks upon the Dalai Lama not as a holy man desirous of gaining autonomy for his province but as a dangerous secessionist?

Tibet as an independent nation

“As recently as 1914, a peace convention was signed by Britain, China and Tibet that again formally recognised Tibet as a fully independent country.”

The sentence I have quoted is from the introduction (http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=6&rmenuid=8) to Tibet’s history on the government-in-exile’s website. It is an outright lie, and the fact that the Dalai Lama has done nothing to alter it in all these years makes me think less of him. Media reports favourable to the separatist cause invariably quote the 1914 treaty as ground for considering Tibet a once-independent state.

Before 1914, all agreements regarding Tibet’s boundaries were signed between Britain and the Qing emperor, proving that Britain did not consider Tibet an independent nation. In 1914, when the Qing empire had crumbled, a conclave was held in Simla between representatives of British India, Tibet and the weak new Chinese government. The final draft agreement provided for Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, and marked boundaries between China, Outer Tibet (more or less what is today the Tibetan Autonomous Region) and British India.

The first lie Tibetan activists tell, then, is that the treaty defined Tibet as a “fully independent country”. The 1914 document cannot possibly be interpreted to mean any such thing, containing as it does the sentence, “Tibet forms part of Chinese territory”. The Chinese envoy, moreover, rejected the draft. The second lie in the government-in-exile’s statement is that all three parties signed on to the deal.In 1914, Britain had an extant agreement with Russia, which included a commitment that all agreements about Tibet would be signed with China. Since the Chinese did not sign the Simla agreement, London believed it contravened the Anglo-Russian pact. As a result, Britain itself did not publish the accord as an official document till the Anglo-Russian treaty ended in 1938. The basis of Tibet’s claim to independence, then, rests on an agreement that did not offer Tibet sovereignty, was not signed by China, and rejected for decades by the very power that drafted it, Britain.

Arunachal Pradesh

The recent diplomatic spat between China and India was sparked by the Dalai Lama’s trip to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, an area China has never accepted as a settled part of India. Tawang has an interesting history. The boundaries drawn by the British in the late 19th century placed all of Arunachal in Tibet. Later on, British India moved north, but Tawang stayed a part of Tibet. Only in the 1914 agreement was the boundary of British India shifted further to swallow up Tawang. China, remember, never signed on to the agreement. The dispute over boundaries was central to its refusal to sign. The man who drafted the accord was Lieutenant-Colonel Henry McMahon, and the boundary he drew is called the McMahon line. It was a classic colonial land grab. Unfortunately, after 1950, the independent republic of India, which repudiated similar land grabs where they were found inconvenient, took the position that McMahon’s border was the settled international boundary between India and China.China was willing to talk the issue through, but after India gave the Dalai Lama asylum in 1959, relations between the nations soured, eventually leading the Chinese to undertake a land grab of their own. During the 1962 war, Chinese forces overran Arunachal, and India’s military fled pretty much all the way to Calcutta. Afterwards, however, China voluntarily withdrew from almost all the areas it occupied, including Tawang.

In an impassioned editorial page article in the Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/The-Moral-Defence-Rests/articleshow/5216162.cms), the activist Tenzin Tsundue wrote, “For India to keep Arunachal, based on the McMahon Line, the only choice is to recognise Tibet’s independence. It cannot legitimise the McMahon Line border otherwise.” His argument is that, while McMahon’s boundary is unjust (Tawang ought really to be in Tibet), the 1914 accord, signed by the 13th Dalai Lama’s envoy, commits any future Tibetan government to respect that border, something China will never do.

I believe the opposite is true. The current Chinese regime is open to a final settlement of the international border with minor adjustments. Their forces have had control of Tawang in the past and withdrawn. India is helped by the fact that the citizens of Arunachal Pradesh have no great love for China. The situation would change radically if Tibet became a sovereign republic. Historically, geographically, culturally, linguistically, Tawang is closer to Lhasa than to Delhi. Instantly, secessionist movements would arise in Arunachal and Sikkim demanding to be part of the newly created Tibetan nation. At that point, a number of Tibetan officials would doubtless discover that the 1914 accord was, in fact, imposed by a brutal colonial regime, and must therefore be rejected.

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A Brief History of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the role of Tibet

23. May 2010 by admin.

A Brief History of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the role of Tibet

Written by Maitreya Bhakal on Friday, March 26th, 2010

On 3rd July 1914, as Ivan Chen made his way down the steps of the Summit Hall building in Simla, he must have been aware of mixed feelings rising up inside him. He had done something which would have far reaching repercussions; and which would for years be remembered by many people on both sides of the Sino-Indian border, albeit in very different ways – He had just left the Simla conference. After refusing to sign the agreement himself, he was made to sit in a separate room, and behind his back, was signed one of the most controversial and bizarre treaties in human history – The Simla accord.

For over a century, the intricacies of the border between India and China/Tibet have baffled scholars. In fact, the plot leading to the Simla conference and beyond actually plays just like a thriller movie or book. The sheer complexity of this problem can be judged by the fact that 36 rounds of negotiations have taken place between India and China at different levels since 1981; but they have yet to reach a settlement.

Background

The era of the late 19th century and the early 20th century was ripe with the European colonial powers finding new ways of exerting their influence in Asia and dividing it up.Tibet was no exception. For years, many kings and empires, from Muhammad Tukluq to the British, had tried to wrench Tibet from China, with no significant successes.Finally, the British came up with an underhand ploy to divide Tibet from within; so as to create a buffer state between British India and China; just as Mongolia had been divided and part of it made into a buffer between Russia and China. Sir Henry McMahon proposed the division of Tibet into an ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ Tibet.

The Chinese representative saw through British imperial designs and smelt a rat; and thus left the Simla conference. But the matter didn’t end there. A note was appended to the Simla accord, which contained a map showing a part of Tibetan territory as Indian, based on a thick red line known as the McMahon line. Furthermore, China was barred from any rights and privileges of the Accord with respect to Tibet.

Disputed Territories

The major territories which are disputed between these two countries can be divided into two distinct parts:

1) The Western Sector – Aksai Chin, which lies to the east of the Kashmir valley, covering an area of about 37,250 sq.km (14,380 sq.mi) – currently occupied by China.

2) The Eastern Sector – The Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China calls South Tibet, covering an area of 83,743 sq.km (32,333 sq.mi) – currently occupied by India.

In addition to these, there are also a few small chunks of territory in between these two sectors, but they are largely irrelevant when compared to these two major distinct territories.

The McMahon Line

The McMahon line is the basis of the Indian claim to the area which was formerly known as the North-East Frontier Agency; and has since become the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. It was drawn with a complete disregard forcartographic techniques and the geography of the area. The scale was – eight miles to an inch.As Wikipedia makes clear, “The actual treaty map itself is topographically vague (as the treaty was not accompanied with demarcation), and the treaty includes no verbal description of geographic features nor description of the highest ridges.” There is no protocol or scientific method which uses cartographic techniques to identify the geographical location of the line. The McMahon line was literally a line on paper.

Aksai Chin

Historical claims on the Aksai China area are even more dubious. There has never been any concrete demarcation of this region.Britain was concerned about Russia’s designs in this area, and hence proposed to make the Karakorum Pass as the boundary, so as to again create a buffer between Xinjiang/China and India.As author Neville Maxwell states,

“In early 1880s, China and India agreed the Karakoram Pass as the fixed point of boundary, while leaving both sides of the pass indefinite. In the mid-1890s, China claimed Aksai Chin as its territory, and voiced the claim to Macartney in 1896, who drew part of the British boundary in the Himalayas. Macartney presented the claim to the British who agreed with his comment that part of Aksai Chin was in China and part in the British territory. Meanwhile, the forward school of British strategist in London suggested that the British should not only include the whole of Aksai Chin, but also all the territory given to Kashmir in 1865.”

In 1899, the British proposed to China that the whole of Aksai Chin would remain Chinese territory and the boundary would be along the Karakorum range; which is the status quo as of today. The Karakorum pass falls precisely on the boundary of territory controlled by India and China, marking northern end of Sino – Indian border, known as the Line of Actual Control.

However, China didn’t reply to this proposal, something which it would regret for years. If it had, the fate of Aksai Chin would have been sealed then and there. Nehru, for his part, appeared willing to play down the Indian claims to the Aksai Chin. He tried to delay disclosure if the news that the Chinese had built a road in the area. After the news had been revealed, he sought to play down the economic significance of the area, describing it as “barren tundra” and where “not even a blade of grass grows”. He even went so far as to cast doubt on the validity of the Indian claim to Aksai Chin. In statements to the Indian Parliament during early 1959, Nehru pointed out that

“…during British rule, this area was neither inhabited: nor were there any outposts, …….this place, Aksai Chin area, is distinguished completely from other areas. It is a matter for argument which part belongs to us and which part belongs to somebody else. It is not clear”.

Britain’s Flip-Flops

Around that time, it was understood by the British government that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory. According to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, both players of the so called ‘Great Game’, Britain and Russia, had decided to negotiate with Tibet only through China. According to the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, Britain was “not to annex Tibetan territory”. British Journalist Neville Maxwell states that McMahon had been instructed not to sign bilaterally with the Tibetans if China refused. But that was exactly what McMahon did, previous promises be damned. Britain and Tibet signed the agreement themselves without Chinese knowledge, and was thus rejected at first by the British government in London. (Later however, its stance seems to have changed; and then changed again in 2008, as discussed below).

Tibet welcomed this treaty because it would give further credence to what it thought was its ‘sovereignty’, even if it came at the cost of territory. Accordingly, the purpose and content of these exchanges had to be kept secret, and not only from the Chinese. Britain seems to have taken upon itself the self-appointed role of Tibet’s Guardian. In the 1940s, British officials in India pointed out to Anthony Eden, the then British Foreign Secretary, that China had no rights in Tibet since it had not accepted the provisions of the Simla accord of 1914 (As if it was up to Britain to decide the extent of China’s ‘right’ to Tibet!). Needless to say, the Tibetan government welcomed these intrusions. Initially, London rejected the Simla accord as it was in contradiction with many previous agreements. But later, in 1935, some hardliners within the government convinced it to start using the line on official maps – thus officially accepting that the McMahon line was the official border between India and Tibet (and hence, later China too). But recently in 2008, a historical statement was released by the British Foreign Office which would have far reaching consequences.

The British government discarded the Simla agreement as an anachronism and a colonial legacy – a “position [the British] took based on the geo-politics of the time”. The British pulled away the only leg India had to stand on. The statement says,

“…….our position is unusual for one reason of history that has been imported into the present: the anachronism of our formal position on whether Tibet is part of China, and whether in fact we harbour continued designs to see the break up of China. We do not.”

“Our ability to get our points across has sometimes been clouded by the position the UK took at the start of the 20th century on the status of Tibet, a position based on the geo-politics of the time. Our recognition of China’s “special position” in Tibet developed from the outdated concept of suzerainty. “ (A New York Times article about this statement, entitled, ‘Did Britain just sell Tibet?’ (as if Britain owned it!) accused the British of ‘rewriting history’ in exchange for China’s support during the financial crisis!)

Effectively, what Britain in fact was saying was that Tibet is a part of China and is not sovereign – which was the position of almost all countries by that time, including EU nations and the US. It even apologized for not having done so earlier. However, what is important in that statement is that the British seem to have completely discarded the Simla agreement – on which the whole of India’s negotiating stance is based. Consequently, if we start with the assumption that the Simla agreement was illegal as Tibet had no right to conclude treaties separately, then we arrive at what the Chinese position has been all along!

The Tibetan question and the cause of the dispute

The fact is that a large part of the border dispute hinges on the uncomfortable question of Tibet’s sovereignty. If Tibet was sovereign at the time of the Simla conference, then the treaty is legal and it serves India’s cause. If Tibet was not sovereign at that time, then the treaty is illegal and serves China’s cause. Some activists campaigning for a free Tibet often bring up the Simla conference as proof of Tibet’s independence.

Their arguments are mainly two fold -

a)The Tibetan representative signed the treaty even though he was instructed by the Chinese representative not to sign, a clear indication undermining Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

b) More importantly, since Tibet concluded a treaty with a foreign power on its own, it was an independent country on that day. At the time of the Simla conference, although the Tibetan government had driven out all Chinese officials from Tibet after the collapse of the Qing dynasty and declared independence, the Nationalist government did not accept this and neither has the PRC or any other government.

India had enjoyed certain privileges with regard to Tibet under the Simla Agreement, including those regarding trade and commerce. If the Simla accord is legal, then it serves India’s cause; and if it is illegal, China’s. However, when China annexed Tibet in 1951, India under Nehru recognized it as Chinese territory, thus giving up those privileges and undermining Tibet’s sovereignty (which it may have momentarily enjoyed during the time of the Simla agreement). Thus in a sense the Indian government tacitly admitted that the Simla agreement was effectively illegal, which to this day remains China’s official position. In doing so, India weakened its own position with respect to the border dispute. The Simla agreement was signed between Britain, Tibet and China. Now, from this information, two questions present themselves -

1) If Tibet was sovereign, why was China invited at the conference at all? Why didn’t the British negotiate directly with Tibet?

2) If Tibet was not sovereign, why was it invited at the conference? Why didn’t the British negotiate directly with China?

In other words, why did China accept to attend a conference where Tibet was represented as a separate party? The answer to (1) is that, as stated above, Britain recognised Tibet to be under Chinese suzerainty. Hence, anybilateral agreement that Britain signed with Tibet (without Chinese agreement) would be illegal. (But ironically, that is exactly what the British did)(2) is a bit more complicated. There are indications that the British had blackmailed the Chinese into attending by threatening to – a) withdraw their recognition of the new nationalist government, and,b) sign the treaty with Tibet alone if China didn’t participate, thus acknowledging that Tibet was in fact sovereign. (But later the British did this exact same thing when China didn’t agree to its terms during the conference). Hence it is clear that Britain’s imperial designs and its policy of ‘divide and rule’ and double crossing everyone was in effect the cause of the entire dispute.

Conclusion

Surprisingly, in this complicated dispute, China has shown a remarkable tendency to restrain its own claims and even recognize the McMahon line. It is willing to ignore history and has offered to recognize Indian claims on 74% of the total disputed territory (currently controlled by India); provided India recognizes Chinese claims on the remaining 26 % (Chinese controlled Aksai Chin). In other words, while China has taken a prudent first step and is willing to convert the current status quo ‘borders’ into the international boundary. But India, on the other hand, is just not willing to even discuss the issue of compromise. In the western sector the claim is entirely a matter of perspective, as Nehru himself admitted. In the eastern sector, however, the entire disputed territory hinges upon one question – The legality, or not, of the Simla agreement. India has had two contradictory stances simultaneously – a) Not recognizing Tibet’s sovereignty and b) Recognizing the McMahon line as the international boundary; and thus the legality of the Simla agreement. However, if a country doesn’t recognize Tibet’s sovereignty, then consequently it is expected that it would also not recognize the legality of the Simla agreement and the McMahon line. The Indian position can also be construed to mean that regardless of whether or not Tibet is sovereign now , it wassovereign when the Simla agreement was signed; and consequently the McMahon line is legal.

Which begs the question on which the whole dispute in the eastern sector is based – Does signing a bilateral treaty with a foreign power make a province sovereign?

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Is War Around the Corner?

22. May 2010 by admin.

“Is war around the corner?”

By Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh

Originally Posted on 1st Jan, 2010

A few month’s back, Bharat Verma, Editor of the Indian Defence Review, in an article, had predicted that China may attack India by 2012. Frankly, at that time, I did not agree with this prophecy, because in my opinion China would not want a war till it becomes a true super power by 2050,and in any case the Chinese, in my opinion, would only go to war, if they had a 100 percent chance of success. Also China has now become India’s leading trade partner, and common sense dictates that good economic relations are a logical antidote against war. Finally, in the event of war in the next five years, the Indian Navy would be in a position to wreck havoc with China’s oil tankers, ferrying homewards, the Middle East oil, through the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombak straits. The IAF, too would be utilised, and the Chinese”cake walk” of 1962, would not be possible.

However, two recent events have caused me to rethink, though I still feel that an Indo–China war is not likely, specially if India urgently reverses the current decline in its defence capability. The first event was the recent early September 2009 Chinese firing across the LAC (the first since 1986, and the first since the 1996 “no firing agreement”), in Kerang (northern Sikkim) where two ITBF jawans were reportedly injured (this report has been denied by the Indian Foreign Ministry). The second event was the firing on 12 September 2009, of five 107 mm rockets, by the Pakistan based Lashkar e Toiba (LeT), across the international border at Indian villages near Amritsar. Are these two firing incidents linked, coming as they do on the background of very disturbing reports of border incursions by our two hostile nuclear armed neighbours? While the Pakistani terrorist based actions are not new, the Chinese activities, sound similar to the ominous activities prior to the disastrous 1962 war.

Another serious mistake we are making is assumimg that the United States will pull our chestnuts out of the fire, by deterring China and pressurising Pakistan. While our broad national interests do generally appear to coincide with Washington, we must remember that no country will go to war against nuclear armed foes, unless directly threatened. Given Pakistan’s undeniable geostrategic location, we should not expect the Americans to “take out” or “neutralise” Pakistani nuclear weapons, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the terrorists. Neither should we assume that America has joint control over Pakistani nuclear weapons. It is good to have close ties with the USA, but it’s prudent not to outsource our national security to any external power.

Musharraf’s latest admission on 14 September, about Pakistan diverting American aid to beef up its defences against India, and how he ensured Pakistan’s strategic weapons programme was “speeded up”, and China’s latest border incursions, should finally clear the cobwebs from the minds of India’s leadership. Why do we continue to suffer nasty surprises at the hands of Pakistan and China. Some 47 years after 1962, India has again been repeatedly surprised by China in Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh and in Uttarakhand . About nine years after Kargill, and 15 years after the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts, India was surprised by Pakistani terrorists taking the searoute to cause a bloodbath in Mumbai on 26/11 in 2008. The fact remains that India’s lack of strategic culture has been repeatedly exposed, and its military has been required to fight under very disadvantageous conditions because our politico–bureaucratic leadership, has allowed defence preparations to fall below critical levels, while following a policy of “passive , low reactive defence” which relies more on diplomacy than military strength. Hopefully the restrictions imposed on the Indian Army not being allowed to patrol some “sensitive areas” on the Indo–China border will now be lifted before the Chinese grab more of our territory. Also hopefully, the Government will think about inducting the long delayed 155 mm artillery, and raising more mountain divisions before it’s too late.

Their should be no doubt as to why Pakistan and its terrorists will always aim to cause mayhem in two places in India, viz Mumbai and Vadinar. Mumbai (its stock market turnover is four times Pakistan’s GDP) and Vadinar port in the Gulf of Kutch (it has three refineries with 99 million tons capacity and over two million tons of fuel storage). Yes, attacking foreign tourists in Goa will gain a lot of international publicity, but Mumbai and Vadinar are India’s economic jugular, and attacking these will keep India economically hyphenated to Pakistan. Fortunately the Coast Guard’s new North West Command, for Gujarat, headquartered at Gandhinagar has become functional, and is expected to be formally inaugerated by the Defence Minister in October. Hopefully, this new Command will urgently receive additional vessels and aircraft to ensure the safety of Gujarat, including Vadinar, because nothing can be more dangerous than creating a “paper force”.

What is the second best method to attack Mumbai and Vadinar,after terrorism? The answer is cruise missiles with land attack capability, launched from ships, submarines and Maritime Patrol aircraft like the P-3C Orion. Theoretically, the 120 km range, Harpoon anti-ship missile with a 250 kg warhead fits the bill perfectly for Pakistan as an interim system, while its ratcheting up the production of its larger Chinese gifted, 500 km range Babur cruise missiles to build an estimated stockpile of 450. The long term aim of the Pakistani Babur cruise missiles (these can be delivered by fighter or Maritime Patrol aircraft to extend their range) is to counter India’s over publicised Ballastic Missile Defence System (BMDS) and give Pakistan a “cheap”, massive first strike capabilty which may overwhelm India’s nuclear retaliation capabilty. Right now, Pakistan’s nuclear capability is designed to counter India’s superior conventional military power, but the Babur cruise missile along with new miniaturized plutonium warheads, will put Pakistan in a different league altogether.

The newer versions of the Harpoon, which Pakistan is hoping to acquire from the USA, already has a secondary land attack capability built in. What it has now apparently tested a few months back is the older anti-ship Harpoon, (about three dozen of these were acquired from the USA in the Reagan era). Given todays miniaturised Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and Global Positioning Systems (GPS), any missile specialist should be able to convert the vintage anti-ship Harpoon to a land attack capable missile with reasonably accurate chances of hitting the Oil refineries at Vadinar and the various installations in Mumbai port. The only problem would be how to replace the 250 kg conventional warhead in the 53 centimetre diameter cylnderical Harpoon missile with a plutonium miniature nuclear warhead. Most Indian scientists will tell you that it is impossible for Pakistan to achieve this. In my opinion India should expect China to transfer the technology of a proven miniaturised nuclear weapon which would fit the larger Babur, and possibly the Harpoon cruise missiles.

What are the launch platforms for the modified land attack Harpoon missile ? The answer is simple. The two older French built Agosta 70 submarines and the half a dozen American P-3C Orion aircraft are the ideal launch platforms. The missile has sufficient standoff range to hit Vadinar and Mumbai.

Global experts believe that “low tech” nuclear powers would need 8 kg of Plutonium 239 (PU 239) to make a bomb, while “medium tech” powers would need about five kgs, and “hi-tech” powers (including China) would need 3 kg of PU 239.The media has given enough details of the new Khusab 2 and 3 reactors , which will be expected to produce about 15 to 30 kg of Plutonium for 3 to 10 miniaturised nuclear weapons per year to Pakistan. Latest media reports indicate that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons stockpile has now grown from 70 to 90. I have no idea about India’s nuclear weapons stocks, and am uncertain about how many Agni type missiles India can produce per year. China will take Indian deterrence seriously only after we induct the 5000 km Agni 5. The recent controversy about the 1998 thermonuclear tests “fizzzle” has not cleared the air. I am not a nuclear weapons designer, but as a nuclear specialist, it is my opinion that lots of luck would be needed to get a complex thermonuclear prototype device to function properly the first time, and even if it did, it would need atleast two more successful, confirmatory tests in a rugged militarised form. Detterence works best, when it’s based on hard realty, and not ambigious discussions. Also deterrence works best when the enemy leadership is itself threatened with annihilation by a politically firm Indian Government.

The Chinese, as expected have kept the pressure on India, with the latest news of its forces violating Indian territory in Ladakh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand. Being masters of the art of long term strategic planning, the Chinese game plan is obviously to keep India tied down by the triple threats from China, Pakistan and Pakistani sponsored terrorists. India’s foreign ministry should stop justifying China’s daily incursions by talking about “the differing perceptions on the Line of Actual Control”. China will stop its incursions only when it’s deterred by India’s conventional and strategic defence capability. We will need to change our “no first use” nuclear policy, and increase our defence expenditure from the present measely 1.99 percent of the GDP to atleast three percent of the GDP.

Ofcourse, the immediate threat to India is from terrorism by land, air and sea. In August, I was pleasantly surprised to see that the normally chaotic fishing vessel traffic in Mumbai port was now more disciplined. It was also heartening to see the Navy and Coast Guard maintaining round the clock vigil from boats and helicopters. Numerous visitors, enquiring about my health, also assured me that there was now unprecedented co-ordination and co-operation between the Navy, Coast Guard, Police, Customs, Intelligence Agencies and the port authorities. The real threat from the sea will come after early October, when the monsoon subsides, and the seas become calmer for permitting small boat terrorist operations. The recent 12 September rocket attacks from Pakistan on Indian villages near Amritsar, along with terror strikes in Srinagar, are pointers that things will only get worse, unless India responds firmly.

Given the decades of neglect, national security (including strategic deterrence) will need sustained funding for the next decade. The Prime Minister, while focussing on 9 percent GDP growth, and countering drought, will need to keep a very watchful eye on national security. The only insurance against any future disastrous, though unlikelym wars with China or Pakistan lies in deterrence, based on India investing heavily in conventional, counter terrorism and nuclear defence. If India fails to invest sufficiently on national security and displays palpable lack of political will, then there is a risk of minor border incidents spiralling out of control, and tensions escalating. The only danger this time, lies with Pakistan and its terrorists, also joining this unlikely doomsday scenario. We must have excellent economic and diplomatic relations with China, but we must also keep our powder dry. Our foreign policy should be backed by sufficent military power — something akin to a steel fist in a velvet glove.

January 1st, 2010.

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Unending Threats and Challenges

22. May 2010 by admin.

Unending Threats and Challenges

With a landmass of sub-continental proportions, India occupies a predominant strategic position in Southern Asia and dominates the northern Indian Ocean with a coastline that is 7,683 km long, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that is over two million square km in size. India’s land borders exceed 15,000 km which it shares with seven countries including a small segment with Afghanistan (106 km) in northern Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi (Retd) has given the following breakdown of the length of India’s land borders with its neighbours:1

Bangladesh - 4,339 km (4,351 km as per MoD2).
Bhutan - 605 km (700 km as per MoD).
China - 3,439 km (4,056 km as per MoD).
Myanmar - 1,425 km (1,643 km as per MoD).
Nepal - 1,690 km (1,751 km as per MoD).
Pakistan - 3,325 km (3,244 km as per MoD).

(In addition, India has a land border with Afghanistan as well. However, at present the area bordering Afghanistan falls in the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir).

Due to the proclivity of India’s neighbours to exploit India’s nation building difficulties, the country’s internal security challenges are inextricably linked with border management. Also, the challenge of coping with long-standing territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, combined with porous borders along some of the most difficult terrain in the world, has made extremely effective and efficient border management mandatory. However, in practice this has seldom been the case due to the lack of understanding of such military issues among the decision-making elite and inadequate interest in national security, particularly during the early years after independence. Despite several border wars and conflicts, India’s borders continue to be manned by a large number of military, para-military and police forces, each of which has its own ethos, and each of which reports to a different central ministry at New Delhi, with almost no real co-ordination in managing the borders.

External threats to India’s security are not the only border management issue to be dealt with at present by the national security apparatus. India’s rate of growth has far outpaced that of most of its neighbours which has generated peculiar problems like mass migrations into India. Other threats and challenges have also emerged. Dr G P Bhatnagar, former Inspector General, Border Security Force (BSF) has written that the border security scenario is marked by:3

Increased cross-border terrorism.
Infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants.
Emergence of non-state actors.
Nexus between narcotics and arms smugglers.
Illegal migrations.
Left-wing extremism.
Separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers.
Establishment of madrasas, which could result in security hazards.

Smugglers, drug-traffickers and fund-amentalist terrorists are often in league with local criminals, lower rung political leaders and police functionaries. Such a situation exacerbates the challenges of border management, making it more complex for the border guarding agencies. It is axiomatic that poor border management inevitably leads to a volatile internal security situation in the border states of the country. The employment of multiple forces results in problems of command and control as well as the lack of accountability for encroachments, poor intelligence and inept handling of local sensitivities.

Manning the Line of Actual Control with China

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China offers an illustrative example of the lack of co-ordination in border management. The western sector of the LAC in Ladakh and Himachal Pradesh and the central sector along the Uttrakhand border are manned by some Vikas battalions of the Special Frontier Force that reports to the Cabinet Secretariat and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police that is a Ministry of Home Affairs police force, respectively. Infantry battalions of the Indian Army man the Sikkim border and units of the Assam Rifles (AR) man the Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram borders. The AR is a para-military force under the Ministry of Home Affairs that is officered mostly by regular army officers. Its battalions have been placed under ‘operational control’ of local army formation commanders. Though the responsibility is that of the army, the AR battalions given to the army for border manning operations are not directly under its command. This arrangement is not conducive to fostering a professional relationship between the commanders and their subordinates.

Operationally, the Northern and Western Commands are responsible for military operations along the LAC in portions of the Western Sector. The Middle Sector on the Uttrakahnd border is under the operational jurisdiction of the Central Command, while the Eastern Sector along the Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh borders comes under the operational control of Eastern Command.4 On the other hand, on the Tibetan side, the entire LAC is managed by Border Guards divisions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under a single PLA commander of the Tibet Autonomous Region.

The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement signed with the Chinese in 1993, and the agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field signed in 1996, were expected to reduce the operational commitments of the army from having to permanently man the difficult LAC with China. However, contrary to the usual assertion of the Ministry of External Affairs, it has not been possible to withdraw a single soldier from the border with China so far. In fact, despite the 1996 agreement on Military CBMs, several incidents of Chinese intrusions at Asaphi La and elsewhere in Arunachal Pradesh have been reported in the press and have been discussed in the Parliament. While no violent incident has taken place in the recent past, there have been occasions when Indian and Chinese patrols have met face-to-face in areas like the two “fish-tail” shaped protrusions in the north-east corner of Arunachal Pradesh.5 The patrol commanders on both the sides generally limit their inter-action to telling each other that the other side’s patrol is deep inside their territory and that such a violation should not be repeated. However, such meetings have an element of tension built into them and despite the best of training the possibility of an armed clash can never be ruled out.

In the western sector in Ladakh, the lie of the LAC is even more ambiguous because of several “claim lines” and due to the paucity of easily recognisable terrain features on the Aksai Chin plateau. This makes it difficult to accurately co-relate ground and map, except in the area of the Karakoram Pass, which lies on the high Karakoram Range. Both the sides habitually send patrols up to the point at which, in their perception, the LAC runs. These patrols leave “tell-tale” signs behind in the form of burjis (piles of stones), biscuit and cigarette packets and other similar markers in a sort of primitive ritual to lay stake to territory and assert their claim. Again, while no clashes have actually occurred, Indian patrols have occasionally sighted Chinese patrols observing them from a discreet distance and “shadowing” them when they move parallel to the LAC.

These issues are debated during the meetings of the China Study Group that is jointly chaired by the Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) and the Foreign Secretary. While the MEA invariably advises caution, it is extremely difficult for commanders of troops to advocate a soft line to their subordinates. There is an inherent contradiction in sending soldiers to patrol what they are told and believe are Indian areas and then tell them that they must not under any circumstances fire on “intruding” Chinese soldiers. This is the reason why it is operationally critical to demarcate the LAC on the map and the ground after joint physical surveys. Once that is done, tall pylons or pillars that can survive the ravages of weather, can be put up about one to two kilometres apart without prejudice to the position of either side on their respective claim lines. Also, the inadequacy of recognisable terrain features can be overcome by exploiting GPS technology to accurately navigate up to the agreed and well-defined LAC on the ground and avoid transgressing it even unintentionally.

In this light, the Chinese intransigence in exchanging maps showing the alignment of the LAC in the western and eastern sectors, while talking of lofty guiding principles and parameters and a “framework” to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute is neither understandable nor condonable. It can only be classified as another attempt to put off a solution to the dispute “for future generations to resolve”, as Deng Xiao Ping had famously told Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. In other words, the dispute is to be resolved at a time when it is convenient to the Chinese and when they are in a much stronger position in terms of comprehensive national strength so that they can dictate terms and get away with it. At present, it is the Taiwan issue that is at the forefront of Chinese strategic thinking and Chinese belligerence on re-unification is there for the entire world to see. After the reunification of Taiwan, China is bound to turn its gaze southwards towards India and will be able to dictate terms from a position of military strength.

The Western and Other Borders

In the west, the entire border with Pakistan is manned by the BSF except the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The LoC is the responsibility of the army with some BSF battalions placed under its operational control. Since the LoC has been mostly active on a daily basis, particularly since the early 1990s, this is a good arrangement. On the LoC, the primary operational responsibility is to ensure its physical integrity against encroachment by the Pakistan Army. The army’s secondary responsibility is to minimise trans-LoC infiltration by armed mercenary terrorists usually aided and abetted by the Pakistan Army and the ISI. For over 50 years since the Kashmir conflict began in 1947-48, soon after independence, the two armies were engaged in a so-called ‘eyeball-to-eyeball’ confrontation with daily loss of life and property that could justifiably be called a ‘low intensity limited war’. An informal cease-fire has been in place all along the LoC, including at the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) along the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier, since November 25, 2003. Though the LoC is no longer ‘live’ as small arms fire, machine gun and mortar fire have almost completely stopped, infiltration from POK continues at reduced rates.

The border with Nepal was virtually un-attended till very recently as Nepalese citizens have free access to live and work in India under a 1950 treaty between the two countries. Since the eruption of a Maoist insurgency in Nepal efforts have been made to gradually step up vigilance along this border as India fears the southward spread of Maoist ideology. The responsibility for this has been entrusted to the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), erstwhile Special Security Bureau. The Cabinet Secretariat had exercised direct operational control over the SSB till 2003, but the force is now a Ministry of Home Affairs force. Along the Bangladesh border that has seen active action in recent years, the BSF is in charge. This border remains in the news as there are frequent clashes between the BSF and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) over encroachments, enclaves and adverse possessions. For the Bhutan border, the BSF shares the responsibility with the SSB. Since the Royal Bhutanese Army drove out the Bodo and ULFA insurgents from its territory some years ago, the border has been relatively quiet, but there is a need to ensure that such groups do not again create sanctuaries for themselves in Bhutan. The border with Myanmar also remains operationally active. Several insurgent groups have secured sanctuaries for themselves in Myanmar despite the co-operation extended by the Myanmarese army. The cross border movement of Nagas and Mizos for training, purchase of arms and shelter when pursued by Indian security forces, combined with the difficult terrain obtaining in the area, makes this border extremely challenging to manage. This border is manned jointly by the army and some units of the AR.

India’s border with Bangladesh has a peculiar problem of ‘Enclaves and Adverse Possessions’. “There are 111 Indian enclaves (17,158 acres) within Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (7,110.02 acres) in India.”6 Thirty-four tracts of Indian land are under the adverse possession of Bangladesh and 40 pieces of Bangladeshi land are in India’s adverse possession. Though the Land Border Agreement of 1974 has provisions for the settlement of the issue of adverse possession, it has not been implemented so far as the problem is politically sensitive. The border guarding forces are left to deal with the day-to-day problems that are bound to be thrown up by such territorial complexities. Unless the political leadership invests time and effort to resolve this sensitive issue, unseemly clashes that do no credit to either side will continue to occur and spoil relations between the two countries.

Issues for better Border Management

Ideally, border management should be the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs during peacetime. However, the active nature of the LoC and the need to maintain troops close to the LAC in a state of readiness for operations in high altitude areas, have compelled the army to permanently deploy large forces for this task. While the BSF should be responsible for all settled borders, the responsibility for unsettled and disputed borders, such as the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the Indo-Tibetan border, should be that of the Indian Army. The principle of ‘single point control’ must be followed if the borders are to be effectively managed. Divided responsibilities never result in effective control. Despite sharing the responsibility with several para-military and police forces, the army’s commitment for border management amounts to six divisions along the LAC, the LoC and the AGPL (Actual Ground Position Line along the Saltoro Ridgeline west of Siachen Glacier) in J&K and five divisions along the LAC and the Myanmar border in the eastern sector.

This is a massive commitment that is costly in terms of manpower as well as funds, as the deployment areas are mostly in high altitude terrain, and needs to be reduced gradually. The real pay off of a rapprochement with the Chinese would be the possibility of reducing the army’s deployment on the LAC. To some extent, the advances in surveillance technology, particularly satellite and aerial imagery, can help to maintain a constant vigil along the LAC and make it possible to reduce physical deployment as and when modern surveillance assets can be provided on a regular basis to the formations deployed forward. Similarly, the availability of a larger number of helicopter units will enhance the quality of aerial surveillance and the ability to move troops to quickly occupy defensive positions when it becomes necessary. However, these are both costly ventures and need to be viewed in the overall context of the availability of funds for modernisation.

The deployment patterns of CPOs are marked by ad hoc decisions and knee jerk reactions to emerging threats and challenges, rather than a cohesive long-term approach that maximises the strength of each organisation. Dr. G. P. Bhatnagar has identified the following lacunae:7

Deployment of multiple forces in the same area of operations.
Lack of any doctrinal concepts.
Designed for a ‘fire fighting’ approach rather than a ‘fire prevention’ or pro-active approach.
Based on a strategy of ‘reaction and retaliation’ rather than on holistic response to a situation, resulting in stress and decision making problems at the functional level.
Wastage of energy and efforts.
Lack of co-ordination and synergy between the security management organisations.

The recent nomination of the CRPF as the national level counter-insurgency force should enable the other CPMFs like BSF and ITBP to return to their primary role of better border management, as had been recommended by the Task Force on Border Management that was constituted by the Group of Ministers (GoM) formed to review major issues pertaining to the management of national security after the Kargil conflict.8 The task force was led by Madhav Godbole, former Home Secretary and had made several far-reaching recommendations. It had recommended that all para-military forces managing unsettled borders should operate directly under the control of the army, there should be lateral induction from the army to the para-military forces so as to enhance their operational effectiveness and had suggested several perceptive measures for better intelligence coordination.9 The task force studied steps needed to improve border management and suggested measures for appropriate force structures and procedures to deal with the entry of narcotics, illegal migrants, terrorists and arms. It also examined measures to establish closer linkages with the border population to protect them from subversive propaganda to prevent unauthorised settlements and to initiate special developmental programmes.10

The recommendations of the task force were accepted by the GoM and are being implemented in phases. While some action has been taken, clearly much more needs to be done to make border management more effective. The infiltration of armed mercenary terrorists from Pakistan, mass migrations from Bangladesh into lower Assam, the smuggling of consumer goods and fake Indian currency from Nepal, the operations of ULFA militants from safe hideouts in Bhutan and the sanctuaries available to the insurgent groups of the north-eastern states in Myanmar and Bangladesh, have all added to India’s border security problems. If Pakistan implodes due to its internal weaknesses and the impact of ultra radical extremism, thousands of refugees may be expected to rush across to India for shelter and succor, much like the influx from Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1971. Effective border management is now, and should always be, a primary national security priority.

Notes

Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi (Retd.), “Changing Battlefields”, Force, August 2004, p. 50.
“National Security Environment: An Overview”, Ministry of Defence website, www.mod.nic.in.
Dr. G. P. Bhatnagar, “Border Security”, SP’s Land Forces, Vol. 2, Issue 6, 2005.
“Seal of Trouble”, Force, Vol. 1, No. 12, August 2004.
“An IB (Intelligence Bureau) report (No. DIBUO No-12) which corroborates the Chinese consolidation and LAC violation has been sent to the PMO and the home ministry… The IB report says that until last October, there were 195 successful attempts by the Chinese to violate the LAC.” Ajay Upreti, “Watch that Line: China Violates LAC and Intensifies Activities on the Border”, The Week, May 1, 2005.
n. 3.
n. 3.
Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security, mod.nic.in/newadditions/chapter-i.pdf.
P. K. Vasudeva, “Reorganising the Defence Set-up”, Tribune, November 27, 2000.
“Internal Security and Border Management”, PIB Press Release, pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2000/rjun2000/r13062000.html.

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